



































Acts of terror and increased activities in extremist milieus have stressed the need 
for developing policy to counter violent extremism (CVE) in the Nordic countries. 
In such policy, multiagency collaboration structures are given a central role in 
preventing the recruitment of youth to extremism. In this study of Nordic pol-
icies developed to counter extremism and prevent crime, we have mapped and 
compared the organization of multiagency collaboration, the practices that are to 
be utilized and the legal frameworks that support these approaches. The findings 
reveal previously unknown discrepancies, similarities and dierences between the 
Nordic countries that can help to inform a sometimes heated and polarized debate 
on how extremism is handled. By combining discourse analysis and organizational 
institutional theory, we provide a framework that conceptualizes multiagency 
collaboration structures as “hybrid spaces” where two dierent logics – a soci-
etal security logic and a social care logic – competes, mixes and co-exists. This 
framework gives some explanation to why multiagency collaboration sometimes 
evokes inter-organizational struggles and how such struggles are played out in 
work to counter violent extremism.
This report summarizes the first part of the HEX-NA project (Handling Extremism 
- Nordic Approaches) and focuses on exploring dierent levels and types of policy 
on countering violent extremism in the Nordic countries (Iceland excluded). In the 
parts that follow, perceptions of among the public and public sector professionals 
will be explored and multiagency collaborative work in practice will be studied. 
HEX-NA is a three-year research project (2018-2021) funded by Nordforsk.
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Introduction 
This report summarizes the first part of the HEX-NA project and 
focuses on exploring different levels and types of policy on countering 
violent extremism (CVE) in the Nordic countries (Iceland excluded). 
HEX-NA is the abbreviation for Handling Extremism - Nordic Approaches, 
a three-year research project (2018-2021) funded by Nordforsk under 
the call for “The underpinnings of Nordic Societal Security”1. The 
HEX-NA research team is coordinated from Center for Research on 
Extremism (C-REX) and the University of Oslo and consists of 
researchers from different disciplines affiliated with Aarhus University 
in Denmark, Turku University in Finland, Center for Resarch on 
Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo and the Police 
University College, and the Segerstedt Institute at the University of 
Gothenburg in Sweden.  
The project studies different aspects (policy, perceptions and practices) 
of multiagency approaches to handling violent extremism. Such 
collaborative work between agencies was (at the time of the project 
start) considered to be most extensively used in Denmark (SSP) and 
Norway (SLT), while somewhat less so in Finland (Ankkuri) and 
limited in Sweden (SSP[f]). Whether and how the model should be 
implemented more extensively and/or reformed to fit the CVE context 





will provide relevant input to this debate by describing and comparing 
different Nordic multiagency approaches aimed at Countering Violent 
Extremism. 
Important points of departure for studying the multiagency approaches 
within the scope of the HEX-NA project are the core tenets of the 
Nordic governance model, namely policy legitimacy and mutual trust 
between government agencies/authorities and between citizens and 
government agencies/authorities. One hypothesis is that different 
frameworks and regulations affect the possibilities for multiagency 
collaborations and for sharing information between agencies, which 
may be crucial for success. In the project as a whole, this hypothesis 
will be tested in three interconnected studies of policy, perceptions and 






This first part of the study is focused on policy concerning multiagency 
cooperation in handling extremism and has as its explicit aim to address 
the following questions: 
a) What are the similarities and differences in 
organizational structures of the SSP/SLT/ Ankkuri 
model in the four Nordic countries? What is the 
role of civil society organizations? 
b) What are the practices recommended in national 
policy documents regarding a multiagency 
approach to CVE? How are the recommended 
practices advocated? 
c) What are the possibilities and obstacles for sharing 
information posed by the legal frameworks and 
professional secrecy rules within and between 
agencies (police, schools and social services) in the 
four Nordic countries?  
In short, this part of the project has three areas of focus for which we 
will use identified policy texts addressing CVE as the data to address 
these objectives. These areas of focus are: Organizational structures, 
Recommended practices and Legal frameworks. 
Reading guidance  
In writing this report, we have attempted to make each chapter into a 
separate section that can stand by itself, meaning that readers can 
choose to focus on areas of particular interest, or read the entire report. 
Chapters 1 and 2 constitute the background to the study as they focus 
on descriptions of the research and policy field and theoretical and 
methodological points of departure. Chapter 3 surveys the 
organizational structures while Chapter 4 focuses on recommended 
practices and advocacy for using multiagency approaches for 
countering violent extremism and radicalization. In Chapter 5, the legal 
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frameworks focusing possibilities and obstacles for exchanging 
information in preventive purposes between public agencies are 
mapped.  Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of the survey, and 
thus constitutes the short version of the report. Finally, Chapter 7 
consists of remarks on the analysis and discussions of the results. This 
chapter primarily depart from a critical point of view and explores (1) 
the policy-as-discourse-way of governing the field; and (2) how 
multiagency cooperation can be interpreted as a hybrid organizational 






There seems to be a general understanding that terrorism is preceded 
by radicalization and extremism. Following the terrorist attacks in New 
York in 2001 and in the wake of “the War on Terror” (Hodges 2011), 
governments all over Europe have recognized the need to take action 
against violent extremism and terrorism at all levels of society, not just 
within the national security and military authorities (Schmid, 2013). 
Furthermore, recent events in the Nordic region have stressed the need 
for the prevention of violent extremism and for policy that deals with 
preventive measures. Such events include the terror attacks in Norway 
2011 by Anders Behring Breivik; the Copenhagen terror attack in 2015 
by Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein; the stabbing attack in Turku in 
2017 by Abderrahman Bouanane; the truck attack in Stockholm in 
2017 by Rakhmat Akilov, and very recently, in August 2019, the attack 
on the mosque in Bærum by Philip Manshaus.    
Even if there are some misconceptions in making direct causal links 
between terrorism and radicalization, and extremism and 
radicalization, violent extremism is a contemporary problem that calls 
for actions to prevent and counter the violence in itself and to protect 
those that might be affected by it. Internationally, prevention in this 
area is termed CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) and PVE 
(Preventing Violent Extremism). In this report, we primarily use the 




1.1 Terrorism, Extremism  
and Radicalization  
There are multiple and sometimes contradictory ways of defining, 
understanding and linking together terrorism, extremism and 
radicalization among authorities, organizations and in academia 
(Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Richard (2015) argues that “it appears 
that terrorism, radicalization and extremism have increasingly become 
merged into a single discursive framework” (p. 371). This merge is also 
evident in policy documents. However, there is some common 
ground to be found in the definitions.  
Terrorism is usually understood as an act; a specific method of 
committing serious crime perpetrated by a non-state actor with a clear 
ideological motivation (Richards, 2015). Some are of the view that 
terrorism is always connected to political motives, while others claim 
that criminal gangs can use terrorism as a means of achieving their aims 
(Bjørgo, 2015). One fundamental problem with defining terrorism is 
the interpretative prerogative and the distinction between terrorism 
and legitimate resistance. However, the European Union has agreed 
upon a common definition of what constitutes a terrorist offence as: 
acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a 
population', 'unduly compelling a government or international 
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act', 
or' seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country or an international organization (European Parliament 
2015 p.2). 
However, this definition is rather state centric and not very relevant to 
the terrorist violence we encounter in the Nordic countries. Shootings, 
bombings or dynamite attacks on mosques, synagogues, asylum centres 
or attacks on people in public areas are often intended to terrorize a 
specific group rather than the state. Ravndal and Bjørgo (2018) suggest 
the definition of a terror attack as: 1) premised on political ideas, 2) a 
premediated attack, and 3) the violence is intended to trigger 
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target. 
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The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016) also reaffirms that 
terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, 
civilization or ethnic group. This mean that a terrorist offence is first 
and foremost connected with intentional acts of violence aimed at the 
destruction of certain structures, and that connections with religious or 
political motives are of secondary importance. More or less formal 
organizations, such as the IRA or Al Qaida, which carry out terrorist 
acts, are referred to as terrorist organizations while an individual 
performing a similar act is called a terrorist.  
Extremism is a related, normative term, that usually refers to broader 
ideological and political milieus, specific organizations and individuals 
that have attitudes, values, ideas, norms and behaviours that, in 
comparison with the majority political and religious mainstream norms, 
are viewed as extreme (Schmid, 2013). If violence is used or supported 
in order to achieve the extreme agenda of a movement, organization, 
group or individual, it might be labelled as “violent extremism”. In 
Sweden, an intermediate term between the terms extremism and 
violent extremism has been introduced, namely violence affirming 
extremism, which refers to those extremist milieus that support and 
accept violence but do not necessarily act in violent ways. A common 
understanding is that extremism has two dimensions: rejecting 
democracy and universal human rights, and justification of the use of 
violence for political goals.  
In the Nordic region, there are three politically or religiously motivated 
milieus in focus: the violent right-wing or white supremacy movement; 
the violent left-wing or autonomous movement; and the violent 
Islamist movement. Besides these, there are examples of nuclear 
activists, animal rights activists and religious fundamentalist groups or 
sects that can be defined as extreme, without having the objective of 
disturbing or destroying democracy. In an overview of violent 
extremism as a concept and discourse, Helene Lööw (2017) states that 
there are problems with treating the three groups as one: “the violent 
extremists”. This unification erases ideological and tactical differences 
and makes the issue far to general. However, the common 
denominator and reason for being defined as extremist and at-risk 
milieus is that for different reasons, they reject current forms of 
democracy and democratic governance. 
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Radicalization is also a highly contested term, and among 
practitioners is often mixed up with extremism (Grossman & Tahiri, 
2015), but usually refers to the gradual process by which someone 
becomes an extremist and/or terrorist (Lindekilde, 2012). These 
processes are often described in metaphorical terms as paths, stairways, 
rungs on a ladder or as jig saw puzzles. In Finland, the term violent 
radicalization is used along with extremism. Even though extremism 
and radicalization are intertwined and related by violence, they are not 
necessarily aligned:  individuals who hold extremist views or attitudes 
might never engage in violent acts (Horgan, 2008). To highlight this 
phenomenon, research on radicalization points out that a distinction 
between cognitive and behavioural radicalization should be made 
(Neumann, 2013). Cognitive radicalization is about developing, 
accepting and supporting values, ideologies and attitudes that are 
radically different from mainstream societal norms.  Behavioural 
radicalization focuses on acts and behaviours; the action “pathways” 
leading to violence and activities aimed at disturbing, destroying and 
damaging societies.  
The terrorism/extremism problem  
In the annual threat assessments compiled by the security services in 
the Nordic countries2 the challenges for society are framed as terrorism 
and violent extremism as a single problem (in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden) or as two separately assessed threats (Finland). Using different 
scales, both Denmark (level 4 of 5), Finland (level 2 of 4), Norway 
(level 3 of 5) and Sweden (level 3 of 5) assess the overall terrorist threat 
to be elevated or significant. These scales define probabilities for 
various incidents related to different extremist groups merged into one 
combined threat. This merging and differentiation in definitions makes 
it difficult to discern how the threat stemming from violent extremism 
is assessed. However, as recognized by Ravndal (2017), the numbers 
used for assessing threats are most likely biased as they rely on different 
data and on crimes and delinquencies registered in different ways. 
 
2 Annual threat assessments for 2018 were collected from the Danish Centre for Terror 
Analysis (CTA) 2018; the Finnish security intelligence service SUPO (2018) & 
Ministry of the Interior 2018a, 2018b; the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) 
2018; and the Swedish Security Service SÄPO & NTC 2018. 
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Thus, assessments give an indication rather than a reliable view of the 
current status.   
When assessing the threat from extremism and terrorism at a national 
level, the problem is represented as potential risk, most likely scenarios, 
probabilities and estimations based on intelligence information. While 
these scenarios and probabilities may be proven to be correct in the 
future, they do not seem to rely on past experiences. To give an 
example, the assessments of Islamic extremism include issues of social 
control, such as intimidation of Muslim women and girls, rather than 
terror attacks by Islamic extremist groups. How the problem relates to 
Islamic extremism seem to be uncertain, and the potential threat to 
society seems to be exaggerated because it includes probable incidents. 
When Malkki and Saarinen (2019) present their overview of jihadism 
in Finland, it shows that even though individuals involved in Jihadist 
activism in Finland have increased in the past decade, it is still relatively 
low-scale in comparison with other western European countries. The 
milieu is described as fragmented and unorganized, and activism 
consists mainly of small-scale, non-violent support activities. In early 
2019, the growth phase seems to be losing its momentum.  
The Nordic countries have suffered some incidents where lone actors 
have committed atrocities inspired by extremist convictions. The terror 
attack in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011 was the most fatal attack in 
Europe since the incidents in Beslan in 2004. In Oslo, the terrorist 
killed eight people and 69 young individuals were murdered on the 
island of Utøya. The attack was carried out by a right-wing fascist 
acting alone. He was not following orders, was not financed or given 
any logistical support by any organization (Gardell, 2017; Hemmingby 
& Bjørgo, 2016). However, his ideological beliefs and the manifesto he 
distributed before committing the terrorist acts is firmly rooted in 
nationalism, nationalistic conservatism and hatred of Muslims. In 
Sweden, there have been a number of incidents where lone wolfs with 
a right-wing extremist agenda have carried out lethal/fatal deeds. John 
Ausonius (also known as the Laser man) shot 11 people (who he 
believed looked ‘non-white’) and ended up killing one between 1991-
1992. In the years between 2003 and 2010, Peter Mangs shot and killed 
two people, and attempted to kill or harm at least 10 others in Malmö. 
Mangs has confessed to killing several others in addition to the murders 
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he was convicted of (Palmqvist 2015; Gardell 2015). He has defined 
his actions as “a low-key terror war against multiculturalism” (Gardell, 
2015). In 2015, a young man in Sweden murdered three non-white 
individuals at a school in Trollhättan. In 2017, Rakhmat Akilov ran 
down pedestrians on Drottninggatan in Stockholm, killing five people 
and injuring many more. The deed was inspired by religious Islamic 
terrorist organizations, even if none claimed responsibility for it. 
One of the most prevalent extremist organizations in the Nordic 
countries, and especially in Sweden, is the Nordic Resistance 
Movement (NRM), an aggressive national socialist organization with 
the aim of creating a Nordic national socialist state. As Mattsson and 
Johansson (2019) describe the movement, it is the largest hub for neo-
Nazis in the Nordic countries. NRM members have made their 
presence felt through provocative public meetings and rallies. Through 
the frequently updated website “Nordfront”, they are active in 
producing news, radio programmes, calls for activism, and so on. 
Members of the NRM have been convicted of planting bombs close to 
housing for asylum seekers.  
In threat assessments and evaluations, (violent) extremist activities are 
mentioned far less frequently than terrorism. For example, harassment 
and death threats against political opponents, violent clashes between 
opposing groups, arson attacks on housing for refugees, illegal 
weapons, combat training, and propagating extremist ideologies are 
fairly common events in the Nordic region. Participating in such 
extremist milieus has a negative impact on young peoples’ lives in terms 
of stigmatization and social marginalization, and on potential future 
family and working life. Such activities may also have a negative impact 
on the local community in many ways, causing conflicts, stigmatizing 
communities, etc. In surveys among Norwegian politicians in the 
parliament (Fisher Bjelland and Bjørgo, 2014; Bjørgo & Silkoset, 2017), 
it is made clear that threats from extremist individuals cause fear and 
disrupt their work as elected representatives and their private lives. The 
fact that politicians are concerned about their own or their loved ones’ 
safety to the extent that they in some cases consider leaving, or actually 




Thus, violent extremism and radicalization is a present threat to safety, 
the sense of security and social harmony. Thus, we need to consider 
how extremism and extremist views and actions may harm individuals 
and society.  
Since the term radicalization is contested, and in many ways relative, 
one must always relate it to the current political norm to discern what 
is radical.  Sikkens, van San, Sieckelink and de Winter (2018) suggest 
that “radicalization is the process through which an adolescent or 
young adult develops ideals that are severely at odds with those of their 
family or the mainstream” (p.2276). Thus, this definition 
predominately pinpoints young adults and adolescents as vulnerable 
for radicalization, a focus which is being increasingly contested 
(Andersson Malmros, forthcoming; i.e. Norwegian Security Police, 
2016; 2019 and Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017). However, adolescents 
and young adults are the groups that are the primary focus of the 
Nordic multiagency approaches. Radical extremist views and actions 
are generally considered to be a phenomenon related to young people 
and mainly occurring among men.    
There are many theories that attempt to explain why young people 
engage in violent extremism. Attraction factors can be an ideological 
conviction, the excitement, adventurousness, and the chance of finding 
a temporary family (Simi et al. 2016), and one recurring factor is a sense 
of belonging or rather the sense of not belonging in mainstream society 
(e.g. Bjørgo 2005; Kimmel, 2007;Simi, Sporer & Bubolz, 2016; Vestel 
& Bakken 2016; Mattsson & Johansson, 2019). Another dimension of 
engagement is seeking authoritarian leadership that can give direction 
and security in an otherwise insecure life situation (Rieger et al. 2017). 
A sense of security can also be an important aspect in times of 
economic and social uncertainty when young people might risk being 
unemployed. Also, school failure and negative social experiences, 
exclusion and discouragement are prevalent explanations (Lhotzy, 
2001; Braunthal, 2010; Larsson & Björk, 2015; Schafer et al. 2014). 
Thus, radicalization is firmly connected with search for belonging, 
hope, identity and identification with a group or with other individuals.  
A common trend in research and policy is the idea that radicalization 
can be predicted by identification of “at-risk” signs. Lists of such signs 
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are often handed out to schools, social services and other agencies that 
meet young people in their everyday work. These are often concerned 
with behaviours and changes that can be detected by professionals. 
Examples of such behaviour include: changes in style and clothing; 
religious obsession; display of symbols; truancy; growing facial hair, etc. 
(Andersson Malmros, 2019). 
Signs of risk can also be related to risks in upbringing that can make 
children and young people more vulnerable to extremist propaganda 
and potentially joining a violent group.  One such sign is the prevalence 
of extremist attitudes in the near vicinity, as extremist attitudes can be 
passed down in families and communities (Schafer et.al. 2014; Skiple, 
2018).  Other environmental risk factors are domestic conflicts, 
violence and alcohol abuse along with experiences of school failure or 
bullying in school.    
As stated by Mattsson, Hammarén and Odenbring (2016), the 
radicalization discourse tends to focus on how individuals can cause 
harm to society, missing out on the fact that the young individual can 
come to harm.  Besides the dangers related to physical confrontations, 
attraction to or involvement in an extremist movement can cause 
stigmatization and ostracizing of both the individual and his/her family 
(Brittain, 2009; Spalek, 2016).  
1.2 Perspectives on CVE  
and Handling the Problem 
In the CVE field, it is rather widely acknowledged that there are at 
least two main approaches to handling the problem. One is security 
measures, the other is social preventive measures (Herz, 2016). 
Security measures are those that are supposed to protect and ensure 
that social institutions, infrastructure and citizens are not injured or 
harmed. Such measures therefore aim to reduce the capacity of already 
radicalized extremists and the vulnerability of potential targets 
(Bjørgo, 2013; 2017). Examples of such measures can include 
securing public spaces, key infrastructure nodes and gathering places. 
“Security-by-design” (Richter-Friis van Deurs, 2017) is a term that 
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entered the CVE debate to conceptualize security as integrated in the 
design of public spaces and streets. The placing of large concrete 
benches on the shopping street Kungsgatan in Gothenburg and of 
spacious cast iron flowerpots on Karl Johan Boulevard in Oslo and 
on Strøget in Copenhagen are examples of how aesthetic elements 
have been placed in the urban space to ensure that no cars or trucks 
can access the pedestrian space and run people down. Other security 
measures are adjustments made in legal frameworks and the 
strengthening of security services’ capacity for action. Common 
examples are intensified border controls, the criminalization of acts 
related to preparations for or assistance to terrorist attacks or 
financial support or assistance to terrorist groups (Malkki, 2016). 
On the other hand, social preventive measures are primarily focused 
on preventing and reducing the intention to commit extremist acts. 
While the security measures aim to protect infrastructure and citizens 
from imminent attacks, the social preventive measures have a longer 
term perspective and focus on winning “the hearts and minds” of at-
risk individuals (Kundnani, 2012; Bjørgo, 2016). Such efforts are 
heavily influenced by the introduction of radicalization as a way to 
understand what goes on before the bomb goes off (Neumann, 
2008): if there is a pathway to extremism and terrorism, it can be 
detected and reversed. Consequently, preventive measures or actions 
are primarily seen as part of the general public good, welfare and 
social services such as education as they are expected to build 
resilience in the face of acts of violence and anti-democratic 
tendencies.  
The measures advocated in the CVE policies in the Nordic countries 
are often divided into three levels in a “preventive pyramid”, which 
are often used in crime prevention strategies and policy documents3. 
The three levels are supposed to build on each other: the primary 
level includes measures intended to improve general resilience and 
democratizing practices through citizen education and the promotion 
of critical skills. The secondary level includes measures aimed at 
individuals at risk of being radicalized, such as educating front-line 
 
3  e.g. DKR 2012; Skr. 204/15:144; DK 2016: SOU 2017:110; 
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staff in how they can detect and identify individuals at risk. The 
tertiary level includes measures aimed at individuals assessed as being 
part of extremist movements, including mentoring programmes, 
support for relatives and exit programmes (Sivenbring 2017; Rambøll 
2017). The multiagency approaches in focus for our study are mainly 
located in the secondary level, but also extend out to the primary and 
tertiary levels to different degrees. 
!
Figure 1. Preventive pyramidA!!
The social and security perspectives are both apparently influential in 
how the problems of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism 
are handled, and the three levels in the prevention pyramid all make 
crucial contributions to preventing future delinquencies and crime. 
There have been some disciplinary struggles between what has been 
described as more repressive approaches that emphasise punishment 
and restrictions, and welfare approaches that mimic programmes and 
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methods designed to handle other forms of youth delinquency 
(Burnett & Appleton, 2004).  As stated in the Finnish National Action 
Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (FI, 2016): 
It is possible to reduce the threat of terrorism and massacres 
by preventing violent extremism. It is important to bring the 
perpetrators of serious crime to justice. In recent years, Finland 
has reviewed its legislation associated with terrorist crime and 
the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Nevertheless, 
according to studies, the penal system and the fear of 
punishment fail to reduce violence. (ibid. p.12). 
The Nordic approach is one that strives to combine the two 
perspectives by addressing the problem from different angles, and is 
not an approach that tries to advocate one in preference to the other: 
“The challenge therefore is to find balance and constructive synergy 
between the short-term repressive and controlling strategies and the 
more long-term, constructive strategies” (Bjørgo, 2013, p.3).    
It is far from clear how conceptual approaches to understanding 
radicalization and extremism have been perceived among those who 
are involved in local CVE efforts. In a study of CVE action plans in 60 
Scandinavian municipalities, Andersson Malmros (2019) found a 
tangible confusion about whether or not radicalization is regarded as a 
process at all, given the fact that many municipalities actually conceived 
radicalization as a static outcome and/or a political/religious position. 
Furthermore, the plans displayed a plethora of versions of the 
differences between being radical and being extremist and what the 
causes of radicalization are believed to be (in total, 66 different causes 
are mentioned in the plans), and how to determine that someone is at 
risk of becoming radicalized. Hence, radicalization is far from a self-
evident term when translated into local CVE efforts (Andersson 
Malmros, 2019). 
1.3 Nordic Collaboration on CVE 
Founded on common values and a strong tradition of democratic 
governance, the countries of the Nordic region collaborate in a long 
line of issues. All of the Nordic national action plans for handling 
extremism and radicalization (and additional documents), explicitly 
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state that the Nordic countries would benefit from further and 
extended cooperation in their preventive efforts against violent 
extremism. With the purpose of establishing such cooperation between 
the Nordic countries, the Nordic Network to Prevent Extremism5 was 
initiated in 2015. The network functions as a common forum where 
the ministries responsible for the preventive efforts concerning 
radicalization and extremism, amongst other things, can discuss and 
develop policies. In the Network’s programme statement, important 
issues emphasised are the development of preventive efforts and 
methods for early interventions targeted at young individuals who are 
believed to be vulnerable to radicalization; support for individuals who 
are already involved in extremist groups; and the development of exit 
strategies for helping individuals to break out of extremist networks. 
 The Nordic Council’s (2018) International Strategy for 2018-2022 
elaborates further on the prolonging and strengthening of cooperation 
within the Nordic region. The strategy states that the cooperation 
should be exploited to a far greater extent and that the Nordic countries 
should work more closely together on issues such as international 
affairs, defence and security. Among its main priorities the Nordic 
Council wants to: 
strive to ensure that democracy, the rule of law, equality and 
human rights are always high on the international agenda (…) 
The Nordic region must take the lead in combating extremism, 
anti-democratic attitudes, racism and all other forms of hate 
and discrimination (Nordic Council, 2018, p.2). 
Due to their long tradition of cooperation, there are many similarities 
in how the Nordic societies develop actions to meet the challenges 
posed by violent extremism and radicalization.6 Some of the actions 
and methods advocated by policy in a Nordic country may be directly 
inherited from a neighbouring country. For instance, the Danish 
Aarhus model is often exemplified as a model for different multiagency 
approaches in the region. However, there are national differences with 
 
5  Nordic Network to prevent violent extremism. available 2019-08-14 at: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/sub/radikalisering/radikaliseringskonferanse/cooperatio
n-agreement-of-the-nordic-network-to-prevent-extremism/id2364665/ 
6  Iceland is not incorporated in this particular project, since Iceland has not yet been 




regard to what governs CVE efforts in the different Nordic countries. 
As Heath-Kelly (2013) has argued, expertise and knowledge about 
radicalization and extremism are active in the production and 
legitimization of policy and actions. As the sources of expertise and 
knowledge differ between the countries, there are different 
explanations and solutions for the problem of extremism. Also, some 
differences rely on national organizational structures for regions, 
municipalities and government agencies. One of the areas where the 
differences are believed to be most evident is concerned with the 
possibilities to cooperate, to intervene and to share information 
between government agencies. 
 The Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) emphasised the open societies 
in the Nordic countries and their strong belief in everybody’s 
possibilities to contribute to ensuring trustful, tolerant and resilient 
cities. In this effort, the Council has initiated the Nordic Safe Cities 
Network which functions as a collaborative forum. In this network, 
cities are regarded as organized units which can pool efforts to create 
safe and inclusive environments. There is a strong belief in the power 
and efficiency of local efforts: “When they work, they provide citizens 
with a chance to play a meaningful and important role in society” (ibid. 
s, 8).  The Nordic Safe Cities Network has formulated six aims for safer 
cities, namely: Safe Urban Spaces; Safe Online Sphere; Strong Families; 
Safe Public Institutions; Strong Youth Engagement, and Safe 
Communities.  
 The following section describes the emergence of CVE/PVE 
initiatives in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, it outlines some of the 
previous research and reports that have studied preventive efforts and 
the development of CVE at the national level in the Nordic region. 
1.4 CVE - An Emerging Policy Field 
By policy field we are referring to national, regional or local 
organizations responsible for and involved in implementing public 
programmes in a particular field, in this case the field of countering 
violent extremism and radicalization. There are different levels, actors 
and agencies involved in policy fields. In studying these, one might turn 
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to documented policy but also to the actions implemented, to 
assessments, evaluations, public opinion, the press and so on. The 
policy field concerned with countering and preventing terrorism, 
extremism and radicalization in the Nordic region is relatively new and 
also one that has undergone rapid development driven by the incidents 
that have occurred in the region. Using the words of Leena Malkki 
(2016): “Nothing drives counter terrorism policy making like a 
(spectacular) terrorist attack” (p.343). Different events in Europe and 
the Nordic region have quite simply warranted certain measures to 
safeguard society against terrorist attacks and extremist activities.  The 
particular policy field is also an interesting example of how policy is 
implemented when the intended actors comprise a string of different 
professions with a variety of norms and logics. It is also a highly 
politicized field that is dependent on contemporary events and 
incidents around the world.  
Even if the policy field revolving around violent extremism and 
terrorism is a relatively new one, it is still an amalgamation of already 
existing policy fields (such as the police, security, criminal justice, 
education, social welfare, youth work, etc.). The field has undergone 
both revisions and changes in how the problem of extremism is 
believed to be best understood, prevented and/or countered.  An 
analysis of the Nordic Action plans against radicalization and violent 
extremism (Sivenbring, 2017) concludes that measures and actions in 
the plans express the need for more research and knowledge. The need 
for knowledge and more research is mainly focused on seeking 
evidence of best practices and knowledge of how to identify and report 
vulnerable and suspicious individuals. This can be understood as a 
rational step in the ongoing development of a transdisciplinary field in 
need of reliable knowledge and methods.   
Policy documents and texts serve as manifestations of current 
understandings, and as such they also give some clues as to how the 
problem is rationalized and made sense of. The development of policy 
as shared understandings also seems to be of great importance in itself. 
The Finnish Ministry of Interior (2018b) states that: 
A key element in the prevention of terrorism is to incorporate 
the prevention of polarisation and inequality in society in 
policies and strategies. Polarisation and social exclusion 
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increase a sense of alienation, which in turn may breed violent 
radicalization and terrorism (ibid, p.15). 
This statement appears to be saying that there are some indications of 
root causes for extremism and that policy can serve as a gateway for 
achieving different overarching goals in a society, such as preventing 
inequality and social exclusion. 
 With the best of intentions, some of the measures and actions will not 
necessarily reflect what policymakers understand as what works against 
terrorism, “but rather are influenced just as much by what seems 
politically beneficial” (Malkki 2016, s. 344).  This mean that policy 
development in the field could be defined as incremental (Lindekilde, 
2015); as decisions and actions are developed and initiated gradually in 
small steps through negotiations and adaptations between actors. 
However, as the problem is mainly framed as an issue of national 
security, the initial starting point is the security stance. Therefore, there 
are to this day only limited or no specific policies that govern how 
different professionals (such as social workers, teachers, healthcare 
experts) engage with clients who may be at risk of radicalization, who 
have become involved in terrorism, or who are trying to exit terrorist 
organizations.   
In 2017, the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration 
commissioned Rambøll Management Consulting to carry out a 
descriptive survey of the Nordic countries’ efforts to prevent 
extremism (Rambøll 2017). One of the points of inquiry in their report 
was to map out the organization of preventive efforts and to show at 
what levels they are anchored. The report concludes that CVE efforts 
are solely or primarily anchored in the ministries responsible for 
domestic security. Furthermore, it concludes that all the Nordic 
countries have adopted a multiagency approach to prevention, and that 
it is common to integrate preventive work into existing cooperative 





1.5 National Actionplans  
Denmark adopted their first national action plans against extremism in 
20097 and are occasionally portrayed as pioneers in the CVE policy 
field8. This plan has been criticized however for making anecdotal 
connections between problems of radicalization, immigration,and 
integration issues (Lindekilde, 2012; 2015). In 2014, the plan was 
replaced by an updated version9. According to a press release from the 
Danish government, this plan stressed the importance of multiagency 
cooperation10. Since 2016, this plan has been revised a second time and 
its actions are more directed towards specific target groups and the use 
of local resources. The plan in question is called Preventing and countering 
violent extremism and radicalisation, National action plan11 and was born out 
of inter-ministerial working groups, but falls today within the juris-
diction of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing12 (the action 
plan is hereafter designated as DK, 2016). The plan states that the 
current national and international state of affairs calls for the protection 
of fundamental values and individuals’ rights that “form the basis of 
our society” (DK, 2016, p.3). Thus, there is a need for strengthening 
efforts against terrorism and extremism. The action plan further 
emphasizes that a comprehensive preventive effort from both national 
and local authorities as well as civil society is required.  
 
7  Regeringen.DK (2008). A common and safe future– action plan to prevent 
extremistviews and radicalisation of youth. Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration 
and Integration Affairs. (DK) 
8  Axess.se. 2019-06-17. Ranstorp, M. Låt oss lära av Danmark. [available 2019-06-17 : 
https://axess.se/magasin/default.aspx?article=4056&fbclid=IwAR1dCnico1dqdLS2F3r
EFKncO2gz3JjaLmSk1IXf12BqX1rNzETrTxhXKI#.XLR_UE2P5t8.] 
9  Regeringen. Dk. (2014) Prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Actionplan. 
Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs. (DK) 
10 Regeringen Dk. (2016-10-11). Tidligere handlingsplaner om forebyggelse af 




11 Regeringen Dk. (2016). Preventing and countering violent extremism and 
radicalisation. National action plan. The Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration 
and Housing. (DK) 
12 [Udlændige-, integrations- og boligminsiteriet]  
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In Finland the Ministry of the Interior coordinates national prevention 
of violent radicalization measures via the National action plan for the 
prevention of violent radicalization13 (hereafter designated as FI, 2016). The 
Finnish policies use the term violent radicalization, while the other 
Nordic countries’ policies use radicalization and violent extremism. 
The action plan targets individuals and groups who are regarded as at 
risk of radicalization. The aim is to make sure that there are stable 
structures and the capability to prevent radicalization before it occurs 
(Elo et al. 2017; Finnish National Agency for Education, 2018). In an 
earlier national action plan, extremism and radicalization was described 
as a somewhat marginal problem and at this point in time, the issue is 
not perceived as an actual threat. However, Finnish society has had 
some experiences with school shootings, which is reflected in the 
current National action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism adopted. According to the Finnish plan (FI, 2016), the 
primary goal of prevention is to reduce threats and violence against 
people. Together with the Ministry, the police are given the 
overarching responsibility for preventive efforts: “The Ministry and its 
Police Department remain responsible for matters regarding order and 
security in public places. Violent extremism, as a phenomenon, relates 
to the core of maintaining public order and safety of individuals and 
communities as well as protecting civil rights” (ibid. p.14).  
The police are framed as the most important source of knowledge and 
expertise, especially when it comes to identifying individuals at risk of 
radicalization and directing professionals to services that can be of 
help. Knowledge of how to detect at-risk individuals is especially 
important for those working directly with young individuals. The police 
are responsible for public order and security: to guarantee a safe and 
secure living environment (FI, 2016). Municipalities are responsible for 
providing services that promote citizens’ wellbeing and participation, 
while civil society organizations provide services that can strengthen 
people's participation, social interaction and spiritual life.  
Norway introduced an actionplan against racist violence in a specific 
local community as early as 199114 (Carlsson, 1995). In 2010 their first 
 
13 Ministry of the Interior. (2012). Towards cohesive society - action plan to prevent 
violent extremism. (Fi)  
14 Aksjonsplan Brumanddal.  
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national policy for preventing extremism was issued15. Since the 
political landscape and assessed threat were changing, a new plan was 
issued in 2014 that built on the previous plan, adding new knowledge 
and experiences and concrete measures. The Action Plan against 
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism16 (2014) is defined by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security as a dynamic plan, meaning that 
it is annually assessed and revised. A new major revision of the 
actionplan has started in 2019. According to the current plan, it is also 
supplemented by action plans for the prevention of crime17. One third 
of the 30 actions listed in the action plan focus on knowledge and 
expertise; the plan is pervaded by the need for, and the development 
and utilization of available and new knowledge and skills. For example, 
radicalization and extremism is to be incorporated into the training of 
police and correctional officers. Just like the Danish action plan, the 
Norwegian plan (NO, 2014) is primarily centred around judicial and 
security measures and 16 of the 30 measures in the action plan are 
coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. In 
comparison, the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion is 
responsible for 5; Ministry of Education and Research handles 3 and 
the Ministry of Health and Care Services coordinates 2. The Ministries 
of Cultural Affairs and of Foreign Affairs each coordinate 1 measure. 
 In Sweden, the Action Plan for Safeguarding Democracy against Violent 
Extremism was issued in 201118, after which the transparency of the 
policy field became somewhat muddied.  In 2013, the 2011 plan was 
accompanied by the official commission of inquiry (SOU 2013:81)19 
which suggested measures for cooperation and education to increase 
the effectiveness of preventive efforts against violent extremism.  An 
 
15 Regeringen.No. (2010). Collective security - a shared responsibility. Action plan to 
prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the 
Police. (NO) 
16 Regeringen.No. (2014). Action plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. 
Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (NO)  
17 Regeringen.No. (2013). Action plan for the prevention of crime Norwegian Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security. (NO) 
18 Regeringskansliet.Se. (2011). Skr. 2011/12:44. Handlingsplan för att värna demokratin 
mot våldsbejakande extremism. Justitiedepartementet. (SE)  
19 SOU 2013:81. (2013). När vi bryr oss – förslag om samverkan och utbildning för ett 
effektivare förebygga våldsbejakande extremism. Stockholm: Fritzes. (SE) 
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official communication (Skr 2014/15:144)20 was issued in 2015 
containing actions for making society more resistant to violent 
extremism. The recommended actions were evaluated in 201821. In 
2016, the national coordinator issued a National Strategy against Violent 
Extremism22. In 2017, a new official commission of inquiry (2017:110)23 
evaluated the work of, and provided some input on how to- replace´, 
the national coordinator. The replacement was completed in early 2018 
and the responsibility for handling issues of violent extremism and 
radicalization currently rests with the Ministry of Justice. The Swedish 
Prison and Probation Service (Kriminalvården), the Swedish National 
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), the police and security police are 
placed under this ministry. The Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent 
Extremism was established in 2018 and placed under the governance of 
BRÅ. The centre’s main objectives depart from the field of criminal 
policy and focus on strengthening and developing the work of 
preventing violent extremism, ideologically motivated criminality, and 
terrorism.In a personal communication with the Swedish Centre for 
Preventing Violent Extremism 24, actors refer to the Government's 
strategy for countering terrorism  (Skr. 2014/15:146)25, the national 
coordinator’s final report (SOU 2017:110), Förordning 2016:1201 med 
instruktion för Brottsförebyggande rådet (Ordinance with instructions for the 
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) and the Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention’s final report on the task of 
preparing for a centre for preventing violent extremism26. In 
conclusion, there are a number of policy documents and legislation for 
 
20 Regeringens Skrivelse. (2015). Skr 2014/15:144. Åtgärder för att göra samhället mer 
motståndskraftigt mot våldsbejakande extremism. Kulturdepartementet. (SE) 
21 Statskontoret. (2018). Utvärdering av regeringens åtgärder mot våldsbejakande 
extremism 2014-2017. (2018:29). Kulturdepartementet. (SE).   
22 Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism. (2016). Nationell strategi mot 
våldsbejakande extremism. Stockholm: Elanders.(SE) 
23 SOU 2017:110. (2017). Värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism. Hinder och 
möjligheter. Kulturdepartementet. Stockholm: Fritzes. (SE)  
24 Per e-mail of 2019-05-07 
25 Regeringens Skrivelse. (2015). Skr. 2014/15:146. Förebygga, förhindra och försvåra – 
den svenska strategin mot terrorism. Justitiedepartementet.  
26 Brå.(2018). Slutredovisning av uppdraget att förbereda för ett nationellt centrum mot 





handling extremism, and some confusion on what policy it is that 
governs the field in Sweden.  
1.6 Multiagency Approaches  
Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is a complex task 
that calls for complex solutions (Bjørgo, 2011). One of the problems 
with handling violent extremism is that it involves challenges that no 
single actor or agency has the knowledge, information or operational 
space to solve. These challenges can be met by identifying the expertise 
needed for providing solutions and putting together permanent or 
temporary teams of specialists in their respective areas who work 
together in order to solve the problem. In Denmark, this kind of 
organized collaboration has been functioning for decades (Bertelsen, 
2015; Hemmingsen, 2015). In a RAN paper, the Danish multi-
professional cooperative SSP model is referred to as “the model for 
multiagency working with a key role for the police” (Lenos & Keltjens, 
2017, p. 3). 
 The objective of setting up multiagency cooperative teams may seem 
unambiguous, but their purpose and the techniques they use for 
addressing problems might be very different (Sarma, 2018). Also, 
organizational arrangements can differ depending on whether the 
primary objective is to work preventively, making sure that no 
individuals get involved with extremist milieus; or if the objective is to 
prevent radicalized individuals from causing any harm to society; or if 
it is to support those who wish to exit from extremist or terrorist 
organizations. Although there are few (if any) empirical studies that 
have focused on multiagency approaches with the specific task of 
handling radicalization, violent extremism or terrorism, there are 
studies that support the use of this kind of approach for tackling other 
“wicked problems” (i.e. Davies, 2016).  
 In Denmark, this multiagency approach to general crime prevention 
has been used frequently since the late 1970s (Bertelsen, 2015), while 
the multiagency approach is described in Finnish research as a rather 
new trend for which there is a growing need (Pohjola & Korhonen, 
2014). However, while Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden all 
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have experiences of handling extremism and radicalization via 
multiagency approaches, they differ in terms of their practical 
implementation and organizational setups.   
 One of the main reasons for the differences in the Nordic countries’ 
multiagency approaches is the use of pre-existing structures and 
initiatives that were initially developed for other purposes or crime 
prevention activities.  Since the often-alleged signs of radicalization and 
violent extremism among young individuals mimics other identified 
“at-risk behaviours”, the view has been that established models and 
strategies can be adapted and used to prevent and intervene against 
radicalization. As exemplified by Norway’s National Crime Prevention 
Council (KRÅD) (2011), measures to prevent drug abuse among young 
individuals may also prevent criminality. The goal is the same: to 
prevent criminality and other problems that can cause damage on 
citizens and/or society. 
 Early intervention is at the core of the Nordic approach and 
collaboration between schools, social services and the police is called 
the School, Social services, Police (SSP) model in Denmark, SSP(f) in 
Sweden (where the f stands for ‘fritids’ or after-school centres), and 
Coordination of local drug abuse and crime prevention measures (SLT) 
in Norway. Since 2014, Finland has adopted a similar approach which 
it calls Anchor teams (Ankkuri in Finnish), which are to be set up in all 
Finnish municipalities (Ministry of the Interior, 2014). Even if the 
backbone for this collaboration is the school, social services and police, 
a multiagency approach to CVE may also involve other professions 
such as psychiatry, the prisons system, and community or civil society 
organizations. The multiagency approach to preventing and countering 
violent extremism rests on the core tenets of the Nordic governance 
model, which are legitimacy and mutual trust – between government 
agencies and between citizens and the authorities. Despite their 
similarities, the three Scandinavian countries appear to implement this 
model in quite different ways. 
As Blagg et al. (1998) describe it, multiagency approaches are often 
portrayed as ‘an unproblematically good thing’. However, research 
points to possibilities, problems and challenges that occur as agencies 
with different agendas and expertise come together. One such problem 
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is that there seems to be scope for disjunctions between formulation 
in policy and realization among practitioners (Pearson et al. 1992). 
Other challenges can be the use of language, reflecting different 
disciplinary backgrounds among the practitioners and their training, 
and, diversity awareness and the use of terminology to address clients 
with: are students, patients, victims or young people the focus of an 
intervention? Such disciplinary differences are pointed out as aspects 
that can cause internal conflicts. In fact, internal conflicts in teams of 
professionals working together across institutional boundaries seem to 
be rather common. Brown et al. (2011) explored such conflicts in 
Canadian multiagency teams within health and social welfare and found 
that they are often focused around role boundary issues, scope of 
practice, and accountability. Thus, there might be some issues 
concerned with dynamic factors such as the process of collaboration, 
trust, power and commitment between different actors working 
together in multi-professional collaboration teams (Willumsen, 2008). 
Another challenge that is often mentioned is the focus of Part 5 of this 
report: namely problems connected with legal and procedural barriers 
for exchanging information between agencies (Sarma, 2018). 
1.7 Civil Society Organizations  
Civil society can be described as the sphere between the state, the 
market and private households. The Swedish civil society bill (prop. 
2009/10:55) specifies the sphere as one where people, groups and 
organizations act together with common interests. As Chaskin (2003) 
recognizes, social policy often turns to local communities and civil 
society for support in planning and providing actions in relation to a 
number of social issues.  In the RAN (2016) Ex post paper Handbook 
on how to set up a multiagency structure that includes the health and social care 
sectors?, civil society organizations and NGOs are given ample space. 
When recommending the involvement of local communities, this is 
legitimized by their closeness and access to citizens. “Seeing and having 
to cooperate with familiar faces will help engage vulnerable people in 
addressing their potential problems” (RAN, 2016, p.3).  
In preventive efforts to safeguard democracy in the Nordic countries, 
civil society and its organizations can provide support and actions that 
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focus on social and societal efforts in the local meighbourhood. 
According to Chaskin (2003), local connections and knowledge stem 
from a democratic point of view where the participation of local 
communities and its citizens will make policy implementation more 
effective and efficient.  
Neighbourhood participations is seen to promote more 
responsive, competent programs; place boundaries on and 
refocus municipal agendas; establish greater trust in 
government; create a more equitable distribution of public 
goods; increase social interaction and a sense of community 
among residents; and strengthen the link between citizens and 
government (Chaskin, 2003. p. 163).  
Although the local connection can be regarded as enhancing 
democracy and trust, research on civil society organizations (CSOs) 
show that these are often dependent on project based funds and state 
grants (Herz 2016; Sivenbring & Mattsson 2019). This makes the 
efforts and projects handled by these organizations vulnerable, as such 
funding is often limited in time. Some argue that in many modern 
democracies, the social welfare system has withdrawn its institutional 
efforts in certain areas, one such area being social work that used to be 
managed by social services. As shown by Marcus Herz (2016), much 
of the social work in democracies is now done by volunteers and non-
profit organizations.   
When it comes to social and welfare work, new societal expectations 
and challenges can cause blurred lines between what is considered 
public, civil society or private.  Herz (2019) believes that this lack of 
clarity has led to a change in the logic of the work conducted by civil 
society and that is has become more influenced by the public and 
private spheres. In the Nordic action plans and policies, civil society 
organizations are given some attention and implicit responsibility to 
contribute to the handling of violent extremism. One way of 
supporting and legitimizing such responsibilities is to give them funds 
for projects that are intended to work preventively against violent 
extremism and to demand that these organizations produce valid 
results (Sivenbring & Mattsson, 2019).  Making CSOs dependent on 
project funding can jeopardize their efficiency and effectiveness. The 
financial uncertainty can make it difficult to get a successful 
programme and appropriate activities up and running before it is time 
 
 34 
to apply for new funding (ibid. 2019). As Chaskin (2003) acknowledges, 
the differences in connection, accountability, and terms and conditions 
for CSOs creates a loosely connected system of organizations and 
associations, forced to interact with each other and with formal systems 
of governance in improvised ways.    
One obstacle that needs to be recognized (and respected) when 
incorporating civil society organizations into multiagency structures is 
that these do not have the same legal obligations or restrictions as 
government agencies. Government agencies are generally not allowed 
to share information with external actors, while civil society 
organizations might be in possession of information which, for reasons 





2. Theoretical and 
Methodological 
Frameworks 
This section of the report aspires to define our ways of understanding 
policy and how policy mapping and analysis is conducted. 
Furthermore, it describes ways of understanding the multiagency 
approach as a hybrid organizational setting. The definitions and 
distinctions are of significance for giving transparency and rationality 
to the conclusions drawn for this part of the project.   
2.1 What is Policy?  
To make policy mapping and analysing intelligible, we need to 
distinguish what policy is, can be and how policy is understood or 
conceptualized, depending on the theoretical stance of the researchers. 
The most familiar way of describing policy is that “policy is a set of 
actions taken to solve a problem” (Walker 2000, p 14). These sets of 
ideas or plans of action for particular situations are established and 
agreed upon by a group of people, an organization, a government, or a 
political party. Paul Spickler (2006) defines policy in the simplest sense 
as decisions about a course of action. Teun Van Dongen (2010) 
suggests that a common definition could be that a policy will include 
elements of ‘aim’ and ‘resources’, as policy is always a result of 
analysing a problem and conscious choices regarding the resources to 
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solve it. These definitions give policy an air of being a rational, 
utilitarian technique: policymakers agree on a set of actions and 
objectives which, if they are met, should solve the problem at hand. In 
this sense, policy is rational and functional and perceived as capable of 
producing solutions to social problems (Parsons, 1995; Clarke, 
1999).  A second perspective on policy is that it is not functional, but 
rather symbolic (Clarke, 1999). Symbolic policies are crafted by 
organizations seeking legitimacy by their environment. Policy can, 
according to this point of view, be viewed as “window-dressing”, 
adopted to show that the organization is modern and progressive, in 
control of a particular problem or simply because other relevant 
stakeholders have adopted the same type of policy (Clarke, 1999; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that organizations decouple their 
formal structure from their informal practices. Even though 
superficially adopting a rationalized object (e.g. a CVE policy), the 
practices or reforms partnering the object never gets fully implemented 
or implemented differently. Hence, decoupling is to consciously 
“disconnect between organizational practice and organizational 
structure” (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017, p. 80). By engaging in 
decoupling, an organization can maintain or improve its legitimacy 
from its external environment, while neglecting the implementation of 
practices that are considered harmful, inefficient or inconsistent with 
the aim and values of the organization. 
Policy as text or policy as discourse 
In this particular study, we define policy in two ways, one of which 
enables a more conventional descriptive analysis that can show 
similarities and differences within and between the Nordic countries. 
This is what Ball (1993) would define as policy as text. Although written 
and documented, these texts are products of compromise and 
contestations at various stages in the process and always in a state of 
flux. However, we use the term policy as text as a way of focusing on the 
manifested content of the policies, without giving attention to how 




The other definition sees policy as discourse (Ball, 1993) which allows for 
a more theoretical and critical analysis, and enabling revelations of 
potential discrepancies, tensions, gaps and bridges. Echoing the words 
of Michel Foucault (1997), discourses are practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak and are active in the production 
of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. Thus, policy as discourse can be perceived 
as responsible for similar constructions; they produce certain 
knowledge and truths about objects. In this case, they contribute by 
producing knowledge and truths about radicalization and violent 
extremism and rational and logic ways of explaining and handling the 
problem. Policy as part of governmental solutions to societal problems 
also contains implicit representations of what is considered to be “the 
problem” (Bacchi, 2015; Bacchi & Goodwin 2016), or “What’s the 
Problem Represented to be” (WPR). In other words, actions, solutions 
and problematizations say something of how the problem is 
constructed, and who/what might be considered to be the problem 
(Bacchi, 2015). One example of how this is embodied is that even 
though the Nordic countries have been dealing with various problems 
connected with left- and right-wing extremism since the 1930s, these 
problems have not been debated to the same extent as Islamic 
extremism, nor have they had the magnitude needed for setting up 
national action plans to prevent the problem. Also, the problem of 
radicalization has just recently begin to be associated with extreme 
right- or left-wing attitudes or ideologies in public debate. On the other 
hand, the events in USA on 9/11, and the wake of the “war on terror”, 
have combined to “speak the problem into being” (Bacchi & Goodwin, 
2016, p.72). 
Our lives are more or less “saturated with policy” (Brown, 1998); 
legislative frameworks, rules and regulations are constantly present and 
influence who we are, what we can say and do, and how we act. In this 
sense, policy is regarded as an instrument of government. The term 
governmentality (Foucault, 1977) gives an analytical focus to techniques 
and activities aimed at shaping, guiding or influencing people in a 
certain direction. Foucault (1997) defines governmentality as “an 
activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives 
by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what 
they do and for what happens to them” (ibid. 68).  
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If a more conventional policy analysis focuses on policies as addressing 
actual societal problems, a critical policy analysis focuses on the 
represented problem per se, and on how these problems are made 
possible and intelligible and how they are articulated, represented and 
constituted in policies (Bacchi & Goodwin 2016). By posing such 
questions, the analysis enables the researcher to probe the underlying 
assumptions: that there is a problem, how the problem is made intelligible 
and what implications policy might have for society and its citizens. In 
this report, we primarily adopted the “policy as text” approach in the 
initial mapping, while the “policy as discourse” approach will become 
more evident in the concluding discussions. 
2.2 Institutional Logics  
and Hybrid Organizations 
Rules are not always scripted into policy but also exist informally. The 
word institution can be understood from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives. When trying to understand the conditions for different 
organizational actors to engage in multiagency collaboration, we turn 
to the sociological perspective that describes an institution as a ”more-
or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviour that is 
underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that 
give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-producing social 
order” (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby & Sahlin, 2008, p. 4-5). 
Consequently, institutions are “the rules of the game” (Scott, 1995) - 
the regulative, normative and cultural orders and constraints that guide 
social behaviour in specific social spaces. They explain why students 
know to sit down in the classroom and wait for the teacher to start 
talking, why Westerners know to shake hands the first time they meet 
and why Scandinavians expect public authorities to be fair, objective 
and just. From this perspective, understanding multiagency 
collaboration becomes somewhat problematic as the actors in such 
collaborative structures come from different institutional orders. For 
example, we can expect the institutional arrangements within the police 
force to be somewhat different from teachers. To explain such 
institutional heterogeneity in social spaces, institutional logics has 
become a dominant theoretical framework in organization theory. 
Institutional logics can be defined as: 
socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and 
material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, 
by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to 
their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce 
their life and experiences” (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 
p.2).
More simply put, an institutional logic constitutes the formal and 
informal rules that govern, or guide, the practitioner’s actions, 
interactions, and interpretations of situations. Thornton et al. (2012) 
claim that an institutional logic can be deconstructed by analysing 
particular elements of the logic. Collective identities provide answers to 
actors about whom they are and where they belong. The actor’s sense 
of belonging to a collective helps them to orient themselves and 
understand how to act in given situations. The connection to collective 
identities can be based on groups (for example ethnic, cultural, interest 
groups), professions/occupations (for example teachers and doctors), 
organizations, and industries. Goals are to be understood as what is 
desirable to achieve when you belong to a certain collective identity. 
For example, most teachers strive for their pupils to develop as human 
beings, improve and succeed in school. Strategies help actors to 
understand which situations they should act upon and how they should 
act. Each logic resorts to different solutions and answers in a given 
situation. Consequently, some solutions are available in one logic, while 
the same solutions are unavailable in another. The ground for attention 
explains why some questions/situations/problems are given a lot of 
attention in specific logics, while others are not. The ground for authority 
helps individuals to orientate themselves in decision-making. For 
example, some logics entail a more hierarchal, managerial order of 
decision-making, while others are more decentralized or collective in 
their decision-making. To sum up, an institutional logic helps an 
individual to understand which type of collective he/she belongs to, 
what that type of collective is striving to achieve, which 
problems/situations to focus on, which strategies and tools are 
appropriate to apply in relation to the problem/situation, and who 
decides what type of action is appropriate.  
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Thus, each professional organization has its own logics that result in 
certain scripts for how actors are expected to handle different 
situations. In the context of CVE, the police, schools and social 
services are public organizations that are guided by their respective 
institutional logics and thus different ideas on what should be done in 
CVE efforts, how it should be done and why it should be done. This 
results in a complex institutional environment where multiple 
institutional logics might be activated, competing or co-existing 
(Thornton et al., 2012). The multiagency units in focus for this project 
(SSP, SSP(f), SLT and Anchor teams), are thus constructed as new 
organizational units that are constituted from a variety of professionals 
that bring different institutional logics to the collaboration unit.  
A collaboration unit that is constituted from different actors and logics 
can be understood as a form of hybrid organization. As Battilana, 
Besharov and Mitzinneck (2017) state, hybrids can be understood as 
organizations that “instantiate the values and practices associated with 
multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” (p. 137). Since 
multiagency approaches are multi-disciplinary hybrids, they 
incorporate elements from diverse institutional logics and may be 
arenas for contradictions (Pache & Santos, 2013; Battilana & Dorado, 
2010). Hence, tensions might arise and, as Battilana and Dorado (2010) 
argue, there are no “ready-to-wear” models for handling tensions that 
can occur as institutional logics are combined in hybrid organizations. 
Binder (2007) adds that “people are seldom engaged with one or two 
logics, but with multiple logics and with multiple ways of encountering 
those logics, on a continuum of almost purely universalistic to almost 
purely institutional” (ibid. p.567).  
2.3 Methodology 
– Making Policy Intelligible
The analytical work for this part of our project focuses on the policies 
that govern CVE efforts with a certain emphasis on multiagency 
approaches in the four Nordic countries. However, it is obvious that 
“Public policy and the problems with which it is concerned do not exist 
in neat, tidy academic boxes” (Parsons, 1995 p. 64). Comparative 
 
 41 
analysis of different policy tends to be descriptive and give rough 
indications of differences and similarities (van Dongen, 2010). One 
problem is the notorious difficulties in applying the same variables to 
policy from different countries. For instance, actions and objectives in 
the Nordic action plans address various levels in society and are 
presented in different ways. In Denmark and Norway, actions and 
objectives are presented as prioritized areas followed by actions for the 
specific area, while the Finland’s plans formulate objectives as short 
term or long-term goals followed by actions. Sweden’s policy is found 
in different policies and various sources, and is mainly presented as 
actions at the national or local level.  
Furthermore, there are hardly any studies or methodological 
approaches that can capture CVE policy in its entirety. Neither are 
there any universal or specified tool-boxes for policy analysis; in fact, 
there are reasons to avoid a tool-box approach and instead construct 
an analytical framework suited to the policy at hand and the objectives 
for the project.  There is also every reason to avoid the black-box 
problem of not being transparent enough (Patton & Sawicki, 2012). 
Thus, systematic comparisons of policy call for a systematic approach 
that benefits from being inductive, transparent and constructed on the 
basis of empirical findings along with the stated objectives. One way to 
accomplish this is to use models and visual maps27. These are intended 
to function as ways of thinking, or as explanatory frameworks (Parsons, 
1995). To make comparisons possible and to create transparency, we 
have chosen to use policy documents (documents holding aims and 
measures for CVE, published or disseminated by governmental 
institutions) as the main source of information for this part of the 
project. 
Data: identification of relevant policies 
Policies and documents that regulate and govern CVE efforts are, as 
previously mentioned, in a state of continuous (re)negotiation, which 
means that new documents and policies were being produced while 
this policy part of the HEX-NA project was being conducted. One 
example of this is the report from the Swedish official commission of 
 
27 Some of these are enclosed as appendices.  
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inquiry into sharing information between agencies in counterterrorism 
collaborations, which was published in late 2018 (SOU 2018:65). The 
inquiry’s report provides suggestions and recommendations for future 
adjustments to legal frameworks; however, no decisions have been 
made (at this point in time). This means that we have to start from a 
certain point in time with the documents and policies that were 
available and accurate in autumn 2018 and early spring 2019. However, 
we have tried to incorporate changes and updates as they appeared and 
became official. 
As a first step, relevant policy documents were identified by project 
partners in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively. 
These documents follow the common organizational structures 
addressing state, national, regional or local level; thus policy from 
different levels of the organizational structures were incorporated. 
However, there are distinct differences between the local levels that 
make them notoriously difficult to compare. For instance, Denmark 
has 98 municipalities, Finland 311, Norway 356 (from 2020) and 
Sweden 290. While Denmark has three municipalities with less than 
5000 inhabitants, in Norway there are 200 of these small municipalities. 
These internal differences make it hard to make valid local 
comparisons, so instead we have used local policies as examples of how 
multiagency work is portrayed and allegedly enacted.  
Policy that governs established multiagency approaches, including legal 
frameworks, was also identified and collected together with evaluations 
and assessments connected to these forms of cooperation. In this 
instance, some of the documented initiatives deal directly with CVE, 
while others might be more indirect. In cases where uncertainties 
occurred, we consulted the project research team. To cover the 
organizational structure of CVE efforts and involved actors, we also 
include documentation concerned with CVE efforts carried out by civil 
society organizations. Hence, the identifying and collecting stage is 
inductive (Spickler, 2006).   
The policy documents and laws are mainly written in Scandinavian 
languages (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) and some of them are 
available in English versions. Some of the Finnish documents are also 
published in a Swedish version, and a few are translated into English. 
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This means that in some cases, only abstracts to policy were found in 
languages that the authors could read and understand. This might mean 
that some content from Finnish documents has been lost. However, 
we have received some help from our Finnish colleagues for translation 
and for validating our findings.   
Selection of policy documents 
Our selection of policy texts is based on the organizational 
(hierarchical) structures of the four Nordic countries. Thus, documents 
concerning national, regional and local policy for CVE are 
incorporated into the analysis. Criteria for inclusion are that the text 
should be publicly available, have a clear sender (government, agency 
or organization) and a defined target group and that they contain 
objectives, actions and measures for at least one of the agencies in 
focus here (school, social services and police).   
The legal frameworks that could be seen as relevant for constraining 
and enabling information sharing in multiagency work to counter 
violent extremism are extensive.  We have excluded the sections in 
each country’s Data Protection Act (or similar) that regulate the storage 
and collection of personal data, but included those that concern sharing 
of information for preventive purposes. Public Access to Information and 
Secrecy Acts and Data Protection Acts, with some limitations, do not 
forbid government agencies to exchange information once a crime has 
been committed or is imminent. Hence, we are interested in the 
legislation that concerns preventive (not reactive) efforts that target 
individuals (not larger groups or communities). Below, we offer a list 
of the criteria for inclusion: 
1. The mapping concerns legislation that directly deals with information 
sharing between government agencies for preventive purposes in relation to 
individuals 
2. We have chosen a performative approach that focuses on the legislation that 
the involved agencies find to be relevant in relation to multiagency 
collaboration and information sharing in CVE efforts 
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3. The focus of the analysis is on what kind of information, for what purpose, 
is shared between which government agencies and in which direction the 
information flows. 
We have chosen not to include sections that repeat the constraints on 
and possibilities for information sharing expressed by a more general 
law. For example, we have not included a section in the Finnish Basic 
Education Act that regulates professional secrecy if the same content 
is found in the Act on Publicity in Government Agencies. In such 
cases, were we have found a section in a specific Act that adds to or 
complements a generally applying provision, we have included it in the 
survey.  
Limitations 
Lastly, but importantly, our analysis is focused on the content found in 
policy and laws. This means that we do not have the access nor the objective to 
explore how these are put into practice. The focus on policy also means that 
there are other solutions and local variations in multiagency approaches 
and the actors involved than those mentioned in the analysed 
documents and publications. As Willumsen (2008) concluded, policy 
documents and various legislation represent a top-down approach that 
regulates aspects of collaboration in order to ensure the rights of the 
service user. “However, collaboration between the parties is not 
initiated until a ‘case’ arises that requires collaboration for mutual 
efforts” (ibid. p.361). The enactment of policy is elaborated on in more 
detail in the third part of the HEX-NA research project which focuses 
on the practical work of the multiagency teams.  
Also, detailed instructions on how to implement the legislation and the 
reasoning behind it is usually found in the legislative history and official 
commissions of inquiry leading up to the adoption of legislation. Other 
useful data to analyse would be the judicial practice connected to the 
legislation, which would inform us about how the legislation is applied. 
Such an extensive juridical analysis however goes beyond the scope and 
limitations of this report. The findings should therefore be read taking 




In our coding, we have focused on two layers of the data. The first 
layer is descriptive and focuses on the textual content of the policies 
(policy as text). The second layer has an interpretive approach, in which 
the textual content of the policies is analysed from a discursive point 
of view.In order to address policy within the three areas in focus -: 
Organizational structures, Legal frameworks and Recommended 
practices - we develop and elaborate on instruments for initial 
systematic coding for each area. The objective for our different sets of 
analytical coding is to fit the model to the problem, not the problem to 
the model and in line with Ockham’s razor, to use the simplest model 
that will do the job (Walker, 2000).  
For organizational structures, we use a strategic tool based on the Pentad 
analysis model developed by Kenneth Burke (1969). Burke's Pentad 
analysis was initially done to tease out motives and rests on five aspects 
of interaction or dramatic episodes in texts, namely: act, agency, actor, 
scene and purpose. With elaborations on the possible questions to ask, 
making them more suitable for policy texts, and not enactments of 
them, these are the factors that go well with the objective of mapping 
out organizational structures (see table 1.). In our version, this is mainly 
used for mapping out the policy that regulates the multiagency 






How is multiagency work organized in the four Nordic 
countries?  
Act 
What is suppose e done? 
What is the multiagency work supposed to focus on and work 
with? 
Agency 
How is it supposed to be done? Methods 
How are they supposed to perform their work? What methods 
are at hand?  
Actor 
Who is supposed to do it? 
Who is involved in the work? What are their different roles 
and responsibilities? 
Scene 
Where and when is it supposed to be done? 
In what arenas or forums is the actual work being done?  
Purpose 
Why is it supposed to be done? 
What is the purpose of the work? Why is it needed?  
 Table 1:  Modified Pentad analysis 
For recommended practices, our objectives are to map out and compare the 
recommendations made in national policy regarding multiagency 
approaches. This puts the focus on the act, agency, actors and scene of 
the work. As a first step, the sections where multiagency approaches 
are mentioned or referred to in the documents are singled out. Since 
the policies, action plans, handbooks and recommendations are 
numerous and target different levels of the prevention structures, we 
address both national policies and policies aimed directly at 
multiagency approaches. In search of policy concerned with practical 
work and recommendations for a successful collaboration, it is evident 
that the police are the richest source of information, as they often 
produce handbooks and recommendations for national, regional or 
local police forces. The handbooks and recommended practices are 
presented for the four Nordic countries separately, followed by a joint 
analytical discussion of the practices that were found. 
In order to analyse how multiagency approaches are advocated, the national 
action plans are regarded as the main source of information and we 
have focused on a joint Nordic perspective. Thus, we identified 
common themes in how these practices are advocated by asking the 
question: how is this made legitimate and relevant? What are the alleged 
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benefits of multiagency approaches? This means that it is mainly the 
purpose section of the pentad analysis that is utilized. This coding was 
initially done at the national level, and then summarized, compared and 
discussed in a joint Nordic perspective.  
For legal frameworks, the national legal frameworks are mapped out, 
compared and analysed in three broad sections: (1) legal incentives in 
the Police Acts for collaboration and prevention; (2) obstacles to 
information sharing; (3) possibilities for information sharing. Given the 
fact that legal texts are rather scant and do not include the background, 
reasoning and motivation, a discursive analysis becomes difficult to 
perform. Hence, this chapter is highly descriptive. The data is 
presented in a table in order to visualize the similarities and differences 






Q: What are the similarities and differences in the organizational structures of the 
SSP/SSP(f)/SLT/Anchor models in the four Nordic countries and what is the 
role of civil society organizations? 
In scholarly literature, there are some distinctions made between 
interagency and multiagency approaches. The former is about agencies 
which to some degree merge at a practitioner level, while the latter is 
used when various agencies come together to address a problem 
(Burnett & Appleton, 2004).  Of course, there are many different forms 
of multiagency approaches for addressing various problems. However, 
one common denominator is a shared understanding that a joint 
approach could diminish overlaps between services, promote the 
pooling of resources and reducing potential risks (Vanhanen & 
Heikkilä, 2017). One of the main arguments for these approaches is 
that they afford easy access to expertise and agencies that traditionally 
handle problems separately. By organizing multiagency teams and 
structures, pools of service and skills can combine forces while 
duplication of efforts, inconsistencies and differences in emphasis can 
be avoided (ibid. p.34). 
In order to combine expertise from different institutions that handle 
or meet young individuals in their everyday work, new organizational 
arenas and multiagency approaches are developed. One important 
objective for creating such arenas is that they allow access to a broader 
repertoire of institutional expertise that can be utilized and combined 
in a number of ways (Pache & Santos 2013). Thus, they fit the 
definition of being hybrid organizations, meaning that they are 
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organizational structures that combine elements from separate 
institutional logics or discursive rationalities (Pache & Santos, 2013; 
Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The multiagency approaches in focus for 
this study consist mainly of collaborations between schools, social 
services and the police. An organization structured as a hybrid space or 
arena means that initial tasks and objectives for the collaboration need 
to be established and agreed upon; otherwise there is a risk of each 
agency sticking to their traditional objectives, which might jeopardize 
the collaboration. Following Willumsen (2008) and Binder (2010), it is 
also worth mentioning that besides the professional agencies working 
together at an inter-organizational level, multiagency teams are also 
interpersonal collaborations between individuals with different 
personal and professional expertise, skills, ethics and experiences. 
Furthermore, civil society organizations and NGOs are often included, 
which makes the hybridity of interagency collaborations even more 
hybrid. Even if these organizations and associations are ascribed 
significant importance, they are not governed by the same legal and 
professional frameworks as public institutions and their actors.   
In order to map out similarities and differences in the organizational 
structures and legislative frameworks of the multiagency approaches in 
the four Nordic countries as hybrid areas or spaces, we initially describe 
the organizational approaches for countering violent extremism in 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland separately. In doing this, we 
have used the structure of the pentad analysis, which enables further 
analysis of discursive approaches in the different countries. This might 
contribute an understanding the institutional logics of the multiagency 
approaches in the different Nordic countries. 
The mapping of organizational structures in this section of the report 
also situates and describes the SSP/SSP(f)/SLT or Anchor team 
approaches within the different national structures.  It also showcases 
some of the additional services that work as special units meant to 
support the cooperation in handling issues related to violent extremism 
and radicalization. This section is then concluded and briefly discussed 
in terms of the opportunities and challenges for the Nordic 
multiagency approaches.  
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3.1 Denmark 
In Denmark, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing is 
the governing body the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism28, which 
supports preventive efforts in the municipalities, crime prevention 
bodies, educational institutions, housing organizations, CSOs and 
others. The Centre is also responsible for counselling other relevant 
actors in producing action plans in the area, and for providing training 
for professionals who are working in the prevention area. At the 
national level, the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism is joined 
by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET, Politiets 
Efterretningstjenste) and the Danish pPolice’s National Prevention Centre 
(NFC, Rigspolitiets Nationale Forebyggelsescenter), which come under the 
Ministry of Justice. These actors are responsible for providing 
multiagency units with relevant skills and actions when needed. Also, 
within the Ministry of Education the board of Education and Quality 
(STUK, Styrelsen for Undervisning og Kvalitet) supports and guides 
educational institutions in how to work to strengthen democratic 
citizenship and critical skills and to handle concerns for extremism and 
radicalization.     
The Danish approach to violent extremism and radicalization 
according to Hemmingsen, 2015) is anchored in two agendas. “One is 
the protection of the state and society against terrorist attacks, while 
the other is the welfare state’s responsibility for the individual’s well-
being, which obliges it to protect the individual against self-harming 
behavior” (ibid. p.15).  
The Danish action plan (DK, 2016) explicitly positions collaboration 
and common understandings between authorities at the core of 
preventive efforts (ibid. p. 6). The prioritized areas in the action plan 
are centred around the strengthening of existing bodies, including the 
police, municipalities, schools and international collaboration. The 
strengthening also refers to more concrete measures, and 
consequences for disseminating extremist propaganda, for foreign 




fighters and more consistent interventions in criminal 
milieus.  Furthermore, it states that the prevention of extremism and 
radicalization is based on the crime prevention framework, but that it 
has been developed into a separate focus area within this framework.  
Danish SSP 
In Denmark, multiagency approaches for prevention in different 
institutional areas have existed since 1977 (Det kriminalpræventive råd 
- DKR, 2012). SSP is described as an interdisciplinary collaboration
between Schools, Social services and the police, aimed at general crime
prevention. The national action plan (DK, 2016) highlights that the
crime prevention collaborations between authorities are mainly for that
purpose. And that SSP and other multiagency forms of collaboration
can “draw on methods from the fields of social work and healthcare to
prevent radicalisation” (Ibid. p.14).
SSP collaboration have been the inspiration to what is called the 
Aarhus model of radicalization prevention. According to Bertelen 
(2015), the Aarhus model is: 
(R)ooted in solid experience and know-how. The SSP
organization provides a formal platform embracing exactly
those institutions, resource networks and employees who are
able to meet the particular needs of young people (ibid.
p.242).
Multiagency approaches like SSP are an important part of CVE 
interventions in Denmark; Rambøll (2018) shows that SSP is the most 
prevalent form used in organizing local preventive actions. The starting 
point for SSP cooperation between Schools, Social services and the 
Police was the need for early multiagency preventive actions for 
children and young people at risk of ending up in criminal activity or 
drug abuse. Thus, the main objective for Denmark’s SSP efforts is 
crime prevention, and is thus placed in the middle section of the 
preventive pyramid. 
Like CVE efforts in general, the SSP collaborative model is divided 
into three levels: (1) activities targeting children and young people in 
general; (2) specific activities targeting children and young people at 
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risk; and (3) individual activities targeting children and young people 
who have exhibited criminal behaviour.  
The organizational structure of SSP cooperation has three levels; a 
structure that aligns the political level and the executive level with the 
operational level (practice). 
Agency level Involved actors Purpose 
Area council 
- in 12 police
districts 
(Kredsråd) 
Chief of police and city 
mayor, key actors such as 
representatives from the 
probation service, healthcare 
system and psychiatry and 
SSP coordinators are invited 
to participate on a regular 
basis, others when needed.   
Develop strategic aims and 
priorities, frameworks and 
regulations for areas of action and 
intervention. Discuss cooperation 
between the police and the local 
community. Provide overviews of 
the local area and share 




There are differences 
between municipalities. 
Relevant actors include civil 
society organizations, 
representatives from 
government agencies and 
institutions and municipal 
administrations. The police 
chief and SSP consultant are 
most often involved. Other 
actors may be involved ad 
hoc. 
Operationalize decisions made in 
the area council, coordinate SSP 
efforts and ensure that that 
prevention efforts are in line with 
policy frameworks (child, health 
and abuse policies). The local 
council is responsible for local 
assessments of needs and for 
developing local strategies for 
SSP. Coordinate cooperation in 
the local community and align the 






Actors directly working with 
young people in the 
municipality such as the 
police, social workers, youth 
workers and 
teachers.  Other relevant 
actors may be involved ad 
hoc. 
Operationalize decisions made in 
the local council. Assess needs 
among young people in the local 
community who require 
interventions. Inform about local 
individual or collective needs for 
support. Responsible for 
involving young individuals and 
families in crime prevention 
activities. Explore the need for 
methods and actions to be used in 
primary prevention. 
Table 2. Organization of Danish SSP. 
According to DKR (2012), the operational level is based on local 
network groups related to schools. These operational units are allegedly 
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better positioned to observe and detect signals among young people in 
the local community. 
Additional Services 
As a special unit supporting the SSP, the Info houses are not actual 
physical buildings but serve as “preventive hubs” anchored regionally 
in (12) police districts. The Info houses function as centres for sharing 
knowledge and expertise, and a forum where the police and municipal 
actors in the area can discuss methods, actions and challenges in 
general preventive work and specific cases. The Info houses are 
“centers of excellence concerning extremism and radicalization” 
(Hemmingsen, 2015, p.27). 
The objectives of the Info houses also include to initiate preventive 
efforts on behalf of the police or the municipalities. One of the 
missions of the Info houses is to assess the referred cases and decide if 
these are cases of violent radicalization or a relatively harmless case of 
“legal radicalization”, “youth rebellion” or simply individuals in need 
of other measures (Bertelsen, 2015, p.243). If there are no security 
issues, the cases are referred to municipal services for further action. If 
there are then these cases fall within ordinary welfare services such as 
career counselling, therapy or housing but also services specifically 
related to violent extremism. For those in need of some form of 
intervention, mentoring is an essential element (Bertelsen, 2015). A 
mentor can play a crucial role in a dis-engagement and/or de-
radicalization process as well as act as a guide in the ordinary struggles 
of everyday life. The website for the Aarhus municipality (2018)29 
informs citizens about the services of the Info houses, and these are 
listed as counselling and guidance, parent network, workshop for 
young people, Syria preparedness (Syriensberedskab), mentor support 
and EXIT. Also, the Aarhus municipality states that the Info houses 
are linked to policemen with special experience who are in constant 
contact with co-workers within the region.  
29 Aarhus Kommune (2018). Indsatser for borgere. [retrieved 2019-07-11 from: 
https://antiradikalisering.aarhus.dk/indsatser-for-borgere/#1 ] 
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In some municipalities, there are SSP consultants who are involved in 
the local council. The SSP consultant is described as a bridge builder, 
coordinator, source of inspiration, and communicator of information 
(DKR, 2012).  The role of the consultant is to make sure that the right 
expertise is involved, that relevant knowledge is shared and that new 
methods and ideas are introduced. The SSP consultants’ association 
(SSP Samrådet)30 serves all municipalities working with SSP as a model. 
The association has 12 areas which are the same as the police districts 
(DKR, 2012). The SSP consultants’ association has a sub-committee 
focused on prevention of extremism and exit processes. 
3.2 Finland 
In Finland, policies on counter-terrorism and countering “violent 
radicalization” are somewhat intertwined. The Finnish counter-
terrorism strategy state that “Counter-terrorism in Finland is based on 
cooperation and partnership among all authorities and societal actors” 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2018, p.14). One of the fundamental 
principles of prevention in the Finnish action plan is the interaction 
between different authorities, organizations and communities. Such 
multiagency cooperation is assumed to contribute up-to-date 
awareness of the situation and contribute various means and solutions. 
No single authority organisation possesses the means to put a 
stop to the radicalisation process among individuals or groups 
on its own. When the different practitioners collaborate, they 
also gain access to a wide range of instruments (FI, 2016, p. 
14). 
With the multiagency approach as a fundamental principle, one of the 
short-term goals for actions is to (up until the end of 2018) establish 
national and local structures and procedures for multi-professional 
cooperation; making it possible for authorities, organizations and 
communities to prevent violent radicalization and extremism. In 
December 2018, a press release from the Ministry of the Interior stated 
that the new police strategy would have an increased focus on 
preventive efforts, aiming at engendering a sense of security and a 
30 SSP Samrådet web page:  [available 2019-02-05 at http://ssp-samraadet.dk/ ] 
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decrease in the financial and human burden of crimes and disruptions. 
Two of the main themes for the strategy are to further develop the 
activities of the Anchor teams and to broaden the cooperation with 
educational sectors31.   
Finnish Ankkuri - the Anchor team approach 
The Finnish Anchor team approach was initially established as a 
project in 2004 and is very much inspired by the Danish Aarhus model, 
trying “to be the anchor for young people who drift away” (Lenos & 
Keltjens 2017). Its purpose is to offer seamless services and to 
accelerate interventions for adolescents in need of support and to offer 
a client-based service (Ministry of the Interior, 2013; 2014). The 
Ankkuri approach is described as an intersectoral early intervention 
model (FI, 2016 p.19), consisting of mixed teams of professionals 
collaborating at the local level (Ministry of the Interior 2014). 
The Anchor team approach is firmly tied to the police, which has a 
special responsibility for preventing and countering radicalization and 
extremism, thus all police departments must carry out activities in 
accordance with the Anchor team model (FI, 2016 p. 27). According 
to a press release from the Ministry of the Interior, a multi-professional 
Anchor team is “made up of a police officer, a social worker, a 
psychiatric nurse, in some parts of Finland, even a youth worker” (ibid. 
p.2)32.  However, the capacity of the Anchor team model in different
cities and settings is reliant on the local operating environment and
circumstances and operates at three levels: minimum, basic and high.
The Finnish Anchor team approach distinguishes between multiagency
work and multi-professional work. The latter refers to professionals
working together in established teams while multiagency work refers
to professionals coming together on a case-by-case basis “whilst
working and residing in their respective organizations” (Nordic
31 Ministry of the Interior (2018-12-19). New police strategy shifts focus to preventive 
work.[available 2019-01-20 at  https://intermin.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/poliisin-
uusi-strategia-siirtaa-painopistetta-ennaltaehkaisyyn ] 
32 Ministry of the Interior (2018-08-15). Project is underway to improve referral of 




Council of Ministers 2017, p. 45). The 2017 annual report that 
evaluates the national action plan underlines the need for local actors 
to know who to contact in cases of concern for the situation or 
behaviour of a particular individual. “The contact point can be the 
Anchor team or a contact person indicated by the city or the police” 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2017 p.13).  
In the Handbook for the Anchor model (Moilanen, Airaksinen & 
Kangasniemi for the Ministry of the Interior, 2019), the objectives of 
multi-professional work are to prevent crimes and strengthen the 
wellbeing of young individuals; to offer young people and their families 
appropriate help at the right time; to support participation and prevent 
exclusion; and to prevent and identify radicalization resulting in violent 
extremism and in that way strengthen internal security through early 
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youth work and 
the health 
sector.  
Responsible for the coordination and 
evaluation of Anchor team efforts. Ensuring 
that the teams have adequate resources for 
doing their work, including guidance and 
support from management. Define target 
groups for the Anchor teams, make sure that 
the team is aware of, and follows the 
legislation and guidelines for sharing 
information.  
Grassroots 






Operational work in shared office premises. 
Table 3. Organization of Anchor team efforts. 
Additional services 
In 2016, a cooperation network was established between the police and 
the mayors of the capital region (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and 
Kauniainen). The cooperation network is meant to ensure that 
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“radicalised individuals living in the region, or one about to become 
radicalised, will not be left without the appropriate support merely 
because of the red tape33” (Ministry of the Interior, 2017 p. 21). The 
network is to ensure that there are effective structures in place for 
monitoring and handling violent extremism and to exchange 
information about the current situation in the region. As of 2019, there 
is a new multiagency group in Finland for handling single cases of 
individuals returning from conflict areas. The group consists of 
representatives from SUPO (Finnish security intelligence service), 
KPR (National Bureau of Investigation), the police and other related 
authorities.  
3.3 Norway 
The set of actors involved in Norwegian actions for preventing 
extremism is broad. According to Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2015), the 
emphasis in CVE efforts in Norway is on preventive measures rather 
than repressive, thus the problem is not considered to be an issue for 
the police and the security services only. One important actor is The 
regional resource center for violence, traumatic stress and suicide prevention34 
(RVTS), which is divided into five regions and have a key role in 
disseminating knowledge about extremism, radicalization and 
prevention to a broad range of local agencies and civil society 
organizations. In the police strategy for crime prevention, mobilization, 
involvement and mutual cooperation are key factors in prevention and 
this is one of the reasons for expanding SLT initiatives (ibid. p,13).  The 
Norwegian action plan commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security35 (hereafter NO, 2014) states that “early 
preventative efforts are a responsibility that rests with many sectors of 
society” (ibid. p.7.). Furthermore, it states that “General preventative 
efforts in many different fields can also help prevent people from 
choosing violence as a means of achieving their ideological or religious 
goals” (ibid. p.7). The plan emphasizes that preventive work requires 
33 We interpret “red tape” as limits on sharing information (confidentiality) between 
organizations.   
34 De regionale resurssentrene om vold, traumatisk stress og selvmordsforebygging. 
[available 2019-10-02 at: https://rvts.no/] 
35 Justis og beredskapsdepartementet]  
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interdisciplinary efforts and thinking, along with established local 
cooperative models where the municipalities, the Police Council and 
the SLT model work together.  
Norwegian SLT 
Norway’s SLT model (Samordning av Lokale rus og kriminalitets-
forebyggende Tiltak/Coordination of local preventive efforts against 
drugs and criminality), is according to National Crime Prevention 
Council (KRÅD, 2011)36 similar to the Danish SSP model (in 2015 the 
KRÅD was reorganized into the Center for crimeprevention37. A report 
(NIBR, 2016:12) states that even though the SLT model has a wider 
preventive and promotive purpose, it is central in local efforts against 
extremism and radicalization. It should also be noted that only about 
half of the municipalities in Norway have implemented SLT with 
dedicated SLT coordinators (though some have only part-time 
functions). This is probably due to the number and size of 
municipalities in Norway. Thus, it should be recognized that 76% of 
Norwegian citizens live in the larger municipalities that have SLT, and 
that in October 2019, there are 190 SLT-coordinators38 .  
SLT is a model for cooperation that primarily (according to KRÅD 
recommendations) handles cases involving children and young people 
under 18. In some municipalities, it is expanded to cover persons up to 
age 23 and occasionally older individuals have been included (some 
municipalities include individuals of all ages in their SLT model). SLT 
involves actors representing the municipalities, police and other 
government agencies. Civil society organizations and local enterprises 
can also be involved in SLT. The model is intended to coordinate 
knowledge and resources between the police and relevant municipal 
units. Also,  SLT is recommended by the Norwegian Crime Preventive 
Council (KRÅD, 2011) as a structure to steer and increase the 
efficiency of preventive efforts (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 
 
36 KRÅD = Det Kriminalitetsforebyggande Råd [National Crime Prevention Council] 
37 Senter for kriminalitetsforebygging 





2014). The organization is based on three levels that allocate the 
responsibilities for governance, coordination and implementation. 








The steering committee use 
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implementation of SLT. The 
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committee into practice and 
needs to have close and good 
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It is voluntary for the municipalities to establish a police council 
(Politiråd). It can be formed as cooperation between the local police 
and municipal authorities for the purpose of crime prevention and 99% 
of the Norwegian municipalities have such councils (Rambøll, 2014). 
The objective is to promote cooperation on general crime prevention 
and security in local communities. The police council is a forum for 
executives in the police and municipalities and handles general issues 
for citizens, while the SLT is primarily concerned with children and 
young individuals (KRÅD, 2011). It is common, but not mandatory, to 
use the police council as a steering committee for SLT. An evaluation 
of the police council (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2014) shows 
that more than half of the municipalities in Norway apply an 
organization where the police council is also the SLT steering 
committee. This is for instance the case in Fredrikstad (Politiet øst 
Politidistrikt, 2018), while in Oslo the mayor is the director of the 
police council with the chief of police as vice director (Politiet Oslo 
politidistrikt, 2018).  
SLT coordinators are responsible for the local coordination of SLT. 
For instance, in the municipalitiy of Oslo there are 15 SLT 
coordinators representing each part of the city and they function as the 
secretaries of the regional steering groups. The coordinators also 
participate in municipal agency sections (Politiet Oslo Politidistrikt, 
2018). An evaluation from the Norwegian Police University College 
(PHS, 2008) shows that the most common position for SLT-
coordinators is a placement within the city mayors staff and that this is 
the most valued position since it gives an overview of levels and actors 
available in the municipality. Fredrikstad is a much smaller municipality 
than Oslo, have two SLT coordinators they are the driving forces in 
the mission to make different municipal instances and organisations to 
cooperate in preventing crime (Politiet øst Distrikt, 2018). The 
evaluation of the National actionplan from 2017, states that these 
municipalities are satisfied with their SLT work and that the SLT, 
coordinator is of specific importance for aligning the efforts of the 
steering committee and the working committee (Justis og 
Beredskapsdepartementet, 2017). Even though this may not be true for 
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all of the coordinators, the evaluation from PHS (2008) highlights the 
coordination of crime preventive actions as crucial. It also concludes 
that though the main mission for the SLT coordinators is to initiate 
measures in the SLT-work, the “administrative work appears to be the 
most adequate description of what is actually being done” (ibid. p. 11). 
The SLT coordinators main partners on a local level is connected to 
the preventive police officers. These may be single officers dedicated 
to preventive work, or larger preventive police units is some cities. 
Such units are concerned with cases involving individuals under 18. 
Their main tasks include general youth crime and delinquency (gangs, 
drugs, violence etc.) but also extremism. Much of what they do may be 
considered as social prevention. Preventive police officers try to 
intervene before a crime has been committed, usually in collaboration 
with other agencies. In cases related to extremism and radicalization, 
they work closely with the regional police radicalization contacts. 
Except collaboration with coordinators on different levels, the 
preventive units can work together with schools and civils society 
organizations in order to prevent crime39. 
In addition, preventive radicalization contacts (Radikaliserings-
kontakter) are established in “relevant police districts” (NO, 2014, 
p.20) and function as contacts between the security police (PST) and 
the local collaborating parties. According to the 2017 evaluation of the 
action plan (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017), radicalization 
contacts are now established in all police districts. The radicalization 
contacts have an advisory function in the police council and SLT. 
However, the evaluation also shows that there are relatively few cases 
handled that concern radicalization or extremism.  
3.4 Sweden 
Sweden’s CVE policy has undergone some organizational and 
discursive shifts during the last few years and the responsibility for 
 





handling issues concerning violent extremism has been transferred. In 
addition, action plans and strategic policies have been evaluated, 
revised and replaced. In comparison with other national strategies, 
Sweden has previously put more rhetorical emphasis on long-term 
strengthening and safeguarding of democracy than on security 
measures. One example of this is that the responsibility for actions 
against violent extremism and the former National Coordinator against 
Violent Extremism was placed under the Ministry of Culture. Even if the 
national coordinator function is now repalced by the Center Against 
Violent Extremism (CVE), the ministry is still responsible for the 
Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society (MUCF), which amongst other 
things, supports and finances projects that aim to safeguard democracy 
against violent extremism. 
In Sweden, (in autumn 2019) there are no specific responsibilities for 
CVE efforts placed at the regional level. County administration boards 
cooperate with the seven police territories on crime prevention and 
these territories coordinate smaller police districts or local police units. 
In the Swedish case, local actors like first-line personnel (professionals 
working within education, afterschool leisure centres, social services, 
healthcare services and local police) are often described as key actors 
in prevention. Civil society organizations and faith communities are 
also believed to play a crucial part in prevention work. One 
fundamental aspect of this solution is that for vulnerable individuals or 
for children and young people, mutual trust and emotional or social 
bonds are necessary for making individuals feel safe and protected 
(Sivenbring, 2018).    
Swedish SSP(f) 
Even though SSP(f) is briefly described in SOU (2013:81), there are no 
national regulations or recommendations for the establishment of 
specific multiagency approaches as in Denmark for instance. However, 
there other forms of multiagency approaches besides SSP(f), for 
instance SIG40 (Social action groups) which are locally organized in 
municipalities. The SIG and SSP(f) teams are generally based on the 
 
40 [SIG = Social Insats Grupp]  
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same foundation and their aim is crime prevention. The difference is 
that SIG teams are interagency collaborations (Burnett & Appleton, 
2004), as they are put together based on individual cases and 
assessments of the needs of a particular individual (National Board of 
Health and Welfare, 2016). The SIG are also organized and 
coordinated by social services. 
Organizing SSP(f) efforts at the local level is dependent on 
collaboration agreements between the police and social services in the 
municipalities. While being frequently mentioned in policy on CVE, it 
remains unclear how many municipalities in Sweden actually use SSP(f) 
as a multiagency structure for handling violent extremism. According 
to the Swedish Police (2013), Gothenburg, Uppsala and Malmö have 
established SSP (f) cooperation. However, in the Police publication 
(2017) Support for crime preventive work41 a functioning SSP(f) or SIG is 
framed as a proven effective foundation for handling young people at 
risk of becoming radicalized.  
Agency level Involved actors Purpose 
Local steering 
group or central 
cooperation team 
(local kontroll-
grupp eller centralt 
samarbetsteam) 
SSP(f) coordinators from 
local divisions of the city. 
Executives from involved 
agencies. Headed by social 
services. 
Organization and control 
of the cooperation, 
responsible for 
frameworks, objectives 
and evaluation. Providing 
support and information 
Executive group 
(Ledningsgrupp) 
Heads of agencies/groups, 
unit leaders, youth police, 
school principals, from the 
municipality and police. 
Coordination, planning 




Actors directly working 
with young people through 
SSP(f) in the municipality, 
police and civil society 
Operational work, 
everyday relational and 
social actions.   
Table 5. Organization of SSP(f). 
 





Additional services  
The 290 municipalities have the legal and financial responsibility for 
local social services such as childcare, schools, social welfare services, 
afterschool leisure centres, etc. Thus, the municipalities and local 
initiatives play a significant role in the governance of society. This is 
also the case for prevention of violent extremism, as responsibilities 
formulated on a national level are more or less shifted to the local level. 
All municipalities have been encouraged (by the former national 
coordinator) to develop local action plans for handling violent 
extremism and to appoint a coordinator responsible for the local 
coordination of preventive actions in each municipality. However, 
studies have shown that not only are these plans often missing, but the 
work tends to defeat the objectives of preventing extremism, as it lacks 
alignment with local assessments of existing problems and instead 
relies on national assessments. Thus, these plans sometimes miss the 
mark of making local prevention effective or even possible (Andersson 
Malmros & Mattsson 2017).   
In November 2015, the (former) Swedish national coordinator decided 
to set up and pilot municipal Kunskapshus (Knowledge centres) in the 
municipalities of Stockholm, Örebro, Gothenburg and Borlänge. 
These were meant to serve as coordinating hubs for safeguarding 
democracy by preventing radicalization and the development of violent 
extremist milieus (SOU 2017:110). These centres are managed and 
organized by the different municipalities and like the Danish Info houses 
and the Dutch Veiligheidshuis (security centre) that have inspired these 
organizations, they should be seen as a function rather than a physical 
building. Their objective is to develop and optimize municipal and 
regional resources in order to strengthen local CVE efforts. 
Furthermore, they serve as an entry point for the municipalities 
concerning issues related to violent extremism and are intended to 
make a contribution through coordinating local support for individuals 
who want to leave violent milieus, and for their relatives. Another 
specific objective given by the (former) National coordinator is that the 
knowledge centres are expected to cooperate with civil society 
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organizations in their work with defectors and their relatives. In 
addition, they are intended to enhance democratic practices through 
citizen dialogues, theme days, youth and family activities, etc. (Axelson 
& Stier, 2017).   
The evaluation conducted by Axelson and Stier (2017) with colleagues, 
shows that the knowledge centres in the four cities have chosen 
different organizational settings; this is most evident when viewing 
who the involved actors are and who are regarded as external resources 
to the Kunskapshus. In Örebro and Gothenburg, the local 
coordinators work with the police and social services while in Borlänge, 
only the local CVE coordinator is involved, and Stockholm did not use 
the designation (Kunskapshus) at all. Overall, the evaluation shows that 
the knowledge centres have acted effectively where they have occurred, 
especially when different actors and agencies have worked together. 
However, there have been uncertainties and tensions between the 
different preventive perspectives focusing on socio-political measures 
on the one hand, and security measures on the other. 
3.5 Civil Society  
A mapping of knowledge about the prevention of extremism, 
commissioned by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism (2018) 
defines approaches to prevention and shows that civil society 
constitutes a major part of these approaches. Support and guidance, 
information and education of citizens, the inclusion of family and 
social networks, and the involvement of civil society organizations are 
highlighted as potential ways to strengthen prevention against violent 
extremism. The Danish national action plan (DK, 2016) frequently 
mentions and involves civil society and affirms that all contributors to 
society are important to ensuring a positive development “from 
authorities to parents, families and civil society (ibid. p 3).   
Among these civil society actors and their associations and 
organizations, faith communities are often included and so are families 
and relatives. As these actors are voluntary and often driven by 
ideology, there are few ways to govern or frame their efforts. As stated 
in the Swedish report SOU (2017:110) “Civil society has no legal 
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obligation to prevent violent extremism, but often has the will and 
unique possibilities to do so” (p.94). Instead, a way to incorporate these 
actors, and gain access to their very important services, is to support 
them financially or to provide them with knowledge and training. 
Another way to buy into their services is to give them responsibility for 
providing knowledge and education for local communities. Through 
responsibilities, accountability, financial support or grants, there are 
also some incentives to measure and assess the work being done. 
Measures that are intended to strengthen civil society and its 
preparedness to handle violent extremism can be regarded as 
safeguarding, democratizing or resilience building practices. To achieve 
this, governmental agencies and departments offer grants for projects 
that focus on preventive work. In Sweden, for instance, the Swedish 
Agency for Youth and Civil Society [MUCF] and funds like Arvsfonden offer 
generous grants for projects that are aiming at safeguarding democracy 
against violent extremism and radicalization (Sivenbring 2016; 
Andersson, 2017; Herz 2019; Mattsson & Sivenbring 2019). In 
Norway, the Ministry of Culture offers financial support for organizations 
and projects that use dialogue approaches and projects that can 
contribute to developing knowledge and forums for dialogue about 
political issues related to faith and belief systems (Justis og 
beredskapsdepartementet 2017, p.9). Such democratizing measures can 
also be about offering training and disseminating knowledge among 
civil society organizations.  
The Norwegian police (National Police Directorate, 2018) 
acknowledge the importance of working with civil society and that 
establishing such collaborations is an important mission for preventive 
police contacts, the police council and SLT (ibid. p, 8). Likewise, the 
Danish KRÅD (2012) include housing, sports clubs and local 
enterprise as potential partners in SSP collaboration. The Swedish 
report SOU (2017:110) explicitly places SSP(f) agency and civil society 
actors at the core of safeguarding democracy against violent 
extremism.  The use of civil society organizations in social work has 
previously gained little attention in public debate about preventing and 
countering extremism (Herz 2019). One reason might be that there are 
few possibilities for drawing any valid and reliable conclusions about 
the efficacy of the democratizing actions and measures that these 
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organizations and associations have long been focusing on. There are 
simply few reliable quantitative possibilities or measurements available 
to show how values and attitudes change through interventions. 
However, there are many individuals who, in their everyday work or 
through their work in civil society organizations, meet with young 
people at risk, and who actively intervene in order to prevent those 
young people from coming to harm or doing harm to others. 
They deserve strong support that rests on a stable foundation. 
Many of them have been involved long before we started 
talking about violent extremism, and they have knowledge and 
experience based on many years of good work. We believe that 
this work is often overlooked for the purpose of finding rapid 
and apparently effective ways of coming up with solutions for 
problems that have developed over many years. (Andersson 
Malmros & Mattsson, 2017, p.76).42 
Appendix 1 in this report shows some of the formulations that 
underline the importance of civil society organizations mentioned in 
national action plans, investigations or from evaluations and updates. 
CSOs: Offering alternatives, adding to,  
and making up for a lack of, social services 
Obviously, civil society and its organizations are defined as relevant 
actors in that they serve as neutral arenas where young individuals can 
meet, connect and find purpose and meaningful activities to be 
involved in. The Danish National Action Plan (DK, 2016) 
acknowledges that civil society organizations and associations can 
contribute to increasing resilience, even when that is not the main 
purpose of these activities (ibid. p.32). Associations and organizations 
that offer activities are often run by adults and organizers who can 
serve as significant others for young people in need of guidance. The 
importance of a sense of identity and belonging is something that these 
 
42 Original quote in Swedish. ”De förtjänar ett starkt stöd som vilar på en stabil grund. 
Flertalet av dem har varit engagerade långt innan vi började tala om våldsbejakande 
extremism och för med sig kunskaper och erfarenheter grundade genom många års 
mycket dugligt arbete. Vi tycker att detta ofta har förbisetts till förmån för att snabbt 
och till synes handlingskraftigt komma på nya lösningar på problem som vuxit fram 
under årtionden.”   
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actors can offer that official agencies and institutions often cannot 
offer.    
CSOs are thought to be able to promote positive environments in their 
local communities and on the Internet and, as a positive alternative, are 
framed as a chance to weaken the appeal and attraction of extremist 
milieus. In order to strengthen the non-governmental or civil society 
organizations in their work, an NGO-run centre has been established 
(DK, 2016). The centre welcomes members of the public who have 
concerns about radicalization, either for themselves or for someone 
they know. The centre offers a lot of the services that public authorities 
are traditionally responsible for, such as counselling and support, 
promoting positive personal development, assisting in finding work, 
accommodation or applying for a place in higher education. The 
Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI) 
offers skills enhancement and capacity-building programmes targeting 
local associations and individuals working in them, who are given an 
“intensive training and counselling programme, where they receive 
guidance on activities that will help to attract and retain children and 
young people in the communal activities of associations” (DK, 2016 
p.21).  
Another important mission for CSOs is to fill the void when there is 
no available support or guidance offered by municipal or other local 
services for concerned relatives and friends. Dryden (2018) points to 
the sometimes misleading conviction that professional actors are 
always best suited to protecting and supporting individuals in need, 
while relatives and friends might have better chances of getting access. 
This is also acknowledged in the report from a Swedish government 
official commission of inquiry (SOU 2017:110) which stated that such 
support is of great relevance but that public service support and 
guidance for relatives and friends is generally missing (ibid. 
p.93).  Furthermore, the investigation acknowledges that civil society 
organizations have the ability to build trust that authorities and 
municipal actors are often lacking. “Cooperation with civil society 
actors is therefore a prerequisite for effective preventive work” (SOU 
2017:110, p.118). Support from local institutions and from local 
organizations can be crucial and necessary for helping relatives and 
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friends to find ways of handling and caring for their young ones who 
are at risk or in trouble (Aasgard 2017). 
As an example of how CSOs and NGOs can be mobilised to handle 
specific services, the Red Cross in Sweden was contracted to set up a 
telephone help-line to counter radicalization (Mattsson, Arvidson 
Lebidinski & Johansson 2015). In 2016, this task was handed over to 
Save the children who operated it until the end of 2018. The help-line 
received a number of calls from professionals from the multiagency 
services of interest in this project.  However, relatives and friends were 
also in frequent contact with the help-line, seeking advice, support and 
guidance on how they could approach or handle their young family 
member without causing more harm. During the time the help-line was 
operating, calls from relatives and friends were slowly but steadily 
increasing. It was often hard to know where to direct those who 
expressed concern for their loved ones becoming radicalized or their 
attraction to extremist milieus (Sivenbring 2018; 2019a). Furthermore, 
there was a lack of trust in the authorities, which their contact with a 
CSO helped to bridge.  In 2018, the newly established Centre for 
Preventing Violent Extremism took over the telephone help-line service 
which now only handles calls from professional actors. According to 
the centre’s website, relatives and friends are encouraged to contact 
CSOs with their concerns43.  
In a press release from the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, Milla 
Perukangas, who leads a government project for improving referral of 
radicalized persons to relevant services says that: “Clients often find it 
easier to trust NGOs and communities than authorities. Local 
communities can help to reach out to those in a vulnerable position 
and guide them to the right services” (ibid. p.2)44. There are also some 
studies showing that relatives and friends of individuals who are at risk 
of being drawn into an extremist movement, or who are already 
engaged in such a movement, avoid contact with government agencies 
 
43 cve. se (2018-12-20) Kontaktvägar för stöd mot våldsbejakande extremism [contacts 
for support in countering violent extremism] [available 2019-02-06 at 
https://cve.se/stod.html ] 
44 Ministry of the Interior (2018-08-15). Project is underway to improve referral of 





because they fear that their relatives could be reported to the 
authorities.  It can be emotionally difficult to discuss these issues with 
friends or co-workers, and parents often feel that they are viewed as 
complicit and run the risk of being ostracized due to the actions or 
attitudes of their loved ones. To have a friend, a family member or a 
loved one involved in extremism can cause worry, shame and grief. 
(Brittain 2009; Guru 2012; Simi, Sporer & Bubolz 2016; Vanhanen & 
Heikkilä 2017; Aasgard 2018). A CSO can be an option for seeking 
guidance and support, as they can offer professional secrecy that 
government agencies, due to legal frameworks and obligations, cannot. 
In Norway, the CVE policies are almost exclusively handled by the 
public agencies and CSOs mainly play a role in general prevention (Lid 
& Heirestad, 2019). Only in exceptional cases will CSOs intervene 
actively on high-risk individuals (ibid.). This is partly due to a large 
public sector and comes with its advantages and disadvantages. For 
instance, when handling individuals who are by and large sceptical 
towards the public apparatus and surveillance, this strategy might fall 
short in CVE work.  
In Sweden, civil society and its organizations are also a source of 
expertise and services when it comes to supporting individuals who are 
in the process of defecting from an extremist movement. “Fryshuset” 
runs programs called Passus45 (for defectors from criminal groups) and 
especially Exit46 (for individuals who need support in defecting from 
extremist milieus). These initiatives have made an impact on similar 
programs in Denmark and Norway (Bjørgo, 2009). In Sweden, the 
“Knowledge centres” (Kunkapshusen) are expected to cooperate with 
civil society organizations in their work with defectors and their 
relatives. Also, the Centre for prevention of violent extremism 
advocates contacts with CSOs for individuals in need of exit support 
and guidance47.  
The civil society is also ascribed a special position for handling 
situations in vulnerable or exposed neighbourhoods. Referring to 
 
45 Om Passus, available 2019-10-01 at: https://fryshuset.se/verksamhet/passus/2540] 
46 Om Exit, [available 2019-10-02 at: https://fryshuset.se/verksamhet/exit/om-exit] 
47 cve.se. (2018-12-20). Kontaktvägar för stöd mot våldsbejakande extremism. [available 
2019-02-08 at https://cve.se/stod.html ] 
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research, SOU 2017:110 stated that civil society organizations are 
important in these areas as trust in government agencies is often low. 
Civil society can then offer an alternative, constituting a meaningful 
platform for building trust, confidence and feelings of belonging.  
Hence, CSOs are regarded as a trustworthy actor able to interact 
naturally with the local community. Activities run by CSOs can provide 
non-violent alternatives for young individuals, and offer additional help 
and support, in this case provide and offer are keywords that pinpoint the 
voluntary character of these organizations. Their position in the local 
community make them suitable to serve as a connection between 
government agencies and citizens while also having a monitoring 
function: “The actor that is first to highlight new problems” (Official 
communication. 2014/15:144, p.30).   
In short, the role of civil society and its organizations is:  
• To offer a sense of belonging and positive alternatives to 
harmful milieus. 
• To build resilience against anti-democratic practices among 
citizens.  
• To compensate for services that might be lacking or 
insufficient for people in need.  
• To serve as a trustworthy and sometimes more confidential 
alternative for people with little trust in public organizations.  
• To offer support and guidance and channel individuals to 
appropriate services.  
3.6 Conclusion 
As illustrated by the surveys in this part of the report, there are both 
similarities and differences in how the Nordic countries’ approaches 
are framed and organized to handle the problem of violent extremism 
and radicalization. To conclude Section 3 and the mapping of 
organizational structures, we summarize some of the similarities and 




Action, Agency and Actors 
• Three-tier organizational structures: The multiagency 
approaches in all the Nordic countries seem to follow a three-
tier organizational structure where governance, coordination 
and operational units are aligned. This structure is a chain of 
command, connecting the political level with the executive and 
operational local levels. It is also meant to enable a local 
situational overview and flexibility in adapting interventions to 
local needs and to the available local resources. This might be 
of importance when working with individuals at risk and in 
need of support.  
• Initiating and establishing multiagency efforts: There are 
some differences in how this cooperation is initiated and 
established between the agencies. In Finland, it is intended to 
be (to some extent) mandatory, and implemented by and 
through the police. This is similar to Denmark, where the 
district police chief is required to establish councils consisting 
of the police chief and the mayors of the municipalities. In 
these, trends in crime and questions of crime prevention are to 
be discussed. Multiagency work through SSP cooperation has 
been established for a long time and its placement in police 
districts makes it available when the need arises. In Sweden, 
multiagency work is often preceded by an agreement between 
the municipality and the local police force, but it is unclear who 
is to initiate it. SSP[f] work in Sweden is not widespread and to 
date no regulations or recommendations for the model exist. 
In Norway, establishment is reliant on local needs and 
resources and SLT collaboration is initiated by an agreement of 
cooperation between municipalities and police. SLT has been 
implemented in around 50 per cent of Norwegian 
municipalities.  
• Agencies in charge: The police is the governing agency for 
multiagency efforts in Denmark and Finland while this work in 
Sweden and Norway is governed by the municipalities in 
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cooperation with the police (more so in Norway, less so in 
Sweden). In Sweden, social services in the municipalities are in 
charge of these multiagency efforts. Although there are 
differences, the crime prevention discourse is very evident in 
Nordic policy documents. The police are in the position of 
being the agency in charge and acknowledged as the expert 
source of knowledge. Since violent extremism (in cases where 
violence is used) is a criminal offence, this comes as no 
surprise.  
• Using existing structures or establishing new ones: 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden have all previously established 
multiagency cooperation for handling problems with 
delinquent children and young people. These collaborations are 
now being utilized to include interventions in the area of 
extremism and radicalization prevention. To make this 
cooperation more effective, it is complemented by additional 
expertise (such as Kunskapshus, Info houses, Radicalization 
contacts).  Finland have been inspired by the multiagency 
collaborations that have been successful in Norway and 
Denmark in particular, and has established a structure for 
handling the somewhat novel problem of extremism and 
radicalization. Sweden has chosen a somewhat more 
ambivalent and non-permanent solution. 
• Incorporated agencies: The operational units that put into 
practice the actions and measures decided consist of actors 
representing different agencies and disciplinary expertise. The 
primary agencies involved in the Nordic multiagency 
approaches for handling violent extremism are the police, 
social services, and schools and educational services. In Sweden 
and Norway, youth workers, after-school centre supervisors 
and teachers are also involved. In Finland, psychiatric nurses 
are permanent partners in the Anchor teams while school staff 
or youth workers are not mentioned to the same extent. 
• Additional expertise: In order to provide the multiagency 
approaches with expertise in handling issues specifically related 
to radicalization and violent extremism, the operational 
SSP/SLT and Anchor units are supported by municipal or 
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regional units such as Kunskapshusen or local CVE 
coordinators (in Sweden), Info houses (in Denmark) and by 
police local council, SLT-coordinators and radicalization 
contacts (in Norway). In Finland, there is a network in the 
capital region which ensures that the work is done according to 
the guidelines. These supportive hubs are specialized in 
handling and managing issues of radicalization and violent 
extremism. These expert units are connected to the 
multiagency teams by coordinators or contacts who are often 
situated within the police force. 
• Coordinators: One of the most important functions 
mentioned in policies and evaluations is the coordinating, 
consulting or contact function. These often function as a link 
between different organizational levels and as bearers of 
relevant information. The coordinating function can also make 
sure that relevant expertise is in place and that local needs are 
met.  
• Incorporating civil society: In all the Nordic countries, civil 
society and its organizations are explicitly mentioned in policy 
as part of their preventive efforts. In some cities, they are fully 
integrated in the work while in others they are integrated to a 
lesser extent. The incorporation of these (often) social actors 
utilises a “whole society approach”, as civil society 
organizations are believed to have more legitimacy when 
reaching out to citizens and especially to young citizens. Their 
privileged position as voluntary and free from obligations and 
sometimes even membership or registration can make them 
appear to be safer for certain individuals. CSOs are often able 
to build trustworthy relationships with individuals in need of 
support.  
 
Scene and Purpose 
• Local understanding: The need for multiagency approaches 
as a way of dealing with problems with young individuals is 
mainly dependent on local resources, the local situation and 
needs. There are many cities and municipalities in the Nordic 
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countries that have never, and likely never will, encounter 
problems connected to extremism. Therefore, the need for 
collaboration in general in most cases is not focused on violent 
extremism, but on handling cases where individuals at risk can 
get support and guidance.   
• Protected value: The main objective of multiagency 
cooperation in the Nordic countries is to prevent crime, protect 
fundamental rights, prevent people from choosing violence 
and reducing the threat of violent extremism to society. Thus, 
they are meant to prevent, protect and reduce the impact of 






4. Recommended Practices 
and Advocating 
Multiagency Approaches 
Q: What are the recommended practices in national policy documents regarding a 
multiagency approach to CVE, and how are these practices advocated? 
There is little evidence of practices that are proven to be effective when 
it comes to successfully preventing or countering violent extremism 
and radicalization (Eriksson, Beckman, Sager 2018; Feddes & Galucci 
2015; DK Center for Forebyggelse af Ekstremisme 2018).  Successful 
practices take a long time to develop and adapt, and consequently, their 
effectiveness in preventing violence and extremism is difficult to 
evaluate and validate. This is also commented on by the Danish DKR 
(2012), as they are experiencing an increased demand for crime 
prevention based on scientific evidence and knowledge about 
functional methods that have been proven to work effectively. One 
conclusion DKR draws from this focus on evidence and efficacy is that 
it is caused by a need for control over public (economic) resources. 
There is some academic literature that looks at different perspectives 
on multiagency approaches for handling problematic issues, and how 
these approaches are motivated or advocated. For instance, Burnett 
and Appleton (2004) studied multiagency approaches for handling 
youth criminality in England and Wales. They highlighted how speedy 
access to information, advice and specialist attention are portrayed as 
bonuses for young people in need. These aspects often appear to be 
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the centre of attention when advocating multiagency work. Another 
aspect that is mentioned less often is that multiagency approaches can 
be seen as an answer to “the growing amount of clients with multiple 
problems that require the professionals to work across traditional 
professional boundaries” (Pohjhola & Korhonen, 2014, p. 527). 
Complex problems demand complex solutions and the responsibilities 
that used to be handled by separate professional instances are being 
transferred into multiagency organizational forms. 
This section is dedicated to explorations of 1) the recommended 
practices and 2) how multiagency approaches are advocated. In this 
section, the parts of the national policy documents and frameworks 
that deal with cooperation between agencies have been collected and 
analysed. We also incorporate local policy, handbooks and evaluations 
related to the field and to some extent “grey literature” in the analysis. 
4.1 Recommended Practices 
Recommended practices for a multiagency approach to CVE are scarce 
in the national policies. This might be because the specific objective to 
counter extremism is a rather new one and that these multiagency 
approaches are not only concerned with issues of radicalization and 
violent extremism. They often rely on collaborations where roles might 
be allocated on the basis of the actors’ original professional expertise 
or tasks. There is also an inherent logic in not being very specific in 
defining recommended practices, since one of the strengths pointed 
out in multiagency organization is that practice can be adapted 
according to local and situational needs.  
However, one of the objectives mentioned in the Norwegian police 
strategy for crime prevention is to identify and collect examples of best 
practices (National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 10). We could regard 
this as a case of there being a lot of good practices and methods being 
used by different agencies and by local units and that these could be 
collected, but as we as far as we are aware, these have not been properly 
tested and validated. Also, multiagency work can be regarded as one of 
the methods or initiatives believed to be “best practice”. As 
acknowledged by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism 
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(National Center for Forebyggelse af Ekstremisme, 2018), the research 
and literature on prevention seems to focus on results that could 
strengthen preventive actions, or results that rely on subjective 
experiences of these actions. Thus, there might be different definitions 
of what constitutes “best practice”. The Danish DKR (2012) mentions 
that efficiency and evidence is often firmly tied to economy, meaning 
that best practice is sometimes equated with economically efficient 
practices.   
In this section, we focus on recommended practices that come in 
different forms and from different senders, which make them hard to 
compare. Some of them are more conceptual, while others are 
formulated as handbooks containing concrete advice that might not be 
exclusively designed for multiagency work. In addition, the task of 
countering or preventing extremism is placed within an organization 
that is already hybrid, where the new task might add further hybridity.  
We describe some of the ways in which recommended practices are 
formulated in different policy documents at the government agency or 
local level in the four Nordic countries separately. As concluded in the 
previous section, the field is influenced and controlled by the police 
and by crime prevention discourses. This is evident from the search for 
policies focusing on practice in multiagency approaches leading us to 
documented policy and recommended practice which is primarily 
supplied by the police.  In order to make the section somewhat 
systematic, we therefore focus on the publications from police crime 
prevention services as key documents, and add recommended practices 
from other agencies where these exist.  
We differentiate between two aspects of the recommended practices 
namely the whys and the hows, or in pentad analytical terms the purpose, 
the act and the agency of the practices and start from the following 
queries: 
1) What are described as elements of success? 
What recommendations are made for making the 
approach work?  
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2) What are the tools, methods or techniques 
mentioned in policy for concrete operational 
work with “at-risk individuals”?  
Denmark - elements of success 
The Danish National Council for Crime Prevention provides a guide for 
successful SSP cooperation (DKR, 2012). Trust between actors is 
essential for both prevention and intervention, and something that 
needs to be in focus for operational work (ibid. p.10). The Crime 
Prevention Council highlights some important factors for successful 
SSP: 
• There need to be clear definitions of responsibilities for each 
level 
• It is important to ensure that knowledge is disseminated to all 
levels and relevant knowledge needs to be gathered, 
coordinated and mediated 
• Concrete knowledge of local needs and realities is regarded as 
crucial and essential for effective cooperation. The 
organization of SSP need to reflect the concrete challenges and 
needs of the local community 
• There needs to be mutual respect and receptiveness between 
agencies. 
The local reality and knowledge of local circumstances and needs are 
put forward as one of the main foundations of functional SSP 
cooperation (DKR, 2012, p.17). Indeed, the Danish approach stresses 
the need for regularly updated knowledge and evaluations of the 
situation in order to tailor appropriate actions.   
Tools and techniques 
First and foremost, the DKR guide focuses on the collaborative aspects 
of SSP efforts and frameworks for how to utilize different expertise to 
make the best of prevention and interventions. The tools and 
techniques seem to be best developed by the actual operational units 
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in cooperation with the SSP coordinators. However, there are some 
recommendations in the guidelines for successful collaboration.  
• Use all the information at hand, involve people who are related 
to the young individual.  
• A more complete evaluation of the situation makes it easier to 
formulate concrete actions.  
• Work with, discuss, develop and share good examples.  
The Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior has published a 
series of handbooks for the prevention of extremism. The Handbook for 
relationships and mentoring 48 addresses professionals within SSP (along 
with others working with young individuals at risk of radicalization). 
The handbook gives some advice on how to evaluate the situation, how 
to work with relationships, how to communicate and how to prepare 
and assign mentors to the person in need of assistance. In short, some 
of the recommended practices are:  
• Focus on the individual’s resources and motivational factors to 
formulate concrete and attainable goals and evaluate them. 
• Thoroughly prepare every meeting with the mentee, be 
attentive to the mentee’s needs.  
• A relationship needs to be based on mutual trust, and on the 
individual and his/her experiences, not on his/her ideological 
beliefs. Keep the personal and the private separate.  
• Never try to convince, press, preach, moralize or condemn.  
• Assign a mentor who has something in common with, or who 
can easily understand, the young individual in need. They might 
have similar experiences, religion, interests, etc.  
The Handbook also contains a set of checklists and plans that can be 
used in the practical work with young individuals. These mainly show 
factors to consider when communicating with a person in need of 
support, and some guidance in how to map risk and resilience factors, 
 




resources and motivation. Thus, the checklists focus on the practical 
aspects rather than assessing if the individual is at risk. 
The Danish approach appears to emphasise knowledge in general and 
specific knowledge about the individual in need of an intervention. 
Furthermore, it focuses on relational aspects and on collaboration 
between actors where the individual client is in centre of attention.  
Finland- elements of success 
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014)49 is of the view that multi-
professional collaboration can produce more and better services, for 
the same costs. We understand this as an expression of society getting 
more value for the money spent. In Finland’s policy, we find some 
elements that are believed to bring success to the Anchor approach. 
These are presented at a more conceptual level and describe the 
prerequisites of functional cooperation.  
• The benefits of the cooperation are recognized when 
stakeholders trust each other. They need to have a positive 
attitude and motivation for the cooperation. Participants in the 
multi-professional group understand each other, where they are 
coming from, their circumstances, and are capable of seeking 
new ideas, points of view and solutions through conversation 
and collaboration. Essential for professional collaboration are 
good will, respect for others, responsibility for one’s own 
actions and willingness to help and listen to others in an 
appropriate way.  
• Multi-professional collaboration requires shared aims. The 
purpose is to intervene in problems together.  
• It is important to agree on the common rules and structures of 
the collaboration.  
• The models are modified in relation to local needs and are 
continuously evaluated and developed.  
 
49  References from this publication have been kindly translated from Finnish into 
English by our Finnish colleagues.  
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Tools and techniques  
In 2019, the Ministry of the Interior published a handbook for Anchor 
collaborations (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019). The 
handbook suggests a number of concrete actions. In some sections it 
is very detailed:  
• When a client has been selected, he or she is invited to a 
meeting where information about the concern and the 
motivation for a multi-professional course of action is 
introduced. A plan is formulated for upcoming meetings. 
Parents are, if it is advisable, invited to the initial meeting. The 
following meetings are reserved for the client alone.  
• The meetings mainly take place at police facilities, but if 
required meetings can be arranged elsewhere.  
• Informed consent must be obtained from the client to share 
information within the multiagency group.  
• During meetings the client, parents or relatives and experts give 
their version of the incident (or the reason for the Anchor 
team’s involvement). It is important to listen to the client. The 
experts then inform the client about the legal position and the 
eventual consequences of the incident.  
• Everyone needs to share their point of view. After this, the 
discussion can turn to details and the identification of needs for 
change, how this change can be achieved and how everyone 
involved can act to support the change.   
Thus, the aim of the meetings is to find methods and support that 
promote the wellbeing of the client and to prevent him or her from 
committing crimes in the future. In order to achieve this, the handbook 
stresses the need to evaluate and map out the current life situation of 
the young individual. This is done by using a standardized template for 
discussion provided in the handbook. The use of the template is meant 
to ensure a multidimensional mapping of the situation.   
The handbook also gives some detailed suggestions on setting up 
agendas for the meetings. Information letters, invitations or calls to 
attend meetings, to-do lists, templates for informed consent, 
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instructions for documenting activities, evaluation forms and a wordlist 
are included (ibid. p. 73-86). 
The Finnish approach is (in policy) focused on reaching consensus 
between partners and actors. Through carefully planned meetings 
and conversations with the individual client, it is believed that he or she 
will make positive changes and refrain from committing crimes in the 
future.  
Norway - elements of success 
In Norway, crime prevention is posed as the primary strategy for the 
police and close collaboration with other actors is one of the central 
elements for the years to come (National Police Directorate, 2018). 
The Norwegian Police’s (City of Oslo, 2014) SaLTo Handbook on concern, 
is focused on local practices and SLT efforts targeting young people 
aged 12-22. The handbook lists the different levels that are involved in 
preventive work followed by some guidelines for professionals who are 
concerned about someone at risk of becoming radicalized. This is then 
followed by a list of “potential signs of concern” (ibid, p.9) where 
statements, utterances, interests, aspects of appearance and use of 
symbols, activities, friends and social networks are themes that are 
mentioned. The next chapter presents potential risk and protective 
factors in the young person's immediate environment, and the last part 
of the handbook describes some examples of relevant actions (elements 
of success) that are coordinated through SLT, including:   
• Cooperation between services and sectors, led by the police 
councils/SLT 
• “A broad and constructive dialogue involving other 
government agencies, organizations and the local communities 
is essential to ensure success” (ibid. p.5) 
• Development of individual action plans, activating measures 
and services for a specific individual. 
In the handbook, dialogue is framed as a key method for preventing 
violent extremism: “Dialogue results in good relations, which in turn 
ensure good prevention” (ibid. p.11). 
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Tools and techniques 
The methods or practices that are mentioned or recommended in the 
handbook (ibid. 2014) focus on dialogue and relational techniques such 
as conversation, mediation, mentoring, guidance and individual 
programmes.   
• Conversation intervention is a much-used tool by the police in 
their contacts with young offenders. 
• Mediation and reconciliation should follow conflicts and abuse, 
where schools and conflict councils are spaces for this. 
• SLT uses mentors for young offenders and the mentor 
functions as a counsellor and influential sponsor/supporter. 
• Guidance for parents and the parents’ network can be provided 
in the local community. 
The police (National Police Directorate, 2018) promote the SLT model 
as an effective and relevant model for preventing crime. Besides close 
collaboration and involvement, the strategy requires increased priority 
and knowledge about models for cooperation, innovation, project 
work and trans-agency cooperation.   
The Norwegian recommended practices appear to rest on 
conversational techniques and social psychology foundations and 
social relationships are their focus. Their protective value can be found 
in the individuals and their chances of positive change through 
mediation, counselling, reconciliation and mentoring. At the core is 
a need for building trust and resilience. 
Sweden - elements of success 
The Swedish Police (2017) describe some elements of success in 
multiagency cooperation and encourage local police to: 
• Strive for broad cooperation, and try to incorporate partners 
from different agencies and organizations 
• Cooperate with the local community on issues that involve the 
people living there 
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• Integrate the issue of violent extremism into existing crime 
prevention efforts 
• Strive towards showing a positive result that proves that 
cooperation is useful and something to build upon (Swedish 
Police, 2017 p.8). 
Thus, a key element of success is indeed cooperation, and another is to 
prove how effective cooperation is. The foundation of effective 
collaboration is sharing relevant information between actors. This 
information is divided into two types: 1) general situational awareness 
that describes and visualizes the problem; and 2) specific information 
that contains direct or indirect personal data.  Of these two, the former 
is not associated with any ethical or legal restrictions, while the latter 
calls for careful consideration.  
The importance of trust is also an aspect when it comes to collaborative 
work between the police and other actors. 
• The police base their actions on conflict-reducing principles 
(knowledge, facilitation, communication and differentiation) in 
dialogue with cooperation partners. (The Police, 2017 p.10). 
This mean that the Swedish police recommend the use of conflict 
reducing dialogue, not only when in contact with clients, but also when 
cooperating with others.   
According to an evaluation of Sweden’s CVE efforts, coordination and 
clarity are useful when it comes to expanding cooperation between 
different actors involved (Statskontoret, 2018). In fact, one element of 
success is that there is a coordinating agent. Whether it is a person or 
a position, the coordinating function has increased cooperation by an 
estimated 70% between the years 2014 and 2017 (ibid.). 
The coordinating function is also given some attention in the Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ, 2016) manual: 
Samverkan, i lokalt brottsförebyggande arbete (Cooperation in local crime 
prevention efforts). It describes the agreements for cooperative work 
between police and municipal services such as schools and social 
services. According to the manual, an agreement should be based on 
local needs and problems that the police and municipality can solve 
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together.  The agreement should stipulate practical issues such as time 
frames, the establishment of a new organization for mutual governance 
and evaluation. The decision is about the clarification of participants’ 
roles, obligations, mandates and powers and for giving the 
collaborative work status and legitimacy (BRÅ, 2016 p.19).  Other 
elements of success in collaboration are the identification of key actors 
and new potential partners, the clarification of the organization’s 
motives for collaboration, knowledge of each other’s organizations, 
and respecting rules regarding professional secrecy.   
Tools and techniques 
The practices recommended by the Swedish Police (2017) resemble 
those in the Norwegian policy. They are focused on relational work 
and on building trust:    
• Create good relations and trust in the local community; this also 
increases the chances of detecting and preventing 
radicalization. 
• Good relations take time to establish and therefore the local 
police need to have support from the management. 
• It is important that the individuals involved in building trust 
have an interest in other cultures, religions and events in the 
surrounding world as these events can have local 
consequences. 
The relational work serves several purposes and by building trust the 
chances of detecting individuals at risk are increased. Trust in the police 
may also improve the chances of individuals seeking help and support 
if needed. Much like the Norwegian policies, the Swedish approach 
seems to rely on dialogue and reconciliation. Relationships and trust lie 
at the core of the policy and cooperation between different actors is 
framed as a way of achieving success.  
4.2 Schools and Social Services 
Individuals who are attracted to extremist milieus are generally rather 
young, and it is often advanced that there are strong incentives for 
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including preventive efforts in institutions that routinely deal with 
children and young people.  
Schools and preschools 
A prevailing theme is that educational and childcare services first and 
foremost have the task of safeguarding, preserving and developing 
democracy and democratic practices. This task is also in line with the 
foundational values that are formulated in the national curriculums of 
the Nordic countries (Sivenbring 2019b). Schools are one of the most 
important places for democratic social education. They can act as an 
arena or a safe space for dialogue and conversation, where social 
problems can also be resolved (O’Donnell 2016; Thomas, 2016; 
Mattsson 2019). Teachers and school staff are sometimes faced with 
contradictory tasks: “On the one hand, they are supposed to build trust, 
strengthen and reinforce democracy and ensure that students gain 
knowledge of, and practise human rights and democratic citizenship. 
On the other hand, they are supposed to use their classrooms as 
observatories to detect future radicals and criminals, and sometimes 
report a crime that has not yet been committed” (Sivenbring, 2019, 
p.8). The following section shows some of the recommendations and 
objectives for schools and educational services. It is presented as 
recurring themes in policy at various levels.  
The safeguarding of democracy 
As an important institution in societal development, educational 
institutions have a responsibility in safeguarding democracy. Teachers, 
youth workers and school staff often have close relations with young 
people and access to important information about their everyday lives.  
The Danish national action plan (DK, 2016) places preschools and 
schools in the general prevention level. Their main task is to train 
students in critical thinking and democratic citizenship, to build 
resilience and prevent risky behaviour. The plan also reveals that there 
are a lot of ongoing programmes under development and these are 
focused on developing tools and methods for handling extremism. The 
mission for schools and educational services is also to alert social 
services and the security services when students show signs of 
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becoming radicalized in the same way as they do when criminal 
behaviour is detected.  
The Finnish National Agency for Education (2018) states that schools can 
do much to promote wellbeing and prevent marginalization. Good 
self-esteem, a sense of belonging and the experience of genuine 
opportunities to participate can protect against marginalization (Elo et 
al. 2017). Also, the Finnish national action plan (FI, 2016) is focused 
on democratic citizenship and how to use parliamentary ways of 
effecting change. Critical thinking and knowledge about religion and 
culture are mentioned.  Among the preventive measures (ibid.2016), 
the educational ministries are responsible for two out of 36 measures. 
Both of these are aimed at enhancing critical skills and building 
resilience against online propaganda.   
In the Norwegian Actionplan (2014), schools are listed as actors that 
need to “improve their capability of detecting and acting in the event 
of any concerns that may arise” (ibid. p.18). The Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security is responsible for affording guidelines on how to 
identifying and dealing with early signs of radicalization and for 
developing tools for meeting the challenges. There are also some 
recommended material that can be used in schools, for example the 
European Council's publication “No Hate-Speech” which has been 
translated into Norwegian.  
The Swedish National Agency for Education (2018) says that 
educational institutions have no explicit responsibility to prevent crime. 
However, school principals have the responsibility to ensure that the 
school environment is safe and secure by preventing violence and all 
other forms of offensive behaviour for example. It is also firmly stated 
that schools are to focus primarily on their democratic task. One 
initiative established in SOU 2017:110 was to develop a resource for 
teachers to work with controversial issues. 
Identifying individuals at risk of radicalization 
There are no legal requirements that teachers and school staff in the 
Nordic countries should report students that show signs of being at 
risk of radicalization, as it is in the UK where the PREVENT duty 
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obliges teachers to detect and report at risk signs and behaviour. 
However, the identification of individuals at risk of becoming 
radicalized is one of the more self-evident tasks given to schools and 
teaching staff. The main rational behind this task is not report these 
individuals to other actors but rather to provide opportunities for 
school personnel to intervene .Thus, schools may anyway be given the 
responsibility to observe, investigate and report individuals who show 
signs of concern (NO, 2014; Nasjonal veileder for forebygging av 
radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme, 2016). 
In Finland, the detection of young individuals at risk of radicalization 
is mentioned as a duty for the education sector and youth services (and 
social services). Teachers are presented as key actors in preventing 
violent extremism; however, they “might not always distinguish how 
the behaviour or various problems may be associated with and make 
them vulnerable to radicalisation” (FI, 2016 p.17). Youth workers can 
identify young people who are drawn to extremism and changes in their 
behaviours. In cases of concern, school and social welfare services 
collaborate in assessing the situation and if needed contact the police. 
It is the responsibility of the police to make sure that adolescents are 
steered towards the appropriate services (Elo et al. 2017, Finnish 
National Agency for Education, 2018).  Recommended practices for 
teachers in school and preschools are scarce when it comes to 
handbooks, strategies and action plans. However, the national action 
plan against violent radicalization (FI, 2016), advises school staff to 
cooperate with other agencies. Teachers and educational staff can also 
be considered to be participants in Anchor team efforts.  
As acknowledged by Elo et al. (2017) and by the Finnish National 
Agency for Education (2018), the task of preventing violent 
radicalization in Finnish schools is a rather new one. Thus, it may be 
difficult to discuss these issues in schools and there is also a lack of 
reliable knowledge and evidence of practices that could be regarded as 
best practices for tackling this area. Teachers and school principals may 
feel uncertain about how to confront students’ expressions of 
extremist views and if and when they ought to contact the police or 
other agencies. According to Elo et al. (2017) and the Finnish National 
Agency for Education (2018), it is important that students feels secure 
and accepted at school and that they can express their thoughts without 
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fear. Communication should be open and non-judgmental, working 
with the adolescent is essential where there is cause for concern, and 
they should be involved with their local community. Every adolescent 
should feel that they are part of a community and that they are seen 
and heard.  
In the Norwegian national action plan against radicalization (No, 2014) 
there are no specific measures or actions for schools or educational 
services. However, schools and educational services are listed among 
important actors for measures. The plan is, as mentioned before, 
dynamic and generic. However, there is a guide for how first-line 
personnel (teachers, social services agents, youth workers, police, etc.) 
should act if they came into contact with someone who might be at 
risk of radicalization (Håndtering ved bekymring in NO, 2014 p.27). The 
guide recommends to:  
• Engage in dialogue with the young person. The one who 
suspects radicalization engages in a dialogue, aimed at 
identifying signs of concern and risk. Any concerns and 
suspicions can be discussed with others.  
• Discuss concerns.  If the young person is in school, discuss the 
concerns with the school principal or school administration, 
and with other teaching resources. Make decisions about who 
is responsible for investigate the concerns.   
• Report concerns. The school or school administration can 
consult child protection services or the police who can decide 
if a formal report of concern is necessary.  
• The guide is supplemented with a list of at-risk signs (ibid, 
p.29).  
Given that schools are inclined put emphasis on education and 
fostering democratic citizenship, and preferably not on identifying 
individuals at risk, the task for teachers and school personnel in the 
multiagency teams may be unclear. Their privileged position as being 
close to young individuals in their everyday lives can be utilised in 
relational efforts. According to the Danish DKR (2012), teachers and 
school personnel can contribute to SSP efforts by providing involved 
students with a specialised syllabus or study plan.  
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Cooperating with others 
The Swedish National Agency for Education (2018) has stated that 
cooperation with social services and the police is essential in combating 
violent extremism. Also, an official commission of inquiry report (SOU 
2017:110) highlighted the need for cooperation. Based on the 
importance of efforts to prevent violent extremism being conducted in 
the local community, how schools act, how responsive social services 
are, how civil society works, how good relations are between the local 
police and involved municipal actors are all crucial factor for successful 
CVE efforts (ibid. 2017:110, p.226). However, the official commission 
of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) showed that there are uncertainties about 
who does what, and also an exaggerated reliance on other agencies 
knowing what should be done. The schools committee in the City of 
Stockholm (2018) noted a need to utilise and develop methods for 
collaboration between schools, social services and the police in 
particular. In order to clarify routines for joint actions in preventing 
radicalization, a flow chart has been developed. It is intended to show 
how city employees should act when they encounter incidents that 
cause concern about radicalization (in the actual publication, the flow 
chart is missing).  
In Norway, schools are encouraged to cooperate with the police and 
child protection services. The national action plan (NO, 2014) 
especially recommends that schools investigate and report before 
contacting other government agencies. The City of Oslo (2014) 
recommends that where there is concern about radicalization, school 
personnel contact and cooperate with radicalization contacts and local 
police to get support and guidance.  
Social services 
Social services are traditionally involved when people are in need of 
support and guidance. Furthermore, social services often have an 
understanding of the local situation and contacts at the public support 
services and services offered by civil society.   
In Denmark, a new amendment have been added to the Social Services 
Act, making it easier for municipals authorities to intervene when 
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individuals over 18 are at risk of becoming radicalized or want to 
disengage from violent extremist groups. Apart from this, social 
services are hardly mentioned elsewhere in the national action plan 
(DK, 2016) other than as partners in multiagency work. In fact, social 
services are mentioned a lot less than civil society organizations and 
associations.  
The Finnish national action plan (FI, 2016) lists different actors and 
their tasks in preventing radicalization and violent extremism. The list 
recognizes social services as being an important function when it 
comes to assessing people's needs for special support and to guide 
them to appropriate services “such as benefits for unemployment, 
education and livelihood” (p.17). As social services are also responsible 
for child protection, their mission is aimed in particular at supporting 
and helping individuals under 18. However, among the measures and 
objectives that identify agencies in charge or responsible for different 
tasks, social services and the healthcare system are not mentioned (e.g. 
the police is responsible for 11/36; the Ministry of the Interior for 6/36 
and the Ministries of Justice/Integration/Foreign Affairs are 
responsible for 4).  
In Norway, social workers’ main priority is the client’s social issues 
(Haugstvedt, 2017). Strategies often involve face-to-face meeting as a 
way of gaining trust, with the interest in learning about the client and 
their needs. The social services in Norway are incorporated into an 
organizational hybrid: Ny Arbeids- og Velferdsforvaltning50 (NAV). 
The social services are still formally belonging to the municipalities, but 
their work is mostly coordinated with state bureaucracy and decoupled 
from municipal preventive services. The local social services are 
seldom in contact with individuals at risk of radicalization, if these are 
not initiating contact by themselves. In some municipalities, NAV can 
be responsible for helping and following up specific radicalized 
individuals, helping them to find a job, a place to live and other 
practical issues. This kind of intervention is often called “Entry” (in 
reference to, but rather than, Exit)51. In the Actionplan (NO, 2014), 
child welfare services are defined as actors that schools can contact to 
 
50 New work- and welfare agency.  
51 Personal communication, Tore Bjørgo 2019-09-17  
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discuss concern anonymously, and also if necessary, report the 
concern.  
In Sweden, social services appear to have been given a more central 
role than in the other Nordic countries. The National Board of Health 
and Welfare (2016) gives some recommendations for multiagency 
cooperation, in this case related to SIG (social action groups) which 
are not specifically focused on CVE but on prevention and 
interventions when young individuals show signs of being at risk. Thus, 
the establishment of SIG groups is reliant on local needs and the 
numbers of young individuals in need of support. Furthermore, the 
composition of the group is dependent on the individual needs. For 
successful work, the cooperation needs to be based on a common 
foundation and:  
• An understanding of different professional tasks and limi-
tations and reasonable expectations of what can be achieved. 
• A consensus about the target group and the aims of the co-
operation.  
• Clear routines for steps in the work and for evaluating actions. 
According to support material from the Swedish National Board of 
Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2018), social workers are mainly in 
contact with individuals as they are about to enter or exit an extremist 
milieu; otherwise they are more likely to be in contact with relatives. 
The task of social services is to offer support and to prevent individuals 
from getting involved in destructive milieus. This means that individual 
needs are assessed in relation to the individual’s social environment, 
including immediate family, relations, work, housing and integration in 
society (Socialstyrelsen 2018, p.18).  The National Board of Health and 
Welfare emphasizes the importance of collaborating with other 
agencies. This is based on the Administrative Procedure Act (SFS 
1986:223) that obliges the agency to do so. The Board also stresses the 
need to be clear about the differences in responsibilities for 
cooperating agencies. In giving some directions and guidelines for 
 
 95 
cooperation, they refer to SKL (2010) “elements of success” and the 
following recommendations:52 
• Always cooperate, not only when it’s necessary. 
• Be up to date on the local situation. 
• Utilise actors’ engagement, skills and strengths. 
• Build on existing activities. 
• Work on several fronts - promotive, preventive and countering. 
• Make the individual, not their ideology, the centre of attention. 
• Allocate roles for everyone involved; communicate. 
• Adapt action plans to each individual.  
The recommendations especially stress the need for cooperation for 
being up to date on the local situation, and are about not being focused 
on individuals but rather on the phenomena, trends, attitudes and 
opinions that are circulating in the local community.  
In Finland, social services “can identify a variety of warning signals 
associated with radicalisation and refer people to the required services” 
(FI, 2016 p.17). Unlike the other Nordic countries the Finnish Anchor 
team services explicitly include healthcare professionals, and most 
often these are related to psychiatry. Healthcare services are mainly 
described as a coordinating, facilitating hub. They can access public and 
third sector (CSO) services for disengagement from violence. The 
national action plan (FI, 2016) discusses how, even though violent 
radicalization and extremism is not a mental illness, some research 
indicates correlations between extremism and mental health problems: 
“This being the case, mental health services play an important role in 
preventing violent radicalisation and extremism” (FI, 2016, p.17)  
 
 
52 (SKL, 2010, p 37–40; National Board of Health and Welfare 2018, p. 26) 
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4.3 Advocating a  
Multiagency Approach 
In the following section, we have identified how collaborative 
approaches are advocated, motivated or argued for in the national and 
local policy documents. We have identified three different types of 
arguments for using multiagency approaches in handling violent 
extremism (and other forms of delinquent or at-risk- behaviours) in the 
Nordic national policy documents:   
• To use existing structures and organizations  
for extended purposes. 
• To gather and share knowledge and expertise. 
• To coordinate actions for a more effective response. 
To use existing structures and organizations  
Collaborative approaches for preventing violent extremism rest on 
already established organizational structures anchored in crime 
prevention efforts. In the Nordic case, SSP, SLT, Anchor team and 
SSP(f) approaches are very much inspired by one another.  The use of 
existing arenas for cooperation is highlighted by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2016) as convenient, since it 
allows the utilization of established routines for issues such as reporting 
and following up on individuals who cause concern or who are 
regarded as being “at risk” (of radicalization). The same logics are used 
in Denmark, where the SSP structure and multiagency cooperation 
have a long history of being used in preventing young individuals from 
doing or coming to harm (DKR, 2012).   
The SSP/SLT/SSP(f) and Anchor team services were not initially 
established for countering or preventing radicalization and violent 
extremism, but by using additional expertise they have been facilitated 
for those purposes. In Norway the Police Council is one of the SLT’s 
collaborating partners. In an evaluation of the collaboration between 
the two units, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
(NO, 2014) stated that the Police Council may benefit from 
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collaborating with SLT teams since this form of cooperation is so well 
established within its organizational structure.  This is also the case for 
the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2018) 
which advocate cooperation in everyday practice to make cooperation 
easier when more “wicked problems” occur: “In other words, 
cooperation can be facilitated by using existing structures, for example 
general crime prevention work” (Ibid. p.26).  
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014) stated that multi-
professional collaboration can be cost-saving. One motivation for 
multi-professional collaboration is that problems can be solved 
comprehensively and tackled in a purposeful way. With scarce 
resources, authorities need to prioritize their usage. Early intervention 
saves resources, as functional models produce benefits for all 
participants.  
To gather and share knowledge and expertise 
A common idea is that greater knowledge, insight and understanding 
can more or less cultivate societies that are against violence. 
Cooperation between agencies is meant to bring together both 
knowledge and expertise about extremism and radicalization. The idea 
of collaboration between agencies is founded on discourses of expert 
knowledge where knowledge about and “know how” concerning 
radicalization and violent extremism is an advantage for the actors in 
possession of it. 
Multiagency cooperation is primarily about integrating the 
various knowledge and decision-making capabilities that the 
involved partners individually represent for a common 
good (DKR, 2012 p. 18)53.  
In the Danish SSP context, there is also an express need for the further 
development of knowledge among professional actors and for 
municipalities to acquire qualified knowledge and skills to be utilized at 
the operational level. 
 
53 Original in Danish: Det tværfaglige samarbejde handler først og fremst om at integrere 
de forskellige videns- og beslutningskompetencer, som de involverede 
samarbejdspartnere hver for sig repræsenterer, i et fælles bedste. 
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Gathering expertise and knowledge in specific forums such as the Info 
houses or Knowledge Centres enables easy access for practitioners or 
public actors in need of guidance.  Professional experts representing 
different disciplines and areas are equipped with different instruments, 
techniques and tools for handling problems and challenges. Through 
collaboration, the different agencies gain access to an even wider range 
of instruments.   
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014) argues that there are few 
security related issues that can be resolved by a single authority. Solving 
problems requires wider perspectives. Multi-professional collaboration 
helps to see each authority’s work as part of a bigger picture where 
everyone is aware of their own tasks, and at the same time they are 
committed to common goals and aims.  
The multiagency approach is supposed to facilitate both the 
dissemination and sharing of knowledge as well as providing training 
to local authorities. In this sense, practitioners working within 
multiagency teams are experts within the field and as such they 
function as resources for other participants in prevention efforts and 
employees working in close contact with members of the public (DK, 
2016). In Finland, the annual assessment of the national action plan 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2017) states that cooperation between 
agencies “promotes the development of skills and the dissemination of 
best practices” (ibid. p.17). However, there are no specifications of 
what these “best practices” might be.  It also seems that the police are 
often assigned the tasks of training and disseminating knowledge and 
best practices to other agencies.  
In Norway, the SLT coordinators are given the specific task of 
providing knowledge and information to the steering committee, and 
to allocating different disciplinary expertise in operational groups. 
Information, expert knowledge and overview are some of the key 
components in the cooperation and as it is formulated in Norwegian 
policy: “The ones who do not know where the problem really lies, can’t 
do anything about the problem”54 (KRÅD, 2011 p. 25).  Multiagency 
 




operational units are also advocated as facilitators or providers of 
“necessary training to regional authorities and other actors”, making 
sure that these are informed of who to contact when intervention is 
needed (FI 2016). 
Knowledge and expertise are also related to what function 
collaborative hubs can have regarding the intelligence services, and 
information about certain individuals or milieus, that can be provided 
by and within multiagency networks. This kind of information or 
knowledge can be used for the identification of individuals who might 
constitute a risk to society, or for handling individual cases. As stated 
in the Danish action plan (2016), “the info houses are partly intended 
as knowledge sharing forums where challenges and methods in relation 
to the prevention of radicalization can be discussed, and partly function 
as a framework for the collaboration between the police and the 
municipalities in reviewing and managing actual cases”.  
The need or the desire to identify individuals at risk of becoming 
radicalized is evident among the objectives, measures and actions in 
Nordic CVE. In the Finnish action plan, one of the prioritized 
measures is to “Increase skills, expertise and awareness as regards the 
prevention of violent radicalization and extremism” (FI, 2016 measure 
4.5). To accomplish this, the following objective has been formulated: 
Professionals and the representatives of organisations who, in 
their everyday work, encounter people who have, or are about 
to, become radicalised are able to widely recognise the 
underlying signs of radicalisation and properly act in order to 
put an end to the development that leads to radicalisation. 
Developing capabilities and professional skills is supported by 
information obtained from research. (FI, 2016 p.23). 
A well-functioning multiagency approach where knowledge and 
expertise are shared can have synergistic effects. Not only does it 
strengthen one's own agency or professional identity, the effect of a 
hybrid organization might also strengthen and multiply the expertise 
and preparedness of the multiagency professional unit as such. The 
Danish DKR (2012) states that this is dependent on secure 
professional identities and a clear understanding of differences in ways 
of acting within difference professions, and who is responsible for 
what.  In line with this notion, the multiagency approach that accepts 
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and acknowledges differences and appreciates the plethora of solutions 
that may be available also promotes a more positive work 
environment.  
To coordinate cooperation for a more effective response 
Cooperation between agencies and actors is generally described as a 
more effective way of organizing preventive and interventive actions 
and as an organizational set-up that allows for bypassing boundaries 
between agencies. 
The operation of local cooperation groups has facilitated 
collaboration between the authorities and with organizations, 
and lowered the threshold for acting together across sectoral 
boundaries, where necessary (FI, Ministry of the interior, 2017, 
p. 17).    
The Norwegian Police’s strategy for crime prevention stresses the need 
for expanding SLT cooperation between Norwegian municipalities. 
Mobilisation, involvement and mutual cooperation are framed as key 
elements (National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 13). 
They are also defined as more effective in their division of 
responsibilities and various resources that can be utilized when needed. 
The efficiency is also connected to competences, expertise and 
knowledge that can be allocated within the cooperation unit: 
Cooperation - we cooperate closely with other actors, share 
knowledge and have access to skills and tools that can be 
flexibly and efficiently utilized to get results. (NO, National 
Police Directorate, 2018 p. 5)55 
Needless to say, coordination and effective responses to common 
problems are also economically advantageous. This is also an important 
incentive for multiagency approaches. For instance, in Finland, the 
Ministry of the Interior (2013) explicitly states that early intervention and 
support is more economical for society than helping adolescents when 
the situation has already escalated and marginalization has increased. 
 
55 Norwegian original. ”Samarbeid- Vi samarbeider tett på tvers og med andre aktører, 
deler kunnskap og har tilgjengelig kompetanse og virkemidler som benyttes fleksibelt 
og effektivt for å skape resultater.” 
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Collaboration between authorities is highlighted especially on issues 
where children and adolescents are involved. As the approach 
integrates specific professional expertise, actions can rapidly be 
implemented and activated for young people in need of support 
(Ministry of the Interior 2013.) 
4.4 Conclusions  
Recommended Practices 
The recommended practices seem to focus on the following elements: 
Relationships; Mutual Trust; Responsibility, Accountability, Clarity, 
Coordination, and Local Understanding. They constitute the core of 
achieving success in multiagency approaches. 
The importance of mutual trust and relationships 
Mutual trust relates to trust between the agencies involved in the 
cooperation, but also within the agencies and in relation to the 
individuals that are the focus of an intervention. Trust includes building 
relationships between agencies and with citizens in the local 
community through dialogue. Trust in the internal work of the 
multiagency units is also about respect for and sensitivity to different 
perspectives and expertise that can be beneficial for handling the 
problems at hand. Trust can also be an incentive for bypassing 
obstacles to exchanging information. By building trust, consent from 
the individual in need can be gained, and also trust between 
professionals can informally bypass legal boundaries.   
The importance of well-defined roles and responsibilities 
Responsibility, accountability and clarity refer to the definition and 
allocation of roles. In an organization where responsibility and 
accountability are clearly defined between the involved actors, 
cooperation is most likely more effective. This also includes the 
importance of the involved actors being properly informed and 
involved in the work, and calls for the dissemination and exchange of 
knowledge and expertise. Clarity and well-defined frameworks and 
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communication for and about the cooperation can decrease potential 
internal conflicts (Pache & Santos 2013). This has been shown in the 
various checklists that are believed to help streamline the work, for 
example.  
The importance of local understanding and individualization 
Local understanding is crucial for successful practices. This includes a 
local overview of potential problems, prevailing attitudes and 
constellations as well as knowledge and contact with local resources 
who can be utilized. With local understanding and coordination, social 
networks are easier to activate. Among the successful elements, there 
is also a focus on individual adaptation and the need for individual 
action plans for persons in need of support and intervention. Much of 
the operational or intervention work being done in differing 
multiagency approaches is reliant on coordinating resources suitable 
for the specific profile of the individual. One such resource might be a 
mentor.  
Advocating a multiagency approach 
Advocations for multiagency approaches are mainly focused on the 
importance of facilitating knowledge from different fields of expertise. 
In summary advocations are revolving the following aspects:  
• Using established organizational structures for handling problems 
can be an effective way to get access to an array of expertise. 
These are “off the shelf” solutions for a novel problem. This 
may be of great importance, since they facilitate opportunities 
to respond quickly, interventions can be early and these can be 
crucial for a successful outcome in the long run. Utilizing this 
expertise can also be economically advantageous.   
• The importance of knowledge and expertise is the most prevalent 
motivation for using multiagency approaches for handling 
radicalization and violent extremism. Bringing together 
different areas of expertise can have synergistic effects and 
“best practises” can be developed. Knowledge and expertise 
are framed as an insulating? force, protecting both citizens and 
society from extremist violence. One aspect that is often 
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mentioned in the documents is the need for more knowledge 
and the development of new ideas and methods.  
• Knowledge can be utilized in a number of ways. It is an asset 
for the units in themselves, as knowledge about a problem is a 
prerequisite for handling it. Also, knowledge is something that 
can be shared, both with colleagues and with others who may 
come in contact with individuals at risk. Thus, knowledge of 
how one can detect and identify such individuals is framed as 
something that needs to be shared. Because of this, local 
knowledge can be an asset for national intelligence services.  
• The police as experts, which can be utilized for educating 
others.  
• Cooperation can bypass boundaries between agencies, or 
rather it can lower the thresholds for joint actions and 







5. Legal Frameworks for 
Sharing Information 
Q: What are the possibilities and obstacles for sharing information posed by the 
legal frameworks and professional secrecy rules within and between agencies (police, 
schools and social services) in the four Nordic countries? 
Exchanging information between government agencies about 
individuals and groups who are perceived as vulnerable to 
radicalization or already radicalized is widely accepted as a central and 
important practice in both Nordic and global CVE efforts (e.g. RAN, 
2016). The key rationale behind information sharing practices is that 
signs of radicalization can be detected in various organizational arenas, 
encouraging the sharing of such information between stakeholders 
such as the police, schools and social services. 
In the Nordic countries, information sharing practices are often 
described as being organized in pre-existing collaboration structures, 
usually those activated in crime prevention targeting young people (see 
sections 3 & 4). In these structures, concerns are often handled by 
multiagency collaboration groups and as previously addressed in this 
report these often, but not exclusively, consist of the school, social 
services and the police. But as shown in previous research and this 
report, alternative and CVE-specific information sharing structures 
have been established (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017; 
Rambøll, 2018). Hence, the question is not whether information 
sharing as a practice is relevant for CVE efforts or not, but rather how 
the structure is put into practice. 
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Besides institutional traditions, the activity and the sort of information 
that is to be shared in multiagency collaboration are reliant on 
legislation. The legislation regulates the type of information that may 
be shared, in which circumstances it is permitted, how the information 
flow between the agencies is to be organized and for what purpose the 
information is to be shared. In a literature review on information 
sharing between public sector organizations, Yang and Maxwell (2011) 
state that adequate legislation regulating information flows is central 
for building inter-organizational relationships, organizational 
effectiveness and to minimize uncertainty. Also, the content and 
implementation of the legislation is key for citizens’ trust in processing 
of personal data by government agencies. On the other hand, 
inadequate legislation may cause information flows that violate privacy 
among citizens and prevent relevant information from being shared 
(Yang & Maxwell, 2011).  
In many aspects, these arguments echo an ongoing debate on the CVE 
field on the balance between organizational efficiency and preserving 
the privacy of citizens. The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), 
an expert organization on CVE organized by the European 
Commission, has written extensively on the subject of multiagency 
work (e.g. RAN, 2016; 2017). Information sharing is seen as an 
important practice, but there are some recognized challenges. Among 
these, legal frameworks are conceived as particularly challenging. 
Partly, this is due to “a lack of knowledge of the legal limits and 
possibilities of data protection and privacy regulations with regard 
to information sharing and breaching confidentiality” (RAN, 2016, p. 
516), which resonates with the potential unintended consequences and 
counterproductive outcomes of information sharing: 
Authorities should respect the fundamental rights of the 
individual to confidentiality, privacy and freedom from 
interference by the State. Clients of healthcare services and 
legal professions in particular have a reasonable expectation 
that their information will not be shared without their consent. 
Where a professional does breach confidentiality, this could 
have permanent negative impacts on the therapeutic 
relationship, trust in the services in general, and future 




Between the lines, this quote indicates what the following section 
explores: information sharing as a contested practice. 
5.1 Sharing Information:  
A Contested Practice  
Besides being one of the most prominent and publicised elements of 
CVE efforts, information sharing concerning individuals perceived to 
be at risk of radicalization is arguably the most contested and hotly 
debated part of CVE efforts globally (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall & Lee 
Jarvis, 2015). At its core lies the problematic relationship between 
constitutional rights regarding freedom of speech, religion and 
association, and the experienced need to intervene in early 
radicalization processes to prevent extremism. As suggested by several 
research literature reviews (e.g. Schimd, 2013; Borum, 2011), we know 
little of why some people choose to engage in political and religious 
violence and others do not, despite belonging to the same social or 
ideological milieu. Put differently, there are few findings to help, for 
instance, a teacher to distinguish between a process leading to radical 
but legal thoughts and behaviours, and a radicalization process leading 
to violence. As a result, critical streams in research have pointed to the 
subjective, often racially and cultural biased, reporting of suspected 
individuals in CVE efforts (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015). 
There are relatively few empirical studies on how information sharing 
practices actually occur. Eijkman and Roodnat (2017) explored person-
specific interventions to prevent religious extremism in Dutch 
municipalities. They found that referrals of individuals, based on 
alleged signs of radicalization, are assessed by multiagency teams which 
then construct an individual intervention strategy. Key elements for 
success, according to the professionals interviewed, were a solid 
network of professionals, “an expert in interpreting signs” (Eijkman & 
Roodnat, 2017, p. 195), a preventive focus rather than a repressive one 
and good information sharing among the partners. In many respects, 
this approach is similar to those being applied in the Nordic countries’ 
CVE policies. The study found that the practices labelled as preventive 
entailed monitoring individuals and disrupting certain extremist 
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activities. Despite a call for not labelling someone a terrorist too early, 
the municipal professionals were mostly concerned with obtaining 
information and correctly assessing referrals rather than broad, social 
community engagement (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017).  
Another qualitative study in the Netherlands explored youth workers’ 
perceptions of radicalization and how to detect such a process (van de 
Weert & Eijkman, 2018).  In the context of CVE efforts, youth 
workers are seen as “particularly important for obtaining information 
about extremism. Youth workers are seen as the eyes and ears of the 
street” (ibid. 2018, p 2). Fulfilling this arguably securitized task has 
proven to be problematic in practice, since the distinction between 
violent extremism and radicalization is unclear to youth workers. Also, 
the quantity and quality of their training varies, opening the way for 
subjective and intuitive assumptions on what are radicalized 
ideas/behaviours. Interventions therefore become based on “a mix of 
facts, norms, values and personal feelings” (van de Weert & Eijkman, 
2018, p.17) increasing the risk of deviant behaviour being interpreted 
as radicalization, mainly affecting young Muslims. If professionals 
continue to engage in such controlling activities, they risk losing the 
trust of the communities in which they work. 
Turning to Scandinavia and empirical research on CVE information 
sharing chains, Andersson Malmros and Mattsson (2017) analysed 127 
municipal CVE policies in Sweden and were critical of the information 
sharing practices proposed. In 15% of the policies, new CVE-specific 
information sharing chains were established. In these, there were 
instructions to report information about non-criminal behaviours and 
political and religious attitudes to the CVE coordinator within the 
municipality, most often the security chief/coordinator. The 
coordinator would then validate the information together with the 
police or the security police. According to the authors of the report, 
there were four major problems with information sharing chains of this 
kind to consider: 
• There is no empirical research that indicates that a CVE 
coordinator is better equipped than front-line personnel in 
predicting who is in danger of becoming radicalized to the 
point of engaging in extremism. Hence, the young people at 
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risk should be dealt with according to already existing 
information sharing chains, passing on the information to the 
social services, which conduct an investigation and decided if 
social interventions are needed.  
• CVE-specific information sharing chains will lead to breaches 
of public access to information and secrecy rules as they will 
transfer sensitive personal data about individuals from one 
municipal unit to another 
• Mapping religious and political thoughts and behaviours that 
are expressed within the frames of the law is considered 
problematic in relation to constitutional law regarding freedom 
of speech and freedom of religion 
• If young people find that (radical) opinions expressed in school 
or at afterschool/youth centres have been forwarded to the 
police when no breach of the law has occurred, it jeopardises 
the possibility to engage in preventive efforts within the 
context of schools and other social welfare activities. This 
might in fact have counterproductive effects on trust and 
legitimacy for the professionals and lead to young people not 
being willing to engage in discussions about controversial 
issues 
To conclude, while policymakers point to the need for more and better 
developed information sharing, critical streams in research warn of the 
risk of stigmatizing politically, religious and culturally deviant thoughts 
and groups. Also, there is a lively debate on how information sharing 
practices relate to fundamental individual rights. This result in 
professionals being uncertain about what kind of information can 
legally be shared, with whom and under what circumstances. 
5.2 Legal Incentives for Crime 
Prevention and Collaboration 
The police are regarded as key actors in Nordic CVE efforts. Besides 
having the obvious responsibility of upholding the national law and 
intervening against crime, all specific acts covering the police in the 
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Nordic countries also instruct the police to prevent crime. In relation to 
CVE efforts, this has given the police a key position in multiagency 
collaboration in the Nordic countries. But as shown in section 5 of this 
report, the role of the police differs in these countries’ multiagency 
approaches. To provide a legal perspective on why these differences 
occur, we have chosen to focus attention on the Police Acts of the 
Nordic countries and the incentives for multiagency collaboration and 
the prevention of crime proposed in those Acts. In appendix 2, 
complete references to all acts analysed in this and the following 
chapters are listed.  
The Danish Police Act instructs the police in §1 to use prevention as a 
“method” to maintain the social functions and enhance safety, security, 
peace and order. Interestingly, the first formulation of their mission in 
§2 includes “to prevent criminal offenses” and later instructs the police 
to help other government agencies in their mission, once called upon 
and according to the law. This mission is later repeated in §15 where 
the use of force is regulated. These provisions are of a general nature, 
but specified in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) §112-
114. §112 instruct the police chiefs to establish district councils 
consisting of the police chiefs and the mayors of relevant municipalities 
in each police territory. In these, trends in crime and questions of 
multiagency collaboration are to be discussed. According to §113, the 
police chief is also responsible for writing and presenting a plan on 
collaboration with the municipalities, government agencies and other 
relevant actors such as CSOs. Crime prevention and the (most) 
relevant specific municipal and state government activities are specified 
in §114, where social services, schools and mental health care are 
mentioned. 
Turning to Norway, its Police Act is similar to the Danish Act in its 
emphasis on general crime prevention and collaboration, although it is 
not as specific. Already in §1, regarding the responsibilities and aims of 
the police force, the police are instructed to work “preventively (…) to 
be part of the total societal effort”. These formulations indicate a clear 
view of crime prevention as a multiagency effort and a core part of the 
Norwegian police’s work. §2 focus the police’s mission to “prevent 
crime” and “collaborate with other government agencies and 
organizations given assignments that interface with the activities of the 
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police”. In Chapter 2 §6, the police force is to achieve its mission 
through spreading information, counselling, maintaining order and 
preventive efforts. 
The Police Acts of Finland and Sweden are less extensive and specific in 
their emphasis on crime prevention and collaboration with other 
government agencies. §2 in the Swedish Act points out that one of the 
tasks of the police is to prevent crime and according to §6, it should 
collaborate with other government agencies and relevant organizations, 
mentioning social services in particular with regard to young people’s 
concerns. In Finland’s Police Act, the only mention of a preventive and 
collaborative mission is in §1, where it is stated that the police should 
prevent crime and collaborate with other government agencies in order 
to maintain public safety. 
  Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Legal 
incentives 
for the police 





§1, 2, 15: to 
prevent crime; to 





114: police chief 
should act to 
establish 
cooperation for 
the purpose of  










§1,2 and 6: 























 Table 6. Legal incentives for the police to engage in cooperation. 
To sum up, all the Nordic countries have assigned the police a clear 
crime prevention mission. Indeed, a collaborative crime prevention 
mission is central in all these countries and included in the legislative 
history of the Acts. But although the centrality of a crime prevention 
task indicates similarity, a closer reading shows differences in emphasis 
on the matter in these countries. The instructions to the Danish police 
are more extensive and specific on this matter. This is evident in 
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particular in the section instructing the chief of police to initiate and 
lead crime prevention activities in collaboration with other government 
agencies and organizations. Crime prevention and collaboration are 
also highly emphasised and recurring in Norway’s Police Act, but 
specified in less details. Sweden’s Police Act does not have the same 
focus on crime prevention and collaboration, but does point out social 
services as a collaborative partner. Finland is arguably the Nordic 
country with the least focus on crime prevention and collaboration 
with other government agencies in its Police Act. 
5.3 Obstacles for  
Information Sharing  
Regarding obstacles for information sharing, there is a high degree of 
similarity in the material from the Nordic countries. Concerning what 
kind of information can be shared, the national constitutions, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights serve as 
general frameworks. They distinctly advocate for the inviolability of 
universal human rights, protecting the individual’s rights to privacy, 
freedom of opinion and advocate tolerance for divergent political and 
religious views. However, these types of conventions are of 
overarching character that we have chosen not to list them in Table 7, 
but instead treat them as general pillars underpinning the work of all 
public services. As Helmius (2016) states, these conventions and the 
declaration should have a considerable impact on limiting what types 
of information can be shared in CVE efforts. The importance of these 
limitations becomes more concrete in the Acts restricting the public 
sector’s gathering, storage and sharing of private information about 
their citizens. The Acts express a generally restrictive attitude towards 
information sharing concerning strictly personal or sensitive matters, 
for example political and religious views. As a general rule, such 
information cannot be collected, stored and shared between 
government agencies. Thus, we can conclude that the general attitudes 
expressed in these Acts are similar, stating that no personal data, as 
defined in the constitutions of the Nordic countries, Data Protection 
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Acts and the Public Administration Acts (or similar), should be shared 
between government agencies. 
Children and young people under 18 are given special attention and 
protection. Norway’s Children Act (Lov om barn og foreldre) §6-7 instructs 
professionals working with children not to disclose any sensitive 
information. In Sweden, the Public Access to Information and Secrecy 
Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) states in Chapter 26, §1 that 
secrecy is particularly strong in social services where children are 
clients. Finland stands out with a comprehensive act on client rights in 
relation to the work done by social services, emphasizing the right to 
privacy among those who are in contact with the social services (Laki 
sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista/Act on Client rights 
in the Social Services). 

















julkisuudesta)  - §23-
24: information that 
concerns a person’s 
political and other 
private views, 
involvement in CSOs 
or family 
circumstances are 
subject to professional 
secrecy 
 
Act on Client rights in 
the Social Services 
(Laki sosiaalihuollon 
asiakkaan asemasta ja 
oikeuksista): 
- §14: Social welfare 
documents that 
contain information 







- §13: government 





Children Act (Lov 
om barn og 
foreldre) 
- § 6-7: 
professional 
secrecy to stop 
others from 
acquiring sensitive 






- Chapter 7, §8: 
confidential 
information is not to 
be shared and used 
outside one’s own 
agency 
- Chapter 26,  1§: 
particularly strong 
secrecy provisions 




- Chapter 26, §11: 
secrecy required in 
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Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
clients or other 
individuals must be 
kept secret 
- §15: Anyone who 
arranges or provides 
social services, as well 
as the person who 
holds a position of 
trust in social services, 
may not disclose a 
document's classified 
content or a task that 
would be classified if it 
were part of a 
document 
 
Basic Education Act 
(Perusopetuslaki) 
- § 40: School health, 
care providers, school 
counsellors, school 
psychologists, and 
practice teachers may 
not disclose to third 
parties what they have 
learned about the 
personal and financial 
circumstances of the 
students or the 
employees of the 




all school milieus 




 Table 7. Legal obstacles to sharing information 
The legal obstacles to information sharing regarding personal matters 
are hence to be considered as strong in all the Nordic countries. There 
must be certain purposes and circumstances that allow the possibility of such 
information being shared. 
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5.4 Possibilities for  
Information Sharing  
Starting with the similarities, a general possibility, found in all Nordic 
countries, is that information can be shared if consent is given by the 
individual (or guardian) who is the object of concern. However, the 
type of information shared and with which agencies must be relevant 
with regard to the problems and possible solutions. Under such 
conditions, it is possible to derogate from (or bypass) the privacy and 
secrecy provisions. Another general possibility for sharing information 
is if it is deemed necessary for the other government agencies to fulfil 
their respective tasks. If “necessary” were to be interpreted generously, 
personal data regarding individuals could always be shared. However, 
these provisions are not mentioned in the national CVE policies, 
indicating that the interpretation of “necessary” is not generous but 
quite strict. 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway all have a provision regarding reporting 
of children at risk, but differ regarding the flow of information. In the 
Danish Social Services Act (Serviceloven), §153 states that children at risk 
should be reported to the municipality, while in Norway and Sweden 
the provisions are more detailed, and specifically require reporting to 
social services. The National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden found 
that this provision, belonging to the Social Services Act 
(Socialtjänstlagen) Chapter 14 §1 is applicable in cases of extremism and 
radicalization. However, the information flow is restricted to the social 
services receiving this information from the police and not the other 
way around (if the purpose is prevention). This serves as an indicator 
of a general line in Sweden’s attitude to at-risk young people: the social 
services are responsible for such tasks. 
Sweden’s Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act 
(Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) chapter 10 §27 contains a 
general provision which instructs professionals to derogate from 
secrecy provisions if the value in sharing the information is deemed 
higher than withholding it. This could be utilized in cases where it 
could be anticipated that derogation from secrecy rules would prevent 
a serious crime (e.g. a terrorist attack) from being committed. However, 
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the application of this section to CVE efforts was contested in a recent 
official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65), since the problems of 
accurately pointing out who was at risk of becoming a terrorist were 
seen as too difficult and risky in relation to individual rights. Similarly, 
but not as explicitly, the Public Administration Act (Forvaltningsloven) 
points to “superior interests” while both Norwegian and Finnish Acts 
point to “danger to life and health” as potential reasons to derogate 
from secrecy rules. 
There are a few sections that more directly touch on information 
sharing for crime prevention purposes and those are referred to in 
national CVE policies. In the Nordic countries, arguably the most well-
known is §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). It 
states that government agencies can share information about 
individuals’ private circumstances, if necessary, to prevent a crime and 
to help socially vulnerable or already convicted young people. In these 
policies, the SSP is mentioned as such an arena in which information 
sharing can take place. Special attention is also given to radicalization, 
as those convicted and released but still radicalized continue to be of 
some interest. When reviewing both national and local policy 
documents in Denmark, it is obvious that this section is central to 
information sharing among government agencies in CVE efforts. 
Practices in Danish multiagency collaborations are built around this 
section and, when they are used, legitimize most kinds of information 
sharing if the purpose is crime prevention. This more generous attitude 
towards information sharing is strengthened by §49 in the Social 
Services Act (Serviceloven), which states that information can be shared 
among social welfare professionals in preventive work around 
vulnerable youth. §12b in the same Act is entirely focused on 
radicalized individuals over 18 years of age, and states that the 
municipality is obliged to offer free counselling but can also engage in 
its own outreach work to affected individuals. The application of this 
provision goes hand-in-hand with information sharing between the 
security police and the municipalities about these individuals.   
The only comparable provision to §115 in the Administration of Justice 
Act (Retsplejeloven) can, quite surprisingly, be found in Sweden. In 
chapter 10, §18a in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act 
(Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) it is statesd that information from 
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other government agencies can be shared with the police if 
circumstances indicate that a young person is about to commit criminal 
acts:  
§115 in the Administration of Justice Act 
(Retsplejeloven) 
Chapter 10, §18a in the Public 
Access to Information and Secrecy 
Act (Offentlighets- och 
sekretesslagstiftningen) 
The police may disclose information about 
individuals' purely private relations with other 
authorities, if the disclosure is deemed necessary 
for the sake of 
 1) the crime prevention cooperation (SSP 
cooperation), 
    2) the police cooperation with the social 
authorities and the social and treatment psychiatry 
as part of the efforts towards socially vulnerable 
persons (PSP cooperation) or 
      3) the cooperation between the Prison and 
Probation Service, the social authorities and the 
police (the KSP cooperation) as part of the efforts 
towards 
      a) convicted, released from institutions under 
the Prison and Probation Service, 
      b) sentenced under the age of 18, released from 
institutions, etc. outside the Prison and Probation 
Service, where they are placed in accordance with 
section 78 (1). 2 of the Act on the Enforcement of 
Punishment, etc., and 
   (c) persons released from pre-trial detention or 
other detention measures under Chapter 70 if 
deemed to be radicalized or at risk of becoming. 
    PCS. 2. To the same extent as mentioned in 
subsection (1). 1, an authority may disclose 
information about individuals to the police and 
other authorities included in the forms of 
cooperation referred to in paragraph” 
Secrecy pursuant to Chapter 26. 
Section 1 does not prevent 
information relating to an 
individual who has not turned 
twenty-one years from being 
submitted to the Police Authority, 
if 
   1. there is a risk that the young 
person will engage in criminal 
activities because of special 
circumstances; 
   2. The task can be assumed to 
help prevent it, and 
  3. In view of planned or ongoing 
efforts for the young person or for 
other special reasons, it is not 
inappropriate for the information 
to be disclosed.
 
Table 8. Comparison between information sharing paragraphs  
No particular multiagency approach is mentioned in the Swedish Act, 
but the instructions in this section could be interpreted and used in a 
similar way as in Denmark. When reviewing the purposes of the law, 
this interpretation is fortified. However, the previously mentioned 
official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) reviewed this section, 
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but did not recognize it as appropriate to be used for early intervention 
in cases of potential radicalization. This is motivated by the uncertain 
link between radical/extreme ideas and criminal extremist behaviour, 
and too generous information sharing would, according to the official 
commission of inquiry, risk violating privacy rights of those concerned. 
However, the paragraph could be applicable in cases were a youth is 
suspected to be about to embark on a travel in order to join terrorist 
groups (SOU 2018:65).  
In table 10 (below), we have listed the relevant acts and paragraphs 





Legal possibilities for sharing information about 
individuals between government agencies 









- §28, part 2-3: 
Consent; Superior 
interest; Necessary 
for other agency to 
fulfil its task 
Social Services Act 
(Serviceloven) 
- §12b: The 
municipalities are 
obliged to initiate free 
and targeted coun-
selling measures for 
citizens over the age 
of 18, where there is 
concern about 
radicalization. The 
municipality can do 
outreach work and, 
on its own, can make 
contact with citizens 
who are deemed at 
risk of being radi-
calized. 
- §49: Municipal 
employees in schools, 




can share information 
about “exposed 
youth” if necessary 
for effective 
prevention 
Act on publicity in 
governmental activities 
(Laki viranomaisten 
toiminnan julkisuudesta)  - 
§26/29: Consent; 
Necessary for another 
government agency to 
fulfil its task 
Police Act (Poliisilaki) 
- Chapter 4 §2: right to 
receive information from 
other government 
agencies if the 
information is not 
restricted by other 
legislation 
- Chapter 7 §2: if 
necessary in order for 
other government 
agencies to fulfil their 
tasks 
Social Care Act 
(Sosiaalihuoltolaki) : 
- §41: collaborate with 
other actors and relatives 
if in the best interests of 
the client. This 
might include sharing of 
information about the 
client. 
Youth Act (Nuorisolaki): 
- § 9-11: consent 
- § 28: right to share 
information with the 
Police if danger to health 
and life exist, or to 
obstruct a threatening 
action. 
Act on Client rights in the 
Social Services (Laki 
Children Act (Lov 
om barn og 
foreldre) 
- § 6-7: if 
necessary, to fulfil 
its task; Danger of 
serious injury or 














to fulfil own task; 
Danger of serious 
injury or threat to 
life 
Social Service Act 
(Lov om sosiale 




- §45. Public 
employees in con-
tact with young 
people must report 
the matter to 
Social Services if a 
child is in need of 
support 







- Chapter 10, 
§18a: risk of 
young people 
carrying out a 
crime 
- Chapter 10, 
§27: The 
General 







- Chapter 12, § 
2: consent 
- Chapter 27, §1-
2: Consent; 
Necessary to 
fulfil own task) 
- Chapter 35. §1: 






- Chapter 14, §1: 
Public employe-
es in contact 
with young 
people must 
report the matter 
to social services 
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Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
 
- §153: Public 
employees must 
report the matter to 
the municipality if a 
child is in need of 
support 
sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan 
asemasta ja oikeuksista): 
- §16: Consent 
- §18: Right to share 
information if danger to 
lives or health 
- §20, 22: Social Services 
has the right to obtain 
confidential information 
about clients’ 
circumstances in relation 
to investigations and other 
parts of their work 
Child Protection Act  
(Lastensuojelulaki) 
- §25: Public employees 
must report the matter to 
social services if a child is 
in need of support 
if a child is in 












of the law 
 Table 9. Possibilities for sharing information 
5.5 Conclusions  
Police and crime prevention: All Nordic countries take a general 
position that the police are to engage in crime prevention as a core part 
of their task. However, there are some differences: 
• The Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) §112-114 
instructs the police to create structures that can be used for 
crime prevention purposes. No other Nordic country has 
similar provisions. 
• In quantitative terms, the Police Acts of Denmark and Norway 
place greater emphasis on prevention and collaboration than 
do Sweden and Finland. 
Obstacles and possibilities for information sharing: We find both 
similarities and differences between the Nordic countries with regard 
to the obstacles and possibilities of information sharing. In all, they are 
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close to identical with regard to emphasising the need to respect 
constitutional rights regarding freedom of speech, freedom of religion 
and the right to privacy.  
• Individual rights concerning freedom of speech and religion, 
protected by the constitutions of the Nordic countries, restrict 
what type of information that can be shared between 
government agencies. 
• In Acts that regulate the government agencies and their 
information sharing, secrecy is the general rule. This rule is 
applied particularly strictly concerning children. 
• Finland has an Act regulating clients’ rights in relation to 
actions by social services, the only one of its kind in the Nordic 
countries 
Regarding possibilities, the most surprising finding was when 
comparing the content of specific provisions in Denmark and Sweden 
in relation to how they appear to play out in practice. In Sweden, this 
debate has been ongoing over the years (i.e. Ranstorp, 2019), often with 
reference to Denmark as a role model. It has been proposed that new 
laws that make it easier to share information should be adopted and an 
official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) was launched to shed 
light on the issue. However, the findings in this report question what 
impact new legal frameworks would have. This is due to the highly 
comparable formulations in §115 of The Administration of Justice Act 
(Retsplejeloven)and Chapter 10, §18a in the Public Access to Information 
and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen). Both of these 
sections are explicit that derogations from secrecy are permitted in 
order to prevent a crime. Despite this fact, the Danish authorities are 
able to use the same formulation as a foundation for information 
sharing aimed at the prevention of extremism, while Swedish 
authorities do not find it appropriate to use this for that purpose (SOU 
2018:65). Expanding the comparison to Norway, no legal framework 
exists that makes information sharing for crime prevention purposes 
possible without extraordinary circumstances or consent. But when 
reviewing the national and local CVE policies and practices in Norway 
(see section 3 and 4), information sharing in crime preventive purposes 
is still advocated.  And despite the dubious legal support towards 
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information sharing in Sweden, such practices are to some extent also 
prevalent in Sweden (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017).  
• Consent from the individual of interest is a general option 
available to government agencies for sharing information 
• All the Nordic countries identify, in different Acts, a superior 
interest and/or danger to life and health as possible reasons for 
derogating from secrecy rules. In the case of imminent terror 
attacks or plots, these rules would be applicable 
• Young people at risk are a special target group in the Nordic 
countries. To some degree, this opens up possibilities to share 
information 
• The Danish authorities have the most extensive options for 
information sharing, in particular with reference to §115 in The 
Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). Sweden has a 
similar section, Chapter 10 §18a in the Swedish Public Access 
to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighet- och 
sekretesslagstiftningen), but it is not utilized in relation to CVE 
• The Danish Acts are the only ones that use radicalization as a 
term: §12b in the Social Services Act (Serviceloven) and §115 
in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) 
• In relation to previous research on Nordic CVE efforts and the 
practices that are advocated in section 4, there are indications 
that national policy (Acts and Ordinances) are decoupled from 
the practical work being done at the local level 
.
6. Summary
This final part of the report begins with a brief summary of the findings 
of the mapping of policy for multiagency work in the Nordic countries. 
The summary is followed by reflections that highlight some of the 
identified benefits and challenges of collaborative approaches to 
handling violent extremism among young people.  Finally, we provide 
a concluding discussion where policy as discourse along with 
institutional logic and hybrid organization theories are applied.   
6.1 Organization 
The mapping of organizational structure focused on how policy 
described multiagency approaches concerned with CVE efforts. The 
mapping found six aspects of multiagency work in the Nordic 
countries:   
• The Nordic countries all use a three-level structure for
multiagency approaches. These align the political level with the
executive level that governs practice.
• Already established structures for multiagency work for
preventing crime in general are now being utilized for handling
issues associated with violent extremism. The cooperative way
of working with “wicked problems” has a long-standing
tradition in Denmark and the Danish SSP model serves as an
inspiration for SLT in Norway and the Anchor teams (Ankkuri)




implementing multiagency approaches. In Sweden (as in 
Norway),  there are no obligations to or rules for establishing 
SSP(f).  
• A way to incorporate CVE in multiagency work is to provide 
additional expertise in the form of Info houses, Kunskapshus 
(knowledge centres), CVE coordinators, police councils, etc.  
• The involved actors are primarily affiliated with the police, 
together with the social services and the healthcare system are 
influential components of multiagency teams followed by 
schools and youth services. Finland is the exception, as schools 
and youth workers are not considered to be permanent 
partners in the collaboration. However, Finland is the only 
country that includes psychiatric nurses.  
• The police are the main government agency in charge of 
multiagency cooperation, especially in Finland but also in 
Denmark. Even if the Norwegian SLT model is placed under 
the governance of municipalities, the local chief of police and 
the police council along with the mayor generally constitute the 
steering committee. In Sweden, the SSP(f) is managed by social 
services which, together with schools as municipal 
organizations make agreements with the regionally governed 
police to set up local SSP(f) teams.  
Civil society and its organizations are considered to be valuable in 
safeguarding society against anti-democratic forces. Their position as 
voluntary and often unburdened by obligations make them better able 
to build trust and social relationships with young individuals in 
particular. CSOs are frequently mentioned in policy as resources and 
potential partners; however, there are some legal restrictions on making 
them into permanent partners 
 
6.2 Recommended Practices 
The section designated for recommended practices initially searched 
for practices mentioned in national documents. The analysis revealed 
that these were virtually non-existent. The recommended practices 
found in policy are primarily found in police recommendations and 
handbooks providing guides for setting up a multiagency collaboration, 
thus these are highly conceptual. Potential actions that can be taken by 
social services and schools are not very specific. Schools are 
recommended to focus on building resilience through teaching about 
democracy. However, in some cases they are recommended to observe 
and detect behaviours that could indicate radicalization. social services 
are positioned as connector for directing clients to services. Social 
services can facilitate contacts with relevant services and guide and 
support at-risk individuals. In Denmark for instance, the Social 
Services Act obliges social services to intervene if individuals over 18 
show signs of entering, or wanting to exit, violent extremist milieus.  
The recommended practices we have focused on are: (1) what is 
described as elements of success and what are the recommendations 
made for making the approach work? and (2) What are the tools or 
techniques mentioned in policy for the concrete work in practice with 
individuals?  In short, the recommendations focus on creating 
relationships, mutual trust, responsibility, accountability, clarity, 
coordination and local understanding for achieving success. There are 
some differences between what are deemed to be relevant tools and 
techniques.  
• Mutual trust and relationships between involved agencies, and
with the social environment in the local community and the
young individual in focus, are crucial. Trust and relationships
can be incentives for bypassing obstacles for sharing
information as willingness to give consent may be facilitated by
relational trust. This also applies to trust between colleagues





• Responsibility, accountability and clarity are motivated by the 
effectiveness of multiagency work and refer to defining and 
allocating the resources of different agencies and their 
collaboration as such. The need for clear flows of information 
is also essential for effective work and something that is in 
constant need of re-assessment and sharing between the 
partners. Clearly defined frameworks can reduce internal 
conflicts and streamline the organization.  
• Local understanding and individualization are necessary for 
obtaining an overview of potential problems, contemporary 
attitudes and constellations.  Local understanding also provides 
a shorter way to access local resources such as civil society 
organizations and makes social networks easier to activate. The 
resources needed are reliant on individual needs, thus there are 
no off-the-shelf methods; actions need to be adapted to local 
resources and individual needs.  
There are some differences between the Nordic countries concerning 
recommended practices and these differences are most notable among 
the tools and techniques.   
• The Danish approach focuses on the individual and 
assessments of individual risk and resilience factors. Resources 
and motivation are important starting points for an 
intervention. The focus is placed in relational work as 
communication and mutual trust are emphasised and the use 
of specially assigned mentors is advised.  
• Finland’s tools and techniques are centred around the well-
being of the client and on reducing the risk of him or her 
committing crimes in the future. In policy there are a plethora 
of templates and lists that are meant to be helpful for assessing 
the problem and how to intervenes. Also, there are detailed 
instructions which indicate a need for streamlining and 
rectifying the actions of the anchor teams in different areas. 
The Finnish approach is also more focused on legal aspects and 
informing the client of the risks and possible repercussions of 
their actions, which implies a more correctional approach.  
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• The Norwegian approach is similar to the Danish approach and 
rests on a need to build trust and resilience. Conversational 
aspects such as “conversation intervention”, mediation and 
reconciliation are prominent among the recommendations. 
The models seem to have social psychology foundations and 
support and guidance for parents and from mentors are 
advocated.  
• The Swedish approach centres on relationships and trust. Trust 
is framed as the prerequisite for individuals being willing to 
contact the police or social services to get support. Similar to 
the Norwegian policies, the Swedish approach focuses on 
conversation, relationships and reconciliation. Cooperation 
between actors is promoted as a way of achieving success.  
6.3 Advocating  
Multiagency Approaches  
In sections committed to highlighting how multiagency approaches are 
advocated, we have singled out sections in the national and local action 
plans that contains the motivations and arguments for using or 
establishing multiagency approaches for handling issues related to 
radicalization or violent extremism. We have identified three main 
themes among the arguments used: (1) Using existing structures and 
organizations for extended purposes; (2) Gathering and sharing 
knowledge and expertise; and (3) Coordinating actions for a more 
effective and efficient response.  
• The use of existing structures and organizations is convenient 
and allows the utilization of established routines for 
assessment, reporting and following up individuals who cause 
concern or are regarded as being at risk of radicalization. The 
multiagency organizations in focus for this study are primarily 
dedicated to general issues and interventions in criminal or 
delinquent behaviour. This may make them into one of the 
most qualified organizations for handling “wicked problems” 
The use of existing structures may also be economically 
beneficial since resources can be quickly brought together for 
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a rapid response. A multipurpose, multiagency structure may 
also be convenient, especially since problems connected with 
violent extremism and violent radicalization simply do not exist 
in some municipalities and regions. 
• Gathering and sharing knowledge and expertise is put forward 
as a potential benefit which, for the common good, is made 
possible through cooperation between different fields of 
expertise. In a multiagency organization, each profession and 
institution brings to it a different perspective and a range of 
instruments that can facilitate the work. The discourse of 
expert knowledge is applied to flows of knowledge between 
agencies:  
• Experts in the field can provide training, thus actors within 
multiagency organizations can be a resource to regional and 
municipal authorities and other actors such as first-line 
personnel. The police are put forward as the main source of 
available expertise.  
• Experts within primarily additional units can provide 
knowledge, intelligence and information concerning 
individuals or groups. This kind of knowledge can be used for 
identifying individuals who might constitute a risk to society. 
Thus, it is considered essential that this information is handed 
over to the multiagency organizations.  
• Knowledge about how to assess and detect at-risk signs is put 
forward as an especially valuable form of expertise. The source 
of such expertise is supposed to be research.  
• To coordinate cooperation for a more effective and efficient 
response refers primarily to the possibility to lower thresholds 
and bypass boundaries between agencies.  The access to a 
variety of perspectives enables flexibility and adaptation to 
different cases and circumstances.  
6.4 Legal Frameworks 
The analysis of the legal frameworks focused on: (1) mapping out legal 
incentives for the police to engage in collaboration on crime 
prevention; (2) legal obstacles to government agencies sharing 
information for crime prevention purposes; (3) the legal possibilities 
for government agencies to share information for crime prevention 
purposes. 
• Beginning with the legal incentives for police engagement in
collaborative crime prevention work, the analysis showed that
the collaborative crime prevention task is central in all countries
and included in the initial provisions of these countries’ Police
Acts. However, differences were also noted. The Danish Police
Act is the most extensive and specific in regard to its crime
prevention task, most prominently exemplified by the sections
in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) instructing the
chief of police to initiate and lead crime prevention in
collaboration with other agencies and organizations. Crime
prevention and collaboration is also emphasised and recurring
terms in the Norwegian Police Act, but less specified, as it does
not include any instructions on the forms and responsibilities
for such work. The Swedish Police Act does not have the same
overall preventive and collaborative focus, but in contrast to
the other countries does specify social services as a particular
important collaborative partner when it comes to young
people. Finland is arguably the Nordic country with the least
focus on crime prevention and collaboration with other
agencies judging by its Police Act.
• The legal obstacles for government agencies are rather similar
in all countries. The national constitutions, the European
Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights serve
as general frameworks that protect individual rights to privacy,
freedom of opinion and tolerance for divergent political and
religious opinions. These general frameworks are specified in




7). The attitude expressed in these is, in general, restrictive 
towards all forms of information sharing that involves personal 
matters (e.g. political and religious opinions/associations). 
Instead, there must be certain purposes and circumstances that 
open up the possibility for such information sharing to take 
place. 
• The legal possibilities for government agencies to share 
information for crime prevention purposes are rather varied 
between the countries. Starting with the similarities, a general 
possibility, found in all Nordic countries, is that information 
can be shared if consent is given by the individual (or guardian) 
who is the object of concern. Another commonality is that 
“superior interests” and/or “dangers to life and health” are 
possible grounds for derogating from secrecy rules. In the case 
of imminent terror attacks or plots, these rules would be 
applicable. Regarding differences, Danish authorities have the 
most extensive possibilities for information sharing, in 
particular with reference to §115 in the Administration of Justice 
Act (Retsplejeloven). Sweden has a similar section, Chapter 10 
§18a in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act 
(Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen), but it is not 





7. Analytical Discussion  
The last part of this report contains our analytical remarks and 
discussion of the findings. This section applies the theoretical 
framework introduced in Sections 2.1. and 2.2 and deepens the 
discussion on the discursive content of the policies and how that helps 
us to understand the institutional logics of multiagency collaboration. 
This section applies a critical perspective meant to probe the 
assumptions and how problems are constituted by policy. The critical 
stance is not to be understood as negative criticism, but an attempt to 
feed further enquiries and deepen knowledge about the conditions for 
multiagency collaboration in CVE efforts. We will start by recalling and 
applying our theoretical framework in relation to CVE policies in 
general but swiftly move on and, through the lens of discourse analysis, 
present an analysis of how different institutional logics are co-existing, 
competing and mixing in everyday CVE efforts. 
7.1 How Policy Matters  
Policy texts are in this analytical section regarded as manifestations of 
discursive truth and knowledge. Such truth and knowledge not only 
hold the prerogative for explaining the problem of radicalization and 
violent extremism, but also contain representations of the problem 
leading to seemingly rational solutions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).  
As Heath-Kelley (2012) argues, the knowledge that enables and 
produces policy and actions rests on the discursive explanatory models 
for the problem at hand. This would also work in a reciprocal direction 
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in line with the Foucauldian understanding that discourses 
systematically form the object of which they speak and therefore are 
active in the production of truth and knowledge (i.e. Foucault, 1997).  
From another angle, policy texts serve a more material function. They 
are transmitters of language and discourse that “lends meaning and 
legitimacy to material practices and in doing so constructs the cognitive 
structures that underpin institutions” (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 
402). Put differently, if a given CVE practice (e.g. multiagency 
information sharing) repeatedly gets acknowledged as important in 
CVE policy, this perception becomes legitimized and might, over time, 
evolve into an objective truth - an institutionalized way of organizing 
CVE efforts. Once these cognitive schemes have been established, they 
become self-regulating mechanisms for organizational activity (Philips 
& Malhotra, 2017).  
However, even if a way of organizing CVE efforts becomes 
institutionalized and gains a taken-for-granted status, the meanings 
associated with the same form can be heterogeneous among the 
participants and observers. In multiagency collaboration, professionals 
with different institutional logics guiding their work come together in 
hybrid organizations to produce CVE efforts. Their respective logics 
influence the collective identity (e.g. occupation group) they relate to, 
what and how they understand problems, what they see as goals and 
meaning in their work, and the strategies they use to handle different 
situations. By exploring these aspects and the discourse surrounding 
them in CVE policy, distinctive institutional logics can be discerned.   
This is an important task for research to direct, since multiagency work 
is often viewed from a functionalist perspective (see Section 1.6), 
focusing on advantages, success stories and “best practices”, while 
neglecting potential conflicts and problems. Indeed, the hybridity 
inherent in multiagency collaboration makes them into “arenas of 
contradictions” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p. 972) and thus central for 





Two logics: Security and Social Care 
When analysing the empirical findings in Sections 3, 4 and 5, we see 
two ideal types of institutional logics prevailing as influential in CVE 
efforts: a social care logic (SCL) and a societal security logic (SSL). As 
institutional logics, they influence the approaches of public sector 
organizations and employees to problems such as radicalization, their 
actions and the meanings they ascribe to their work. Using the 
framework of institutional logics developed by Thornton et al. (2012), 
the SCL and the SSL can be deconstructed into ideal types accordingly: 
  Societal security logic Social care logic 
Collective 
identity 
Police, security police, security 
managers, etc. 
Teachers, social workers, 
youth workers, mental 
health workers, etc. 
Goals -The physical safety of 
citizens/employees/public 
facilities 
-Order and law abiding 
-The well-being of 
pupils/clients 
- Safe-guard individuals 
-Ensure that the rights of 
pupils/clients are protected  
Strategies Authoritarian/repressive: prevent, 
detect, protect, surveil, arrest, 
incapacitate 
Relational: prevent, detect, 

















Table 11. Institutional logics in CVE efforts 
Neither the SSL nor the SCL are exclusively developed for CVE 
efforts, but can be found to be relevant for many other types of 
activities. For example, the SCL is used in schools, social services, 
afterschool/youth centres, in many CSOs and in integration efforts, 
while the SSL is performed by public and private sector security 
organizations. However, it is only in theory that logics are as “pure” 
and singular as in table 11. Rather, it is recognized that one of the 
!
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advocated benefits of multiagency work is that it allows a mixing of 
logics (see Section 4.4).  
Neither is a logic static, but is in fact translated locally and performed 
into being. In that process, it co-exists, mixes and competes with other 
logics in everyday life (Pallas, Fredriksson & Wedlin, 2016). A given 
social space is seldom completely homogenous (consisting of one logic 
or the other) but is heterogeneous and the use of logics depends on the 
problem and context. With that said, some logics and discourses attain 
a hegemonic position in relation to others. In practice, this means that 
certain logics and discourses gets used more frequently and might 
become regarded as “common sense” and therefore guide behaviour. 
Figure 2. Areas in which each institutional logic as ideal types, co-exists, competes 
and mixes in policy 
In figure 2, we map out the areas in which each institutional logic as 
ideal types, co-exists, competes and mixes in policy. As a concern is 
directed to the multiagency collaboration structure, professionals 
interpret it in relation to existing logics – the SSL and the SCL. There 
is an area of co-existence between the logics as they both uses 
prevention and detecting of problems as strategies to achieve their 
goals. This means that practices for handling concerns about young 
people are legitimate and important practices for both logics. However, 
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it is apparent that the concern will be interpreted and handled 
differently depending on the logic activated. The ground for attention 
and the types of problems they focus on are distinctive as cases of 
(potential) rule-breaking are central to the SSL, while the SCL instead 
focuses on signs of individual concern that might harm the individual 
in question. This difference of attention derives from their respective 
goals and the inherent meanings of their work. Such differences might 
provoke conflict when a concern is to be dealt with in a multiagency 
structure, as the SSL approach uses “hard measures” and control to 
reach their goals, while the SCL approach utilizes “soft measures” and 
relational work. Which type of solution is to be used? The character of 
the solutions also affects the grounds of authority: the SSL rests on a 
more formal vertical chain of command where decision-making is 
more centralized, while the individual character of the work conducted 
by collectives connected to the SCL is more horizontal and 
autonomous. Here, we see a potential risk of conflict as, for example, 
the police are more inclined to give orders and are used to being 
listened to, while social workers have a more decentralized way of 
making decisions (i.e. Brown et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, there are reasons to believe that multiagency work is far 
from non-problematic and without conflict in hybrid spaces such as in 
the SSP(f), Anchor teams, SSP and SLT of the Nordic countries. If a 
hybrid organization is to be effective, such conflicts need to be dealt 
with. In the policies, we see two complementary strategies for dealing 
with these conflicts: making one logic hegemonic and/or mixing them. 
A hegemonic discourse and logic in policy 
With regards to the policy field, the police have a prominent role in the 
multiagency work in CVE efforts in all four countries. To a varying 
extent, the police are also the governing authority for this multiagency 
work. This is probably due to CVE efforts being incorporated into 
already established crime prevention structures. For example, in 
Denmark the chief of police is by law instructed to initiate and plan 
crime prevention collaboration with other government agencies. The 
hegemonic position of the police in the CVE arena is also evident in 
the national action plans where expertise, responsibility and actions 
assigned to the police are prevalent. Put together, the police, to a large 
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extent, have the authority to decide how the work is supposed to be 
organized.  Considering the discursive alignment between violent 
extremism and terrorism, this is not a surprise. Foucault (1977) 
discussed how the police as representatives of the state have the 
function of maintaining discipline and order in the society as a whole. 
Hence, the goals of CVE efforts mainly become about preserving 
societal safety and to safeguard democracy against threats. With that 
being said, this analysis is based on the discourse found in policy.  As 
mentioned previously, policy is often decoupled from practice (Clarke, 
1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the police 
are probably also acting in line with a SCL approach in some situations 
(e.g. the Radicalization Contacts in Norway and police preventive units 
in Denmark).The extent and characteristics of such decoupling will be 
further explored in the continuation of the HEX-NA project.  
A hegemonic discourse tends to reproduce itself. As Lindekilde (2015) 
notes, the development and setting of policies are often incremental, 
and this is also the case in the Nordic countries. For instance, the 
Swedish CVE approach was initially governed by the Ministry of 
Culture due to its focus on democracy and socio-political measures and 
its base in SCL. This stance has changed in recent years, moving 
towards a security discourse and today has its starting point in crime 
policy. Consequently, Swedish CVE efforts have been replaced under 
the Ministry of Justice and the new national coordinating office for 
CVE has been organized as part of the Swedish National Council for 
Crime Prevention. This development can be understood as a 
consequence of increased (and more focused) extremist activities and 
events in the world and region, making citizens more prone to call for 
firmer policies and penalizing approaches. Assertive approaches and 
clear messages can make people feel safer and more protected, which 
most likely creates trust in the authorities that can guarantee security. 
As mentioned, the CVE approaches in the Nordic countries 
traditionally rest upon crime prevention and the multiagency 
approaches are developed primarily to prevent future crimes from 
being committed. An example of this is that the Swedish Centre for 
Preventing Violent Extremism firmly acknowledges that their point of 
departure is always penal policy. However, this foundation can seem to 
make other agencies unsure of what their tasks are in relation to 
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preventing crime. Such uncertainty is found in an evaluation of police 
council cooperation with SLT signed by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security (2014). The evaluation shows that 
representatives from other agencies (other than the police) report 
uncertainties about formalities and the agenda of the cooperation. This 
indicates that the police have a more prominent position and that other 
actors experience a need to follow their lead.  In line with Foucault’s 
(1993) argumentation, the ruling discourse represents the truth and 
valid knowledge and in best-case scenarios this hegemonic position can 
ensure authoritative and legitimate trust, while in worst case scenarios 
it could induce uncertainties, distancing and even fear.  
Accordingly, a tentative conclusion of our mapping is that the policing 
discourse indicates that the SSL in some respects has prevailed and 
gained a hegemonic position in relation to the SCL. In CVE and the 
hybrid space in which multiagency work is carried out, the central goals, 
objectives and grounds for attention reflect the SSL. In reference to 
the findings in this report, a hypothesis is that the police in most 
countries become the ground for authority: the collective identity that 
make the final decisions on how to act in the multiagency spaces. In 
practice, this would mean that most concerns about radicalization will 
be interpreted as a (potential) security problem and thus lend legitimacy 
to SSL strategies as a solution. Hence, the hegemonic truth and 
knowledge explaining the problem also give seemingly rational 
solutions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). This finding, however, is not 
without exceptions or national differences.  
The following graph provides a general description of some of the 
differences and commonalities in the prevailing logics and specific 
focal points found in the Nordic countries’ policies, legal frameworks 





Figure 3. Focal points for prevailing logics based on policy data 
The graph illustrates how Denmark, Finland and to some extent 
Norway are leaning towards a more decisive SSL than Sweden. The 
Info houses in Denmark and the “Radicalization contacts” in Norway 
are both prominent examples of the police having a central role in CVE 
efforts, often in close cooperation or as parts of the multiagency work. 
By contrast, Norway have municipal SLT coordinators to align 
different actors and Sweden has CVE coordinators employed by the 
municipality and the multiagency work is led by social services. Possibly 
connected to this, Sweden is also the country with the most restrictive 
attitude towards information sharing for crime prevention purposes 
and the information flow is directed towards social services rather than 
the police or the SLT/SSP/Anchor team structures. Finland is less 
guided by the SCL than the other Nordic countries, mainly since its 
social services, afterschool/youth centres and education services are 
given little attention in the analysed policies. Instead, the involvement 
of mental health instances indicate that the Finnish approach is less 
inclined to consider the social and relational aspects of violent 
extremism and more inclined to explain radicalization as a mental 
health phenomenon, which is also explicitly formulated in the national 
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action plan (FI, 2016). To summarize and compare, Denmark and 
Norway seem to have a more similar approach to CVE while Finland 
and Sweden contrast each other.  
Logics mixing 
Even if arguing that the societal security logic (SSL) has a hegemonic 
status in relation to the social care logic (SCL) and other logics that 
might exists, the most common situation is that logics mix in everyday 
life. Certainly, this comes as no surprise for most people involved in 
CVE efforts. However, the question of how and when they mix in CVE 
efforts remains partly unanswered. In figure 2, we mapped out the 
potential institutional elements (goals, strategies, ground for attention, 
ground for authority) were the SSL and SCL (see previous part) 
compete and mix. We will provide a few empirical examples of how 
these logics mix in multiagency CVE efforts. 
The recommended practices in the CVE policies show a strong 
emphasis on conversational techniques and building positive 
relationships with local communities and young people. For instance, 
in Denmark the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have published a handbook 
for relational work and mentoring in CVE, and in the Norwegian 
SaLTo handbook, conversation intervention, mediation and 
reconciliation are considered to be relevant tools and seem typical for 
the SCL. In Denmark and Norway in particular, such practices are to 
be used by the police. By contrast, we also see how schools and other 
educational institutions are to (1) continue with business as usual, for 
example teaching, developing democracy and safeguarding their pupils 
and (2) making risk assessments and identifying individuals at risk of 
radicalization in their own classrooms. The latter task is a new one, 
deriving from the SSL, and given to schools and educational services 
and reflects both the goals for the SCL (business as usual) and the SSL 
(detect potential threats). We can also see the potential for conflicts 
based on the distinctive goals for each logic in such cases: police 
wanting information in order to protect public security, while teachers 
want to protect the privacy of their pupils. In practical multiagency 
collaboration, teachers and youth workers may have other roles in CVE 
efforts, such as the ones that most often entail a social relationship with 
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the young individual. This may mean that these SCL relationships are 
activated to facilitate SSL intervention and actions.  
In Norway, the SLT- coordinatiors have a key position in aligning 
different levels of actors in the municipalities and come from different 
backgrounds and positions within municipal organizations. Their main 
function is to coordinate and facilitate the work being done in the 
operational SLT- teams in order to prevent crime. The coordinator 
position has been described as primarily administrative (PHS,2008). 
However, its placement between different agencies and organizational 
levels can be regarded as a hybrid position funded in an amalgamation 
of SSL and SCL logics.  The Norwegian police have also established a 
special, personalized function, the Radicalization Contact 
(Radikaliseringskontakten), in all police territories. As concluded in 
Section 3.6, this type of function is the hub between different police 
agencies and the municipalities. However, the radicalization contact is 
more than a hub for communication and information. Even though 
their goals are in alignment with the SSL, the radicalization contact 
engages with young people and individuals of concern using strategies 
that are found within the SCL, such as conversations when there are 
concerns about the young person. The case of the radicalization 
contact shows that even though the police are responsible and the 
ground for attention and the goals of the CVE efforts rest on an SSL, 
the strategies used to obtain the goals are typical for the SCL.  
The mixing of logics is also apparent in the legal framework around 
information sharing (see Section 5.4). All countries have an SCL 
embedded in their restrictions on information sharing which focus on 
care for the individual’s right to privacy. But we have also shown how 
these restrictions can be overridden in cases were lives, health and 
public security may be at risk – goals of value for the SSL. This serves 
as a prominent example of how the SCL and SSL mix in legal 
frameworks and become situation-dependent. We also see how logics 
can be supported by the legal frameworks. Most prominently, §115 in 
the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) in Denmark provides 
rather extensive freedom for government agencies to share 
information about individuals for crime prevention purposes and thus 
reflects the goals of the SSL rather than the SCL. In Sweden, it is the 
other way around. The strong emphasis on social services as 
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responsible for dealing with all individuals of concern and the heavy 
restrictions on sharing information with other agencies, e.g. the Police, 
possibly reinforce the SCL. 
In the other Nordic countries, the social services are given less 
attention in policy. They are sometimes given the task of identifying 
individuals at risk and reporting them to the police. Even if there is a 
general understanding that secrecy should be respected, all the Nordic 
countries have policies partly advocating for information sharing 
practices to be utilized in CVE efforts. Amongst others, Herz (2016) 
highlights the contradictory tasks this results in for social workers as 
they (1) are to report individuals at risk of radicalization to the security 
services, and (2) are supposed to support those who wish to leave 
violent extremist milieus.  
7.2 Producing Subjects and Objects  
The explanatory factors and root causes and processes that are believed 
to ignite and drive radicalization often originate from individual 
grievances and risk factors (Sedgwick 2010; Kundnani 2012; 
Andersson Malmros, 2019). When placing the problem of 
radicalization and extremism within the scope of multiagency models 
designed for crime prevention and the safeguarding of young 
individuals, the problem is also individualized. The potential problem 
with such individualization is that it becomes depoliticized (see also, 
Hemmingsen 2015; Lindekilde 2015; Herz 2016).   
Therefore, we focus on how the policies analysed construct different 
target groups for CVE efforts. In accordance with Foucault (1986), 
policies such as regulations and decrees are sites where governmental 
subjects and objects are produced through problematization; what 
Bacchi (2012; 2015) would refer to as subjects and objects being 
spoken into being. For instance, the positioning of the police in policy 
is (supposedly) transformed and enacted in practice that produces 
subjects (Ball, 2015). This is also the case for institutional logics.  
The institutional objective of the police is to prevent and intervene 
against violence and crime, hence their target groups are mainly 
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criminal elements. The assertive position of the criminal political 
perspective in policies against CVE and in multiagency organizations 
found in this mapping constructs certain individuals at risk as being 
potential criminals. When following the What’s the Problem 
Represented to be (WPR) approach (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), and 
asking “who is constructed as the problem” and analysing the 
documents, the ones who fall outside of what can be described as the 
“Nordic norm” constitute the main category. This can be found in 
some of the actions and best practises suggested in policy. For instance, 
the Swedish police (Polisen, 2017) recommend that the actors involved 
in intervention and building trust have an interest in other cultures, 
religion and events in the surrounding world. This interest can be 
interpreted as facilitators of a common ground, to reach the “others” 
by having an interest in their culture and religion, supposedly not a 
Nordic culture or the Christian religion.  
The Finnish policies return to aspects of marginalization and exclusion 
from Finnish society as possible drivers for radicalization that can be 
countered. There are also several actions in various policies, suggesting 
the involvement of religious organizations and faith communities, 
which indicate that the problem of extremism has strong connections 
with religious practice. Hence, the problematic individuals that might 
be at risk of radicalization are young, criminal elements of another 
culture and religion (other than the mainstream Nordic culture and 
religion). Thus, through CVE policy, the connection between certain 
individuals and radicalization can be “spoken into being” problematic 
individuals.  
The “problematic individuals” can also be spotted through the 
involvement of civil society organizations and their potential role for 
preventing radicalization. In policy, CSOs are framed as important 
contributors in socially deprived areas and the relatively extensive 
mentioning of religious organizations and faith communities reinforces 
the construction of “the other” as the potential threat. However, 
actions and activities directed by civil society organizations have many 
benefits for CVE efforts. They can provide arenas for young 
individuals where investment, obligations and efforts for participation 
are lower than in the public sector context. They can offer social 
relationships with peers or adults, positive role models and positive 
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alternatives to deleterious milieus. Also, their position as voluntary can 
make them seem more trustworthy than government agencies when it 
comes to offering support and guidance. In line with the WPR 
approach (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), this also indicates that alleged 
root causes for radicalization are a lack of healthy relationships and role 
models and that trust is an issue that needs to be considered in 
preventing radicalization.  
In policy, teachers are sometimes positioned as having a certain 
responsibility to observe, investigate and report at-risk behaviours to 
the police or to social services. Lindekilde (2012) writes that teachers 
are seen as “privileged informants”, as they are in daily contact with 
young people who trust them, which may give them a position that 
intelligence services can never get access to. Even if the responsibility 
to keep students safe, and to report if there are signs of concern for a 
student’s wellbeing is a traditional practice in schools; the observing 
and potential reporting of individuals at risk of radicalization can be a 
somewhat new task for school personnel. These are tasks that 
can produce a surveillance position, or to make use of Foucauldian 
semantics, such tasks give school personnel a panoptic function where 
the few watch the many (Foucault, 1977). In turn, such a function can 
mean that both students and teachers are introduced to new 
relationships and positions where the observing teachers make 
students aware of being watched and that their actions can cause 
unwanted interventions. This can be read as an way in which 
governmentality works, as by enactment of policy, it produces subjects 
who are capable of disciplining themselves in a way that is beneficial 
for the individual as well as for society (Foucault, 1997).  
Previous studies have shown that this have been the case when teachers 
and school personnel are made responsible to observe, detect and 
report suspicious behaviour. Being aware of their actions being 
observed and possibly leading to suspicion and intervention, students 
are reluctant to speak about religion, politics and issues since these have 
been made into sensitive questions (Kühler & Lindekilde 2012; 
Kundnani 2015; O’Donnell, 2015). Even if this can be contested and 
certainly not the case in all schools and circumstances, if such practices 
create a culture of reluctance, they may cause new and more unequal 
relations between teachers and students. These forms of “soft 
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disciplining” can lead to distrust and silencing of issues that students 
find important in their everyday lives. For now, we leave this issue to 
future studies within the HEX-NA project.  
7.3 Policy Legitimacy  
and Mutual Trust 
We now finally return to the introduction of this report, and the point 
of departure for the HEX-NA project as a whole, namely the core 
tenets of the Nordic countries’ governance model: policy legitimacy 
and mutual trust. According to Taylor and Warburton (2003), 
legitimacy is connected to generalized assumptions that the actions of 
a unit are perceived as desirable and appropriate within a social system: 
“This remind us not only that legitimacy is something which is 
bestowed by the external world rather than created by any organization 
but also that it is culturally embedded” (ibid. p.323). This means that 
legitimacy is related to accountability, and to trust. Chaskin (2003) 
defines accountability as the extent to which organizations act and 
speak in reliance on their stated goals and how they can be held 
responsible for their actions.  
Denmark's approach for countering extremism is often put forward as 
a role model for a firm and legitimate way of tackling the issue of 
CVE.  The recent turn in Swedish policies towards a more securitizing 
stance could be a way to ensure policy legitimacy when the public 
discourse is calling for more decisive actions.  The multiagency 
approaches for handling extremism can potentially enhance policy 
legitimacy, provided that actions and objectives are regarded as 
appropriate and desirable for handling the problem with extremism 
and radicalization. Of course, this is also the case if multiagency 
approaches and the utilization of mixed logics can be proven effective 
for handling extremism. However, there might be some internal 
institutional conflicts that present obstacles for attaining such 
legitimacy, especially if there are uncertainties about legal frameworks.  
If the hegemonic policing discourse is assumed to be appropriate and 
successful in handling the problem, it can earn legitimacy and create 
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trust among citizens. Such trust can be brought into and enrich the 
multiagency work. On the other hand, the incorporation of a policing 
discourse in schools and social services might seem inappropriate for 
the actors involved. This can delegitimize policy and create distrust 
among the individuals who are affected by the practice. In reference to 
this, there are reasons to be aware of the need for balancing 
perspectives and institutional logics.   
On this note, it is also relevant to mention civil society organizations 
and their elevated position in policy as an actor that can provide trust. 
As much as multiagency work can utilize CSOs in their preventive and 
intervention efforts, there is a risk that too much tapping into their 
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